United States v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 05 February 1906
• Docket Number: 1,253.,1,251
• Parties: UNITED STATES et al. v. JACKSON. SAME v. McKERRACHER.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

143 F. 783

UNITED STATES et al. v. JACKSON.

SAME v. McKERRACHER.

Nos. 1,251, 1,253.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

February 5, 1906

Jesse A. Frye, U.S. Atty., Alfred E. Gardner, Asst. U.S. Atty (Edward E. Cushman, Special Asst. to Atty. Gen., of counsel) for appellants.

Richard Saxe Jones and Wm. H. Brinker, for appellee Jackson.

J. B Metcalfe and John S. Jurey, for appellee McKerracher.

Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and HAWLEY, District Judge.

HAWLEY District Judge.

These appeals present the same question and will be considered together. The appellees were prisoners confined in the United States penitentiary on McNeil's Island in the state of Washington, and petitioned the court below for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that under the laws of the United States they had fully served their time, and were entitled to be discharged. Appellee Jackson was convicted in the District Court of Alaska of the crime of attempting to commit murder and on the 6th day of January, 1899, was sentenced to a period of 10 years in said penitentiary. He arrived at the penitentiary January 13, 1899. Appellee McKerracher was convicted for a violation of the national banking laws in the United States court at Seattle, Wash., and on the 14th day of January, 1902, was sentenced to the penitentiary for a period of five years. He arrived at the penitentiary on January 15, 1902. Both of the appellees fully complied with the rules of the penitentiary during their imprisonment therein. The court issued the writ and held that under the act of Congress passed June 21, 1902 (chapter 1140, 32 Stat. 397 (U.S.Comp.St.Supp. 1905, p. 731)), the petitioners had fully served the time for which they were sentenced, and ordered them discharged. From these orders the appeals herein are taken.

This law reads as follows:

'An act to regulate commutation for good conduct for United States Prisoners. * * * That each prisoner who has been or shall hereafter be convicted of any offense against the laws of the United States, and is confined, in execution of the judgment or sentence upon any such conviction, in any United States penitentiary or jail, or in any penitentiary, prison, or jail of any state or territory, for a definite term, other than for life, whose record of conduct shows that he has faithfully observed all the rules and has not been subjected to punishment, shall be entitled to a deduction from the term of his sentence to be estimated as follows, commencing on the first day of his arrival at the penitentiary, prison, or jail: Upon a sentence of not less than six months nor more than one year, five days for each month; upon a sentence of more than one year and less than three years, six days for each month; upon a sentence of not less than three years and less than five years, seven days for each month; upon a sentence of not less than five years and less than ten years, eight days for each month; upon a sentence of ten years or more, ten days for each month. When a prisoner has two or more sentences, the aggregate of his several sentences shall be the basis upon which his deduction shall be estimated.

'Sec. 2. That in the case of convicts in any United States penitentiary, the Attorney General shall have the power to restore to any such convict who has heretofore or may hereafter forfeit any good time by violating any existing law or regulation such portion of lost good time as may be proper, in his judgment, upon recommendations and evidence submitted to him by the warden in charge. Restoration, in the case of United States convicts confined in state and territorial institutions, shall be regulated in accordance with the rules governing such institutions, respectively.

'Sec. 3. That this act shall take effect and be in force from and after thirty days from the date of its approval, and shall apply to sentences imposed by courts subsequent to the time that this act takes effect, as hereinbefore provided. Prisoners serving under any sentence imposed prior to such time shall be entitled and receive the commutation heretofore allowed under existing laws. Such existing laws are hereby repealed as to all sentences imposed subsequent to the time when this act takes effect.'

Did the court err in its construction of this act, and in discharging appellees from the custody of the marshal? The vital question to be decided is whether the act in its entirety applies to all federal prisoners, to those convicted and sentenced before the passage of the act, as well as to those convicted and sentenced after its passage. Is there an irreconcilable conflict between sections 1 and 3 of the act, and, if so, which section must prevail?

