United States v. Jacques

• Decision Date: 11 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–1016.,12–1016.
• Citation: 744 F.3d 804
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Michael JACQUES, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

744 F.3d 804

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.Michael JACQUES, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 12–1016.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

March 11, 2014.

Brian J. Kelly, by appointment of the court, for appellant.

Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, SOUTER,^* Associate Justice, and SELYA, Circuit Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

Following a seven-hour interrogation in which he confessed participating in the arson of an African–American church, Michael Jacques was convicted in federal court of conspiracy against civil rights, damage to religious real property, and the use of a fire to commit a felony. On appeal, Jacques argues that the district court erred in admitting his statements into evidence because agents obtained his confession through coercive means and in violation of his right to prompt presentment. For the reasons below, we affirm.

I. Facts and Background

On the morning of November 5, 2008, hours after Barack Obama was elected to be the next President of the United States, the Macedonia Church of God in Christ in Springfield, Massachusetts, burned to the ground. Still in the middle of construction, the church was being built for a predominantly African–American congregation. It was approximately 75% complete at the time of the fire.

The National Response Team for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) concluded that the fire was deliberately set and that gasoline had been used to ignite the building. It subsequently convened a joint task force with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Springfield Police Department, and the Massachusetts State Police (MSP) to investigate the incident. When a civilian witness notified investigators of two men boasting about their involvement in the church arson, the task force homed in its investigation on Benjamin Haskell and Michael Jacques.

Soon after receiving the tip, law enforcement officials arranged to have the civilian witness introduce Haskell to undercover State Trooper Henot Rivera. Working under the name “José,” Trooper Rivera made three controlled purchases of narcotics from Haskell, one of which turned out to be a fake bag of heroin. “José” then told Haskell that he could compensate for the botched drug deal by helping with a purported insurance scam-specifically, by burning down a house in Springfield and an abandoned property in Holyoke, Massachusetts. On January 14, 2009, while driving to Holyoke to survey the alleged arson site, “José” encouraged Haskell to describe his credentials as an arsonist. In a recorded conversation, Haskell confided to Trooper Rivera that he and Jacques had committed the church arson in November. Armed with these statements, law enforcement officials intervened and transported Haskell to a police interview room, where he confessed to committing the church arson with the help of Jacques and two other individuals. Haskell agreed to cooperate in the continued investigation of the church fire.

The following evening, January 15, 2009, the task force coordinated a meeting between Haskell, Jacques, and Trooper Rivera, in which “José” invited Jacques to join the insurance scam. Both in the presence of Trooper Rivera and during a private conversation with Haskell, Jacques made incriminating statements concerning his involvement in the church arson. Jacques's statements were caught on tape by the task force, which then detained Jacques and transported him to an interview room for questioning.

Jacques arrived at the MSP's offices in Springfield and was escorted by agents from the vehicle at 7:16 p.m. His questioning commenced at approximately 7:20 p.m., when he knowingly waived his Miranda rights. Jacques's interrogation lasted approximately six hours and thirty minutes and was videotaped in its entirety.

The interrogation was conducted primarily by State Trooper Michael Mazza, although FBI Special Agent Ian Smythe was present during the first hours and again toward the end of the questioning. Over the course of the interview, Mazza and Smythe employed various interrogation tactics from the “Reid technique.” ¹ They exaggerated the strength of the evidence against Jacques, misrepresented the involvement of high-profile federal agents in the case, minimized the magnitude of Jacques's alleged criminal conduct, interrupted Jacques's attempts to deny his guilt, and suggested that Jacques's continued resistance would subject him to more damning media coverage. Repeatedly, the agents informed Jacques that an honest confession might lead to softer treatment by the prosecutor and the sentencing judge, while a failure to cooperate was likely to result in the maximum sentence. They also remarked on the failing health of Jacques's elderly father, suggesting that continued resistance might deprive Jacques of crucial years with his family.

Throughout the interview, Jacques was permitted to take bathroom, water, and cigarette breaks upon request. Having previously faced charges on several criminal matters, Jacques was also aware of his right to ask for the interrogation to cease, although at no point did he do so. He did, however, continue to deny his involvement in the fire throughout the interrogation, claiming that his incriminating statements to the undercover trooper were merely an attempt to make himself “look bigger.”

At 1:17 a.m., just under six hours from the time Jacques's interrogation began and just over six hours from the time he was taken into custody, Mazza asked Jacques to “sign something for [him] real quick” and handed Jacques a waiver of his right to prompt presentment. Mazza read the document aloud and explained the requirement that a defendant must be arraigned within six hours of detention. When Jacques asked Mazza to clarify precisely what he was signing, Mazza replied that the document meant that “you don't want the questioning to stop and be brought to court or anything like that, that you're willing to still talk to me.” Jacques signed the document at roughly 1:20 a.m. Approximately half an hour later, Jacques took another cigarette break. When he returned to the interrogation room at around 1:45 a.m., Jacques admitted his involvement in the church arson. Jacques explained that he chose to confess because Mazza had “proved” the charges and “w[as] honest to me.”

Jacques was arraigned later that morning. He was ultimately charged with conspiracy against civil rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, damage or destruction to religious real property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 247(c), and use of a fire to commit a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1).

Following his arraignment, Jacques moved to suppress the incriminating statements made in his confession. Jacques argued that the confession was involuntary because the agents' coercive tactics had overborne his will and that his waiver of his right of presentment was neither timely nor knowing under federal law. The district court took in abundant briefing and numerous days of testimony, during which Jacques testified, among other things, that he understood the nature of his right to presentment and waived that right to “have a chance to continue explaining” his innocence, “rather than going into court right away and being charged with a crime.” The district court ultimately denied the motion to suppress. On April 14, 2011, Jacques was convicted by a jury of all three charges. On May 9, 2011, the district court issued a memorandum explaining its ruling on Jacques's motion to suppress.

Jacques now appeals to this court.

II. Discussion

In considering a challenge to a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review the court's legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Mejía, 600 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.2010). The voluntariness of a defendant's confession is a question of law meriting de novo review. United States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 438 (1st Cir.2011).

A. Coercive Interrogation

The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination prohibits courts from admitting into evidence a defendant's involuntary confession. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). In assessing whether a confession is voluntary, courts must inquire “whether the will of the defendant had been overborne so that the statement was not his free and voluntary act.” Bryant v. Vose, 785 F.2d 364, 367–68 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 453, 91 S.Ct. 485, 27 L.Ed.2d 524 (1971)). We determine the voluntary nature of the statements by considering “the totality of the circumstances, including both the nature of the police activity and the defendant's situation.” Hughes, 640 F.3d at 438. Relevant considerations include the length and nature of the questioning, promises or threats made by investigators, and any deprivation of the suspect's essential needs. Id. They also include the defendant's personal circumstances, including his age, education, intelligence, and mental condition, id., as well as his prior experience with the criminal justice system, see United States v. Jackson, 608 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir.2010); United States v. Rojas–Tapia, 446 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2006). A defendant's calm demeanor and the lucidity of his statements weigh in favor of finding his confession voluntary. Rojas–Tapia, 446 F.3d at 8.

Numerous facts in the record indicate that Jacques provided his confession knowingly and voluntarily. A defendant in multiple criminal matters in the past, Jacques was experienced with the justice system. Throughout the interrogation and his subsequent confession, Jacques remained calm and provided a level-headed account of his involvement in the arson. His decision to confess was not a sudden or immediate response to any of the agents' questions or threats, indicating the agents' coercive...