United States v. Jakits
| Docket Number | 2:22-CR-194 |
| Decision Date | 02 May 2023 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. BERNHARD JAKITS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
This matter is before the Court on:
On October 11, 2022, the Grand Jury returned an eight-count indictment against Bernhard Jakits. (ECF No. 4). This indictment was superseded January 17, 2023. (ECF No. 46.) The superseding indictment included nine counts: Counts One and Two allege sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e); Counts Three and Four allege attempted sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of the same, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e); Counts Five and Six allege attempted coercion or enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); Counts Seven alleges the making an interstate notice for child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(d)(1)(B) and (e); Count Eight alleges the receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), and (b)(1); and Count Nine is transportation of obscene matters in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 1462(a).
Defendant filed a motion requesting severance of Count Nine (ECF No 58), which was opposed by the government (ECF No. 65). This Court granted Defendant's request (ECF No. 75), leaving Counts One through Eight as part of the first trial scheduled against Mr. Jakits.
Preliminary questions relating to the admissibility of evidence may be raised pretrial with the Court via a motion in limine. See Fed.R.Evid. 104(a); Compton v. Kolvoord, No. 92-3214, 1993 WL 141063, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 1993). Although neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly authorize a court to rule on an evidentiary motion in limine, the United States Supreme Court has noted that the practice of such motions “has developed pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” Luce v. U.S., 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); In re. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. C-8 Personal Injury Litigation, No. 2:13-CV-1103, 2016 WL 3064124, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 30, 2016)).). The purpose of a motion in limine is to allow a court to rule on issues pertaining to evidence in advance of trial, to avoid delay and ensure an evenhanded and expeditious trial. See Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
To obtain the exclusion of evidence, a party must prove that the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. Id. “Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” Ind. Ins. Co. at 846; In re. E.I. Du Pont, 2016 WL 3064124, at *2.
Evidence is not admissible if it is irrelevant. See Fed.R.Evid. 401, 402. To establish the relevance of a particular matter, the evidence must affect the “probability of the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. Further, even potentially relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 403.
District courts also frequently grant motions in limine to prevent the introduction of improper character evidence at trial. See Fed.R.Evid. 402, 403, 404, 608, and 609; U.S. v. Stout, 509 F.3d 796, 797 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming grant of motion in limine suppressing prior bad acts evidence); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shuler, No. 94-5329, 1995 WL 258139, *4 (6th Cir. May 2, 1995) (); Randolph v. Ohio, Dept. of Youth Servs., No. C2- 01-1253, 2007 WL 2852356, *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2007) (granting motion in limine excluding improper character evidence); Ross v. American Red Cross, No. 2:09-cv- 00905-GLF-MRA, 2012 WL 2004810, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 5, 2012) ().
The Court will consider the government's three motions in limine motions seriatim.
The United States seeks direction on the manner in which victims are identified at trial. The government proposes “the adult victim” who is identified by her initials in the Superseding Indictment, be identified “only by her first name and the first initial of her last name, specifically Ashley M.” (ECF No. 83, at 1). And that “[t]he minor victims referred to in the Superseding Indictment as Jane Doe #1 (J.A.) and Jane Doe #2 (N.A.), be identified by their initials” (Id.).
“To the extent that the Court has concerns regarding the use of initials, the government alternatively asks that the victims be referred to by their nicknames.” (Id.).
Defendant “does not oppose referring to the individuals identified in the superseding indictment as Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, and A.M. by something other than their full legal names.” (ECF No. 95, at 1). Further, “[t]he Defense agrees with the government's proposal to use Ashley M. for A.M.” (Id.). However, “the Defense has practical concerns about using first and last initials for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2.” (Id.). Instead, Defendant prefers to refer to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 by their nicknames. Because both sides agree to the use of nicknames, and the Court finds this choice acceptable as well.
Accordingly, reference at trial to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 will be by nicknames and the adult victim will be referred to as Ashley M. The government's Motion in Limine Regarding Victim Identification is therefore GRANTED. (ECF No. 83).
The United States moves to prevent Defendant from offering any evidence or argument related to:
(1) discovery disputes between the parties; (2) bases for prosecution determinations and/or comparisons of the facts underlying this case to those of other child exploitation or child pornography cases; (3) the defendant's knowledge of or beliefs about the ages of Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 for purposes of Counts One through Four; (4) any evidence of the defendant's “good acts” or character, other than that which is permitted pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404 and 405; and (5) whether Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 consented to engage in the sexually explicit conduct at issue .... [(6)] any argument, evidence, or lines of inquiry designed to elicit or which has the effect of supporting jury nullification, including potential penalties the defendant will face if convicted.
(ECF No, 84, at 1). Defendant also makes an argument in his response memorandum related to the admissibility of the potential criminal sanctions against the alleged victims in this case. Thus, the Court will address that issue below as well.
The government “moves to preclude counsel from referencing discovery in any way or otherwise commenting on discovery matters in the presence of the jury.” (ECF No. 84, at 3). It argues that “[c]omments on discovery issues in front of the jury are irrelevant under Rule 401 and may create the misimpression that one side has suppressed information as a means of seeking an unfair advantage.” (Id.).
Defendant responds that he “does not intend to detail the full extent of its discovery requests to the jury or the government's responses to those requests.” (ECF No. 96, at 2). Rather, he asserts that “there are a number of matters that fall within or otherwise relate to the broad category of ‘discovery' which would be entirely appropriate subjects of evidence or argument.” (Id.). Defendant indicates that he intends to “point out evidence that is absent, evidence that was not sought by the government, evidence that was not provided and/or deleted by witnesses, and evidence that was available to the government but not examined and/or not made available to the Defense.” (Id.). “In particular,” Defendant focuses on “forensic evidence from the three phones Janet S. produced to the government which has been available to the government's expert, SA Saltar, but which the government has not made available to the Defense or its experts.” (Id. at 3.) Defendant contends that this type of evidence “is entirely fair game” and that (Id.) This Court disagrees.
The presentation of argument before a jury is not the remedy for failure to provide appropriate responses or disclosures to discovery requests. Instead, a motion to compel is the solution. Juries do not decide discovery disputes. See Rheinfrank v. Abbott Labs., Inc., Case No. 1:13-cv-144 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120581, *21-22 (S.D. Ohio 2015) ( “the Court finds that evidence or argument about discovery disputes would be irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial”); Hinkle v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:11-24-DCR, 2012 U.S....
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