United States v. Jesus
| Decision Date | 07 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:19-mj-23139-AHG-DMS |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. AGUSTINA ZEFERINO-DE JESUS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
(1) DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT;
Before the Court are Defendant's consolidated motions to: 1) dismiss the complaint; 2) preserve evidence and compel discovery; 3) suppress statements; and 4) grant leave to file further motions. ECF No. 23. The Court took the matters raised in the Motion under submission after oral argument on October 8, 2019. ECF No. 25. Having considered the parties' papers and their argument, the Court enters the following Order:
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant is charged in the Complaint with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1), which provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers . . . shall [be guilty of a misdemeanor]." See ECF No. 1. The Government alleges that on July 31, 2019, a United States Customs and Border Patrol ("Border Patrol") agent encountered Defendant attempting to conceal herself in an area one mile north of the United States/Mexico border and approximately 22 miles east of the Tecate, California Port of Entry. Id. at 2. The Government alleges that during the agent's immigration inspection, Defendant stated that she is a citizen of Mexico, without any immigration documents allowing her to enter or remain in the United States legally. The agent placed Defendant under arrest, and took her to the Border Patrol station for processing. Id.
Defendant's case has proceeded under the "Streamline" process, which the Department of Justice uses to manage prosecution of misdemeanor charges brought under 8 U.S.C. § 1325. See United States v. Chavez-Diaz, No. 18MJ20098 AJB, 2018 WL 9543024, at *1-2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018) (). On August 1, 2019, Defendant was brought to Court for her initial appearance. ECF No. 5. Defendant met with an attorney on the ground floor of the Federal Building that morning before her appearance. Defendant was shackled at her legs during that meeting and during her initial appearance in Court. ECF No. 23-1 at 2. At her initial appearance, the Court arraigned Defendant, appointed Federal Defenders to represent her, and set conditions of pretrial release over the Government's oral motion to detain her. ECF No. 5. Defendant appealed the pretrial release conditions, and Judge Dana M. Sabraw modified them on August 14, 2019, to permit Defendant to travel to or reside in the State of Washington. ECF No. 16. Defendant was released on bond on August 14, 2019. ECF No. 17.
On September 17, 2019, Defendant filed the present consolidated motion seekingvarious forms of relief, including dismissal of the Complaint. ECF No. 23. Defendant's motion to dismiss is based largely on the argument that the Court should have managed her case through the Central Violations Bureau ("CVB"). As described in Defendant's Motion, the CVB process is used to prosecute violations of certain federal laws, and violations of certain state laws that occur on federal property. See ECF No. 23-1 at 3-4. Defendants who are prosecuted through the CVB are rarely detained for more than a few hours. They receive a notice to appear instead. At their initial appearance, they have the opportunity to meet with an attorney who can help them negotiate a disposition. CVB defendants are also typically able to avoid any appearance through payment of a fine.
In addition to seeking dismissal of the Complaint, Defendant moves the Court (1) to order the United States the preserve and produce certain requested evidence based on the contention that the evidence is material to preparing the defense under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(1)(E)(i), and (2) to suppress Defendant's statements. The Court will address the Motion to Dismiss before turning to the other motions.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint on six grounds: (1) prosecution of Defendant using the Streamline process rather than through CVB violates equal protection; (2) prosecution of Defendant using the Streamline process rather than through CVB violates principles of selective prosecution and selective enforcement; (3) prosecution of Defendant using the Streamline process rather than through CVB violates procedural and substantive due process; (4) Congress violated the non-delegation doctrine when it enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1); (5) Congress violated the Due Process Clause's prohibition on vague laws when it enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1); and (6) the Complaint fails to allege all the elements of the charged offense.
The Court addresses each of Defendant's arguments below.
First, Defendant argues that the Government violates the Equal Protection Clause ofthe United States Constitution by processing defendants charged with a misdemeanor violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325 under the Streamline process, rather than through the CVB process. Because they are punishable by no more than six months, § 1325 offenses are classified as Class B misdemeanors, which are considered "petty offenses" under federal law. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 19, 3559(a)(7). Other petty offenses, as well as some felonies, are prosecuted through CVB. See, e.g., ECF No. 23, Ex. G (reflecting the CVB docket sheet for October 10, 2018). Thus, Defendant argues that the Government is treating similarly situated defendants differently on the basis of alienage, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, by precluding § 1325 defendants from receiving the "substantial benefits" of the CVB process.
The Equal Protection Clause is part of the Fourteenth Amendment, and states in relevant part that the government shall not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. A threshold issue on which the parties disagree is the standard of review that applies.
Citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), Defendant contends that the Court must apply strict scrutiny to the Government's decision to process § 1325 defendants outside the CVB process. In Graham, the Supreme Court held that the term "person" in the Equal Protection Clause "encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens as well as citizens of the United States." Id. at 371. The Court further held that "classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." Id. at 372. Applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court determined that state statutes that imposed a length of residency requirement on lawfully admitted resident aliens, but not United States citizens, violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Government counters that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for two reasons: (1) the method of prosecution of § 1325 defendants is based on the nature of the charge, not the defendants' alienage; and (2) even if § 1325 distinguishes among persons based on alienage, the rational basis standard of review applies because § 1325 relates to the admission of non-citizens.
The Court agrees with the Government. As other courts in this district have concluded, § 1325 does not create a classification based on alienage that would invoke strict scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Ortiz, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1154 (S.D. Cal. 2019); United States v. Silva-Sosa, No. 18MJ23270-KSC, 2019 WL 1470868, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2019); United States v. Mazariegos-Ramirez, No. 18MJ22276-WQH, 2019 WL 338923, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2019); Chavez-Diaz, 2018 WL 9543024, at *3.1 The Government's decision to bring § 1325 charges using the Streamline process creates a distinction among defendants based on their alleged criminal activity (attempting to enter or entering the United States unlawfully), not based on alienage. That is, rather than creating a separate court for processing alien defendants with respect to any criminal charges brought against them, the Streamline process is only used with respect to charges brought based on alleged unlawful entry in violation of § 1325(a). See Ramirez-Ortiz, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1154 ().
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congressional acts regarding immigration are "subject only to narrow judicial review." Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citation omitted). In Fiallo, the Supreme Court recognized that "in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, 'Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.'" Id. (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)). Even if the Streamline process has a disparate impact on aliens, therefore, it would not be subject to strict scrutiny. See also United States v. Barajas-Guillen, 632 F.2d 749, (9th Cir. 1980) ().
Applying the proper standard, the Court finds that the Streamline process readily meets the rational basis test. Although the Equal Protection Clause requires all similarly situated persons to be treated alike, "so too, 'the Constitution does not require things which are different in...
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