United States v. Ellis

• Decision Date: 06 July 1892
• Citation: 51 F. 808
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. ELLIS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas

51 F. 808

UNITED STATES v. ELLIS.

United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas.

July 6, 1892

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Section 2139, Rev. St., provides that 'every person who * * * introduces, or attempts to introduce, any spirituous liquors or wine into the Indian country shall be punishable,' etc. According to the true sense of the words 'spirituous liquor,' as used in this statute, lager beer is comprehended by its terms, and it is spirituous liquor, and its introduction into the Indian country was intended by the statute to be prohibited, and the words 'spirituous liquor' are comprehensive enough to embrace lager beer.

It is true there can be no constructive offenses, and penal laws are to be construed strictly; yet they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The true rule in the construction of all statutes is to search out and follow the true intent of the legislature, and to adopt the sense of the words which harmonizes best with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. Courts, in the construction of penal statutes, will give them a fair and reasonable construction, according to the legislative intent expressed in the enactment. They will upon the one hand, refuse to extend the punishment to cases which are not clearly embraced in them, and, on the other they will equally refuse, by any mere verbal nicety, forced constructions, or equitable interpretation, to exonerate parties plainly within their scope.

Wm. H H. Clayton, U.S. Dist. Atty.

Frederick & Rutherford and J. B. Forrester, for defendant.

PARKER District Judge, (orally charging the jury.)

The indictment in this case charges that the defendant on the 1st day of January, A.D. 1892, in the Choctaw Nation, Indian country, within the western district of Arkansas, did then and there unlawfully introduce into the Indian country, in said district, spirituous and intoxicating liquors, to wit, 10 gallons of lager beer, contrary to the form of the statutes, etc. The indictment was drawn under section 2139 of the General Statutes of the United States, which provides, first, 'that no ardent spirits shall be introduced under any pretense into the Indian country;' 'that every person who sells, exchanges, gives, barters, or disposes of any spirituous liquors or wine to any Indian under the charge of any Indian superintendent or agent, or introduces or attempts to introduce any spirituous liquor or wine into the Indian country, shall be punishable by imprisonment,' etc. This statute was enacted on the 9th day of July, 1832,-- 60 years ago day after to-morrow, if I am not mistaken. It is a section of the law that, in my judgment, is to be construed in the light of contemporaneous history, in the light of the condition of things then and the condition of things now. In order that we may get at the purpose of the congress of the United States in enacting this statute, and that we may interpret-- not construe-- the words used, (because I do not think there is any ground for construction, but that it is simply a question of interpretation that arises out of the statute,) we have the right to apply the rules that are prescribed by the highest court of the country to be used in the interpretation, or construction, if you please, of statutes. In the first place, as I said to the grand jury, (and I have a right to tell you this, because it is a matter of public history, and therefore a matter that the court takes judicial notice of,) one of the great objections on the part of these people to being removed from their homes in the older states, where there was a higher civilization surrounding them than there would be out in this then wild country, was that it was a frontier country,-- a country that had to be settled by the pioneer,-- where police regulations were not so effective as they would be in older states; and that caused them to ask that the government of the United States should pledge them security and protection in their new homes, if they consented to go. Intoxicating liquor was one of the things that they recognized as the greatest evil to them and their people; and that this court takes judicial notice of, because it is a part of public history; one of the greatest evils, I say, because it has swept whole tribes out of existence. There are a few left of the Delaware tribe up in this Indian country. That tribe was at one time one of the most powerful people of that race upon the continent, and they have been swept out of existence to a great extent owing to the use of intoxicants brought to them and given to them in order to steal from them their rights by the white men. There is now left of that powerful tribe of people only about 400. The wise and good men who were the leaders of these Indian people knew the baneful influence of this destructive power of drink, and they asked that the government of the United States should not only say in its treaties that they should be protected,-- they and their young men, and their people generally,-- but that laws should be enacted making it a penalty upon the part of the white man, or the Indian man, or any other man, to introduce into that country that which would destroy them. And my Brother KNOWLES is right when he says in the Montana case, In re McDonough, 49 F. 360, that the manifest purpose of this statute was to prevent intoxication. If that position be correct, we have the key which opens the way to the correct interpretation of this law. Wherever we may find that which produces intoxication, if that substance comes within the definition of spirituous liquors, we have that which has been prohibited, and which has been said by the statute shall not be introduced. The words 'ardent' and 'spirituous' are used indiscriminately as having the same meaning. If not, the section becomes nonsense. Why would the congress of the United States expressly prohibit for any purpose the introduction as to any other class of liquors that did not comprehend ardent spirits? That would be foolish. We are never to construe a law as nonsense when it can be avoided, but we are, rather, to construe all of its terms as having force. There is no trouble about the rule for the construction of statutes. The supreme court of the United States, almost every year of its existence, has had that question before it, and very recently it has given us rules for the interpretation not only of ordinary statutes, but penal statutes as well. Then, manifestly, if the object intended by this statute was to prevent the destruction of Indians by drunkenness, as well as to prevent the commission of crimes which invariably follow as the consequence of drunkenness and debauchery in a country where the police regulations are limited, it should be construed so as to give effect to the object designed, and to that end all its provisions must be examined in the light of surrounding circumstances. This has been very recently declared to be the correct rule of construction laid down in the case of In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 11 S.Ct. 897. This whole doctrine with regard to the construction of statutes, and especially penal statutes, has been laid down by the supreme court of the United States in the case of U.S. v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 10 S.Ct. 625, wherein it is said:

'As contended on behalf of the defendant, there can be no constructive offenses, and, before a man can be punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute. But though penal laws are to be construed strictly, yet the intention of the legislature must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes, and they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. U.S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat, 76; U.S. v. Morris, 14 Pet. 464; American Fur Co. v. U.S., 2 Pet. 358, 367. ' It appears to me,' said Mr. Justice STORY, in U.S. v. Winn, 3 Sumn. 209, 211, 'that the proper course in all these cases is to search out and follow the true intent of the legislature, and to adopt that sense of the words which harmonizes best with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.''

The object of the statute certainly was to prevent drunkenness, and to protect these people against drunkenness and debauchery, such as you have heard described by the witnesses in this case, and such as come to the knowledge of this court and this jury as having produced death in that country within the last 10 days in more than one case. The manifest purpose of the legislature was to prevent this.

'To the same effect is the statement of Mr. Sedgwick, in his work on Statutory and Constitutional Law, (2d Ed.) 282: 'The rule that statutes of this class are to be construed strictly is far from being a rigid or unbending one; or, rather, it has in modern times been so modified and explained away as to mean little more than that penal provisions, like all others are to be fairly construed according to the legislative intent as expressed in the enactment; the courts refusing, on the one hand, to extend the punishment to cases which are clearly embraced in them, and, on the other, equally refusing, by any mere verbal nicety, forced construction, or equitable interpretation, to exonerate parties plainly within their scope.' This passage is quoted by Baron BRAMWELL in Attorney General v. Sillem, 2 Hurl.& C. 532, as one 'in which good sense, force, and propriety of language are equally conspicuous, and which is amply borne out by the authorities, English and American, which he cites.' Foley v. Fletcher, 28 Law J.Exch. 100, 106; Nicholson v. Fields, 31 Law J.Exch. 233; Hardc. St. Law, p. 251. And the reason for the less...