The fundamental rule in the construction of statutes is to ascertain the intention of the lawmakers. It is only in statutes of doubtful meaning that courts are authorized to indulge conjectures as to the intention of the Legislature, or to look to consequences in the construction of the law. When the meaning is plain the act must be carried into effect. Another canon of construction is that every part of a statute must be viewed in connection with the whole, so as to make all the parts harmonious, if practicable, and to give a sensible and intelligible effect to each; nor should it ever be presumed that the Legislature meant that any part of a statute should be without meaning or without force and effect. The act itself must be presumed to speak the will of Congress, and this is to be ascertained, if it can be, from the language used. It is the duty of the courts to examine the language of the act and ascertain its object and purpose. We are of opinion that from the whole act it is manifest that Congress intended that its provisions should apply to the future, not to the past.

The question as to the proper construction of this act has been decided in four cases. The Circuit Court of New York, in Re Walters, 128 F. 792, held that the act did not apply to prisoners sentenced before the enactment of the law. The District Court of Vermont, in Re Farrar, 133 F. 254, held that the first section of the act was controlling, and that it applied to all prisoners, whether sentenced before or after the enactment of the law. An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and that court reversed the order made by Judge Wheeler, and held that the act did not apply to prisoners sentenced before its passage. United States v. Farrar, 139 F. 260.

In the present case Judge Hanford held that the act did apply to the appellees, who had been convicted and sentenced prior to the passage of the act, and ordered the prisoners discharged. In so ruling we think the learned judge erred.

Appellants claim that the words 'has been or' and 'is,' as used in the first section, were inserted upon the theory that there would probably be prisoners convicted before the act became operative, but not sentenced until after the act took effect, and that these words were used so as to prevent any uncertainty as to the applicability of the law to such prisoners. It frequently happens from various causes that considerable time elapses between the conviction and the sentence, and it is not unreasonable to presume, in the light afforded by the entire section, that these words were intended to apply to such cases. Of course, if this construction is given to the words, it would make the entire act harmonious. Courts should search out and follow the true intent of Congress, and adopt 'the sense of the words which harmonizes best with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and object of the legislation. ' United States v. Winn, 3 Sumn. 209, Fed. Cas. No. 16,740; United States v. One Raft of Timber (C.C.) 13 F. 796; The Lizzie Henderson (D.C.) 20 F. 524, 529; United States v. Ellis (D.C.) 51 F. 808, 810; United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628, 10 Sup.Ct. 625, 33 L.Ed. 1080; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 480, 19 Sup.Ct. 722, 43 L.Ed. 1041.

Appellees claim that there is an irreconcilable conflict between sections 1 and 3. It will be observed that, if the words 'has been or' and 'is' were eliminated from section 1, the statute in all its sections would be absolutely clear and entirely harmonious. By a literal construction of those words, section 1 might, if standing by itself, be construed to apply to all prisoners who had been convicted and sentenced prior to the passage of the act, as well as to the prisoners convicted and sentenced after its passage. And if that was the intention of Congress, there was no necessity of inserting the third section. It would be entirely useless. Sections 1 and 2, standing by themselves would be perfect and complete. They would represent the views contended for by appellees, and to give force and effect to these views section 3 would have to be entirely ignored. This would lead to an utter absurdity under the rules of construction which have been heretofore stated. Congress, in enacting section 1, clearly intended to define and fix the deductions from sentences for compliance with the rules of the prison and good behavior of prisoners. This was the main object and intent of the section, but incidental thereto the words 'has been or' and 'is' were used, which constitute the conflict in the sections. Section 2 of the act simply directs how good time lost by the prisoner for failing to comply with the prison rules may be restored. Section 3 fixes the time when the act shall go into effect, and specifies the prisoners who will be entitled to the benefits of the act, and also the class of prisoners to whom the act shall not apply. This being true, how can it be said that Congress intended that no force or meaning whatever should be given to...