United States v. Jiminez

• Decision Date: 31 May 1978
• Docket Number: No. 78-30091-NA-CR.,78-30091-NA-CR.
• Citation: 454 F. Supp. 610
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Glenda Sue Patterson JIMINEZ and James Ronald Jiminez.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

454 F. Supp. 610

UNITED STATES of America v. Glenda Sue Patterson JIMINEZ and James Ronald Jiminez.

No. 78-30091-NA-CR.

United States District Court, M. D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

May 31, 1978.

Bob Lynch, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff.

Tom R. Meeks, Larry B. Watson, Clarksville, Tenn., for Glenda Sue Patterson Jiminez.

Clark H. Tidwell, Nashville, Tenn., for James Ronald Jiminez.

MEMORANDUM

MORTON, Chief Judge.

Defendants were indicted in three counts by the federal grand jury. The first count charged defendants with conspiring to introduce marijuana into a federal penal or correctional institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; the second count charged them with introducing marijuana into a federal penal or correctional institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791¹ and 28 C.F.R. § 6.1;² and the third count charged them with knowingly and intentionally possessing marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). According to the indictment, defendants introduced the marijuana into the Sumner County, Tennessee, Jail in which defendant James Ronald Jiminez was incarcerated. Defendants have moved to dismiss the first two counts of the indictment on the ground that the Sumner County Jail is not a "Federal penal or correctional institution." In opposition, the government contends that since federal prisoners are incarcerated in the Sumner County facility pursuant to a contract between the United States Bureau of Prisons and Sumner County, authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 4002,³ the Sumner County Jail has become a "Federal penal or correctional institution" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1791.

It is apparent from the language of both 18 U.S.C. § 1791 and its implementing regulation that an essential element of the crime is that it must be committed at a "Federal penal or correctional institution."⁴ The statute is silent, however, as to the scope of this term. No case defines the term for purposes of this statute, and furthermore, there is very little authority on related matters. The court believes, however, that there are several reasons for agreeing with defendants' contention that the Sumner County Jail is not a "Federal penal or correctional institution" under 18 U.S.C. § 1791.

First, no provision of state or federal law, or term of the contract between the Bureau of Prisons and Sumner County, expressly or impliedly states that county jails housing federal prisoners become federal institutions. To the contrary, federal statutes imply that such jails are not federal institutions. For example, one provision, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(b)(1), states: "The control and management of Federal penal and correctional institutions, except military or naval institutions, shall be vested in the Attorney General, who shall promulgate rules for the government thereof, and appoint all necessary officers and employees in accordance with the civil-service laws . . .." 18 U.S.C. § 4001.⁵ The language of the statute is mandatory and sets out what the Attorney General must do with regard to federal penal and correctional institutions. In contrast, the Attorney General, through appropriate agencies, may promulgate rules for the treatment of federal prisoners housed in county jails, but can neither promulgate rules for the general government of county jails, nor appoint jailers, officers, or other employees thereof. The fact that the Attorney General is not able to fulfill his statutorily mandated duty with regard to county jails strongly suggests that county jails are not turned into federal institutions by virtue of contracts entered into under 18 U.S.C. § 4002.⁶ Furthermore, even though 18 U.S.C. § 4002 authorizes the federal government to contract for periods of not more than three years for the imprisonment of federal prisoners in state or local prisons or jails, no "federal agency or officer thereof has any authority to exercise any control over the day to day management of the local institution or over the details of the custody and care of federal prisoners confined therein." Brown v. United States, 374 F.Supp. 723, 727 (E.D. Ark.1974); see Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 93 S.Ct. 2215, 37 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973).

At the same time, no statute of the state of Tennessee transforms county jails in to federal institutions. Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-1103 merely states that "the county jail is used as a prison for the safekeeping or confinement of . . . persons charged with or convicted of a criminal offense against the United States . . .." T.C.A. § 41-1105 requires the jailer "to receive and safely keep" federal prisoners. Neither statute, however, surrenders the jails to the federal government.

Consistent with the implications of these federal and state enactments is the contract between the Bureau of Prisons and Sumner County providing for the housing of federal prisoners in the Sumner County Jail. The contract is entitled "Contract for Service By/In a Nonfederal Facility." (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, attached to the contract as Exhibit A are "RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING CUSTODY AND TREATMENT OF FEDERAL PRISONERS IN NONFEDERAL INSTITUTIONS." (Emphasis added.) Nowhere in the contract or rules and regulations is it said that county jails are to be considered federal institutions. In fact, throughout the documents, institutions such as Sumner County Jail are so often referred to as nonfederal institutions that it seems incredible that the government would now contend that the Sumner County Jail is a federal penal or correctional institution. Also in accord with this reading of the contract is the fact that by its very terms, the agreement to house federal prisoners can be terminated by Sumner County after thirty days notice: One would not think that a federal institution could sever its relationship with the federal government so easily.

Second, the case law is in disarray, and it offers no controlling precedent and little guidance as to the meaning of "Federal penal or correctional institution" under 18 U.S.C. § 1791. For purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such contracts as that between Sumner County and the Bureau of Prisons do not transform county jails into federal agencies or institutions. In Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 93 S.Ct. 2215, 37 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that the United States was not liable under the FTCA for the negligence of county jail employees that caused the death of a federal prisoner confined in a county jail. The county jail was an independent contractor according to the court, and as such it fell within an exception to the FTCA that exempts the United States from liability for the negligence of independent contractors and their employees. The federal prisoner was housed in a county jail pursuant to a contract such as is involved in the instant case. Clearly, then, the county jail is not a federal agency or institution for purposes of the FTCA.

In Henderson v. Thrower, 497 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974), the Fifth Circuit held that a federal prisoner, held in a city jail pursuant to a contract such as that involved in the instant case, could sue the local jail officials and employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court indicated that the existence of the contract had no effect on the potential liability of the jail officials and employees, and that the acts of the jail staff were "under color of state law" in spite of the contract. Had the local jail been considered a federal institution and the jailkeepers federal employees, it is doubtful that the § 1983 suit would have been allowed. Therefore, it is apparent that the contract did not turn the city jail into a federal agency or institution for purposes of § 1983 suits.

The government quite properly points out that these examples of civil liability suits are distinguishable from the present case, which involves a criminal statute. The court, however, does not offer these cases as dispositive of the issue in this case, but merely to demonstrate how arguments related and analogous to the government's here have fared in the courts.

In support of its contention that Sumner County Jail is a "Federal penal or correctional institution," the government relies on a line of cases in which state and local jail officials were held in contempt of federal court for their failure to perform properly their duty with respect to federal prisoners committed to their custody. Ex parte Shores, 195 F. 627 (D.C.Iowa 1912); In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599 (S.D.Ga.1889). In these cases, the courts quoted Randolph v. Donaldson, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 76, 86, 3 L.Ed. 662, 665 (1815): "For certain purposes, and to certain intents, ...