United States v. Jackson, CR 10-199
| Decision Date | 11 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | CR 10-199,CV 18-676 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. DOMINIQUE JACKSON |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
SYNOPSIS
In this action, on March 21, 2014, a jury convicted Defendant of one Count of violating 21 U.S.C. § 846. On July 7, 2014, Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 135 months, which was later reduced to 120 months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). The Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant filed a pro se Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and following notice pursuant to United States v. Miller, 197 F. 3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999), he filed an Amended Motion to Vacate. Therein, he raises a wide variety of issues related to the effective assistance of counsel, including the failure to seek my recusal and trial counsel's alleged conflict of interest. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion will be denied, and no certificate of appealability shall issue.
OPINIONRelief is available under Section 2255 only under exceptional circumstances, when the claimed errors of law are "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice," or "an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962). A district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing on a Section 2255 motion if the motion, files, and records show conclusively that the defendant is not entitled to relief. United States v. Ritter, 93 Fed. Appx. 402 (3d Cir. 2004). "To progress to an evidentiary hearing, a habeas petitioner must do more than proffer gauzy generalities or drop self-serving hints that a constitutional violation lurks in the wings"; as a result, vague and conclusory allegations do not justify a hearing. David v. United States, 134 F.3d 470, 478 (1st Cir. 1998). Further, pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, and I have considered Defendant's submissions accordingly. See United States v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 334 (3d Cir. 2007). In this case, a hearing is unnecessary, and the Motion will be disposed of on the record.
A. Pertinent Background
As Defendant acknowledges, this case involved serial representation by numerous defense attorneys. Initially, Patrick Livingston was appointed to represent Defendant at his initial appearance. Defendant then retained James Wymard, and the Court permitted Mr. Livingston to withdraw as counsel. At a hearing on January 3, 2012, Defendant requested the appointment of new counsel, and the Court granted his request. James Donohue was then appointed to represent Defendant. On January 28, 2013, Defendant filed a pro se Motion seeking to terminate Mr. Donohue's representation, expressing dissatisfaction for a variety of reasons. The Court granted Defendant's request, and appointed Christopher Capozzi as counsel. Mr. Capozzi later sought, and received, permission to withdraw from the case due to a conflict of interest. The Court then appointed William McCabe. Subsequently, Marcus Sidoti and Bret Jordan were retained, and Mr. McCabe withdrew as counsel as a result.
Soon afterwards, Messrs. Sidoti and Jordan moved to withdraw as counsel, citing irreconcilable differences and asserting that Defendant had terminated the attorney/client relationship. The Court initially denied the request, and a conference was held on September 13,2013. At that time, the Court granted the attorneys' Motion to withdraw; Defendant advised that he did not want to proceed pro se, and the Court advised him that this would be his final appointment of counsel.
Subsequently, James Brink was appointed to represent Defendant. At Mr. Brink's request, Mr. Brink and Defendant participated in a status conference held on October 22, 2013. Mr. Brink subsequently withdrew as counsel, and Attorney Michael Cheselka was then appointed to represent Defendant. On the eve of trial, Defendant filed a pro se Motion to terminate Mr. Cheselka's representation. In his Motion, Defendant cited a complete breakdown in communication, and recited multiple avenues that he wished counsel to take, that counsel had not taken. The Court denied the Motion, by Memorandum Opinion dated March 14, 2014 ("March 14 Opinion"). Therein, the Court stated as follows:
Mr. Jackson has cycled through nine experienced and competent attorneys, both appointed and retained. Defendant has been dissatisfied with prior counsel for reasons similar to those he raises now, with yet another lawyer. He cannot, however, force his attorney to present a defense with which the attorney does not agree, or repeatedly acquire new counsel until he finds one who agrees with him...The superseding indictment in this case was filed in 2010, and this matter has been continued multiple times at the request of the defense. I have repeatedly warned Defendant that there would be no further continuances, and that there are limits to changes of counsel...I find that Defendant's objections to current counsel do not constitute good cause requiring substitution of counsel.
March 14 Opinion, pp. 2-3 (citation omitted).
Trial proceeded beginning on March 17, 2014, with Mr. Cheselka as counsel. Following the jury's verdict, Defendant again filed a pro se Motion to have Mr. Cheselka withdrawn as counsel. Subsequently, Blaine Jones was appointed to represent Defendant. Prior to sentencing, citing irreconcilable differences, Mr. Jones then sought to withdraw as counsel. The Court denied the Motion. Following sentencing proceedings, Mr. Jones sought, and was granted, leave towithdraw as counsel. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions in this Court.
As a preliminary matter, I note that the entirety of Defendant's Motion rests on his conviction, which it is apparent he holds deeply, that this Court and all counsel interfered with his autonomy, in terms of his ability to control trial strategy.
I. Conduct of the Court
In support of his position that the Court so interfered, Defendant cites to the principles enunciated in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975), and its progeny. Faretta "merely stands for the proposition that, after a defendant has clearly requested the opportunity to represent himself, a district court is obligated to explain his right to self-representation and to ensure that his decision to forego counsel is made knowingly and intelligently with awareness of the attendant consequences of that decision." United States v. Reed, No. 06-193, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2013).
Accordingly, "[t]he Sixth Amendment right to choose one's own counsel is circumscribed in several important respects." Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988). Relatedly, it is clear that under the law, the concept of a right to counsel of choice differs from the right to effective counsel. United States v. Jennings, 855 F. Supp. 1427, 1441 (M.D. Pa. 1994). Indeed, "[t]he right to counsel does not include more than the right to representation by competent counsel at trial." Siers v. Ryan, 773F.2d 37, 44 (3d Cir. 1985). The Sixth Amendment provides the right to "reasonably effective" assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This right, it has been said, "must at times give way to the need for the fair and efficient administration of justice." United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 1982).
Such a time arose in the case at bar, in which the Court accommodated multiple attorney changes due to Defendant's disagreements with his counsel, until the point at which Defendant's dissatisfaction posed an unreasonable threat of disrupting fair and efficient administration of justice. In these proceedings, the Court discussed with Defendant the option of proceeding pro se, and Defendant did not express a desire to do so; instead and multiple times, he sought different counsel, both retained and appointed. Defendant expressly and repeatedly stated that he did not wish to represent himself, and advised that he did not intend to retain counsel; he requested appointed counsel, and the Court repeatedly acceded to that request. The Court made clear to Defendant that he would, as well, be permitted to retain counsel. Patently, counsel was not forced upon Defendant in violation of Defendant's right to act on his own behalf in court, and Faretta is inapplicable here.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant further suggests that counsels' conduct was ineffective because it violated his authority to make decisions in his case, in that counsel failed to follow Defendant's wishes regarding strategy. In the context of an ineffective assistance claim, a court should be "highly deferential" when evaluating an attorney's conduct; there is a "strong presumption" that the attorney's performance was reasonable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). "It is...only the rare claim of ineffectiveness of counsel that should succeed under the properly deferential standard to be applied in scrutinizing counsel'sperformance." United States v. Gray, 878 F. 2d 702, 711 (3d Cir. 1989). To demonstrate ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency caused him prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
To show deficient performance under Strickland's first prong, a defendant must demonstrate that his attorney's performance fell below "the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 687. With respect to the prejudice prong, the...
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