United States v. Silva-Sosa
| Decision Date | 03 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 18-MJ-23270-KSC |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DANIEL SILVA-SOSA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
A. Procedural History
The defendant, Daniel Silva-Sosa, was arrested on December 19, 2018. The United States (hereinafter the "U.S.") filed its Complaint on December 20, 2018. The defendant's initial appearance and arraignment was held on December 20, 2018, at which time this Court set its conditions for release. The defendant filed his Motions to Dismiss the Complaint, Suppress Evidence, Request Jury Trial, Apply Appropriate Elements of 8 U.S.C. § 1325, and Grant Leave to File Further Motions, on February 6, 2019. The U.S. filed its response to defendant's Motions on February 26, 2019.
Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint on two grounds: (1) the prosecution violated his equal protection and due process rights; and (2) 8 U.S.C. § 1325 is unconstitutional.
Defendant asserts that because his Class B misdemeanor is considered a "petty offense," he should be prosecuted through the Central Violations Bureau ("CVB"). (ECF No. 17 at 5). He argues that this would allow him to have his case dismissed outright or resolved through a fine or deferred prosecution. Id.
Defendant further claims the Federal government discriminates against 8 U.S.C. § 1325 defendants as compared to other individuals prosecuted for petty offenses in the Southern District of California, as he was treated more harshly than defendants charged with equivalent or more serious crimes. Id. at 5. Furthermore, the defendant contends he was discriminated against because of his alienage and national origin in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 6. Defendant cites to Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), in support of his contention that classifications based on alienage, national origin, and race are "inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." Id. at 372.
In response, the U.S. asserts that 8 U.S.C. § 1325 does not distinguish based on national origin or race but, even if it did, the Court should still apply a "rational basis" review. (ECF No. 19 at 3). The U.S. relies on Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981), in which the Supreme Court held that "[u]ndocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class." Id. at 223. Additionally, Plyer instructs "it is 'a routine and normally legitimate part' of the business of the Federal Government to classify on the basis of alien status." Id. at 224.
The U.S. also cites to a decision from this district, United States v. Chavez-Diaz, No. 18-mj-20098-KSC-AJB (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018). Therein, the defendant alleged that his prosecution violated equal protection and due process as he was prosecuted under"Operation Streamline" in the District Court, rather than through CVB. Judge Battaglia rejected this argument. Recognizing the dramatic increase in case filings for individuals who illegally entered the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1325, and the need to hold prompt initial appearances in accordance with Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Battaglia explained the steps taken by the judges of the Southern District of California to address the substantial increase in case filings. Id. at 2-5.
Id. at 6. Accordingly, the Court rejected this argument, noting that Id. at 8. In sum, "[i]n no way does alienage play a part from the Court's perspective of scheduling the various [8 U.S.C. §1325] matters [in this Court] brought by the Government." Id. at 9.
This Court holds that the prosecution of the defendant in District Court did not violate his equal protection rights. As with the defendant in Chavez-Diaz, supra, the calendaring of his case with others similarly charged was based on the charges, not thealienage of the defendants. Rather, the Court has the authority to "administer its business with available resources," and processing cases by charge is not discriminatory. Id.
Arguing that the U.S. violated his substantive and procedural due process rights, the defendant cites to United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), in support of his assertion that the right to substantive due process "prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience." Id. at 746; ECF No. 17 at 7. Defendant adds that even when the government survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must also survive procedural due process scrutiny as set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). (ECF No. 17 at 7). Therein, the Supreme Court identified the following factors for evaluating procedural due process claims: (1) the interest at stake for the individual; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest and the probable value of safeguards; and (3) the costs and administrative burden on the Government. Id. at 335.
Defendant argues that the U.S. violated his substantive due process because it deprived him of the benefits of CVB court, while extending those benefits to individuals charged with similar or more serious petty offenses. (ECF No. 17 at 7). He adds that the Court should weigh the Mathews v. Eldridge three-factor test in his favor because the interests at stake are substantial, charging him in CVB court would alleviate the risk of erroneous deprivation, and that utilizing CVB court for § 1325 defendants would lessen the costs and burden on the Government. Id. at 7-8.
In response, the U.S. asserts that the defendant's rights were not violated because the day after his arrest he appeared for his initial appearance before a U.S. Magistrate Judge who appointed counsel and set bond. (ECF No. 19 at 7). The U.S. points out that defendant is represented by able counsel and is exercising his right to proceed to trial. Id. Further, the U.S. concludes that procedural due process was not violated because the U.S. Constitution does not mandate CVB for all misdemeanor prosecutions. Id.
For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds defendant's due process rights were not violated. There is a rational basis for the Court's procedures and there is nothingshocking or outrageous about the way 8 U.S.C. §1325 cases are handled in this District. The defendant was advised of and invoked his Miranda rights, appeared promptly before a judge in accordance with Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, was appointed counsel, and is proceeding to a speedy trial. The U.S. satisfied the requirement of providing the defendant with the rights afforded under the U.S. Constitution and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Aside from arguing that his case should be processed through CVB, defendant has not identified any other rights to which he is allegedly entitled that he has not received. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on this ground is denied.
Defendant asserts that 8 U.S.C. § 1325 is unconstitutional because it favors unwed mothers over unwed fathers (ECF No. 17 at 8). Reliance is placed on Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017), a case that addressed the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The Supreme Court held therein that statutes that transmit citizenship to children born abroad to unwed U.S. citizens differently based on the gender of the parent violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. The Court's decision, however, did not address other provisions of the INA, such as 8 U.S.C. § 1325.
This precise issue was decided in this District in U.S.A. v. Madero-Diaz, 17cr1291-LAB (S.D. Cal., Oct. 2, 2017), in which District Judge Burns held a defendant lacked standing to challenge an 8 U.S.C. § 1325 conviction on the basis of Morales-Santana because he was not making a claim of derivative citizenship. The case is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit.
Here, similar to the facts presented in Madero-Diaz, the defendant lacks standing to challenge §1325 on the basis of Morales-Santana because he is not making a claim to derivative citizenship. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on this ground is denied.
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Defendant also moves to suppress evidence of the statements he made to a Border Patrol Agent ("BPA"), as well as any evidence not timely provided by the United States during discovery.
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