United States v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 01 January 1886
• Citation: 29 F. 503
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. JACKSON.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

29 F. 503

UNITED STATES v. JACKSON.

United States Circuit Court, S.D. Georgia, Western Division.

October Term, 1886

(Syllabus by the Court.)

In criminal trials simply, a preponderance of testimony is insufficient. A greater degree of mental conviction than in civil cases is held to be necessary, and the evidence must produce such an effect on the mind of the individual juror that, after its consideration, he can, in view of his oath have no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the party accused before a conviction is justified. ^[1]

The flight of the accused under an assumed name, coincident with the theft of letters traced to his possession unexplained tends strongly to show guilt.

When the indictment alleges ownership in the person to whom a registered letter was directed, and it appears in proof that when it was stolen the sender had deposited it with the postmaster, taking his receipt therefor, and it had, by due course of mail, left the mailing office, held, that its custody by the post-office department was for the benefit of the person to whom it was addressed; that it was his property, the sender had no control over it, and there was no variance.

In a criminal trial the good character of the accused is generally a fact fit, like all other facts proved in the cause, to be weighed and estimated by the jury, for it may render that doubtful which otherwise would be clear.

If the guilt of the accused is plainly proven to the satisfaction of the jury, notwithstanding proof of good character is made and has been given its due weight, it would be their duty to convict, irrespective of such proof of character; but, where the evidence is doubtful and conflicting, the importance of the character of the accused is increased.

DuPont Guerry, U.S. Atty., for the United States.

Hawkins & Hawkins, C. G. Simmons, and L. J. Blalock, for defendant.

SPEER J., (charging jury.)

Will R. Jackson is on trial charged with the offense of robbing the mails. The statute he is alleged to have violated defines the offense.

In this trial, as in all criminal prosecutions, the burden and duty is on the government to produce such evidence of the truthfulness of the accusation as will satisfy the jury that the defendant is guilty.

The degree of satisfaction and certainty required is not absolute conviction or certainty, but the evidence must produce that effect on the minds of the individual juror that, after its consideration, he can, in view of his oath, have no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the party accused. By 'reasonable doubt' I do not mean any fanciful conjecture, or strained inference, but I mean such a doubt as a reasonable man would act upon, or decline to act upon, when his own concerns were involved,-- a doubt for which a good reason can be given, which reason must be based on the evidence, or the want of evidence. This being true, it follows, logically, that the party accused, where such doubt as I have described exists, is entitled to its benefit,-- he should be acquitted.

But where the evidence is satisfactory to the impartial minds that the crime was committed; that the prisoner committed it as charged,-- when the mind comes naturally and reasonably to this conclusion, from a fair consideration of the evidence,-- properly there can be no reasonable doubt, and the prisoner should be convicted. The same idea is expressed in another form when it is declared, as I now declare to you, that the prisoner is entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt, by proof, is made satisfactorily to appear. When such proof is had, the presumption of innocence is destroyed, and the prisoner should be convicted.

The following written requests to charge have been handed the court by counsel for the defendant, and I now charge you--

'(1) That, in a criminal case, a preponderance of testimony is insufficient to convict the accused, but a greater strength of mental conviction is held necessary to justify a verdict of guilty; and if there is any other reasonable hypothesis than the guilt of the defendant, from the evidence, or from the want of evidence, you are bound to adopt that theory, and acquit the defendant.

'(2) That the government is bound to prove every material allegation laid in the indictment; and, before the jury will be authorized to convict the prisoner under this indictment, you must be satisfied, from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the money alleged to have been stolen was the property of the person alleged to be the owner in the indictment.

'(3) Where the evidence relied upon to convict is entirely circumstantial, the evidence must connect the defendant with the criminal act charged, and exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than the guilt of the defendant, before you will be authorized to find the prisoner guilty. The defendant is presumed to be innocent, and that presumption abides with him throughout the trial, and until removed by testimony satisfactory to the minds and consciences of the jury.'

Bearing in mind these general rules given to you for your guidance in the determination of this issue, you will come to the consideration of the evidence. It is not disputed that on the first day of October, 1885, the accused was the assistant postmaster at Americus, in this district and division. He was an employee of the postal service. On that night he receipted for five registered packets, mailed from divers places to such points as, by due course of mail, they must go through the post-office at Americus. His receipts for these packets have been introduced in evidence, and his signature identified. It further appears from the evidence that the parties to whom these registered packets were directed have never received them; that careful search was made for them in the Americus office. No account is had of these packets after they reached the hand of the accused. The accused made no record of them, as he was required to do, and he disappeared that night, and left the state, under an assumed name.

These are circumstances which, under the law, demand an explanation from the accused, or that such explanation be furnished by the facts of the case. In the absence of such explanation, if you find that the letters were stolen, these circumstances would raise the presumption that the accused was implicated in their disappearance. You will look to the evidence to see if such satisfactory explanation is afforded. If there be no such explanation properly inferable from the evidence, you will be justified in returning a verdict convicting the prisoner. If you find, on the other hand, from the evidence, that these circumstances have been satisfactorily explained, or that in themselves they are reasonable consistent with the theory of the innocence of the accused, it will be your duty to acquit him. In reaching your conclusion on this question, it is your duty to consider the testimony of the accused himself. By the humanity of the law, he is permitted to testify in his own favor. You are not bound to believe what he says, however, and you must bear in mind that he has great interest in your finding; and if his testimony conflicts with that of other witnesses, who have no interest in the question of his guilt or innocence, generally it would be your duty to credit that witness or those witnesses who have the best opportunity for knowing the fact to which they testify, and the least inducement, from interest or other cause, to testify falsely. You may, however, give to the testimony of the accused himself just such weight as you think it is properly entitled to have.

It is not denied that the accused disappeared from Americus contemporaneously with the disappearance of these registered letters; that is to say, as the prosecution insists, on the night of October 1st. He himself says that the receipts were made out on the 2nd, but that the letters were registered or dated on the 1st. If you...