State v. Stewart
| Decision Date | 09 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–1113.,13–1113. |
| Citation | 858 N.W.2d 17 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Jillian Jane STEWART, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Amy Klocke, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
In this case, we consider whether the offense of possession of a controlled substance merges with the offense of introduction of a controlled substance into a detention facility by operation of Iowa's merger statute and principles of double jeopardy. For the reasons expressed below, we conclude the crimes do not merge and may be simultaneously charged in one criminal prosecution. We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
As this case raises purely legal issues, the facts need not be recited in detail.
Jillian Stewart was arrested by Sioux City police. She was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2011), introduction of a controlled substance into a detention facility in violation of Iowa Code section 719.8, and unlawful possession of a prescription drug in violation of Iowa Code section 155A.21(1). The State dismissed the possession-of-a-prescription-drug offense prior to trial. After a jury trial, Stewart was convicted of the two remaining offenses. The district court entered judgment against Stewart for both crimes and sentenced her to a five-year indeterminate term of incarceration on the introduction charge and a one-year term of incarceration on the possession charge, to be served concurrently.
Stewart appealed. She claimed the district court entered an illegal sentence because the offenses of introduction and possession merged into a single offense under Iowa Code section 701.9. She also asserted the district court erred in assessing court costs for a charge which was dismissed by the district court. The court of appeals held the offenses did not merge, but agreed with Stewart that costs should not have been assessed to her related to the dismissed charge. See State v. Petrie, 478 N.W.2d 620, 622 (Iowa 1991) ().
We granted further review. We allow the decision of the court of appeals to stand with respect to the cost issue. See Hills Bank & Trust Co. v. Converse, 772 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Iowa 2009) ( ). We consider only the question of whether the remaining criminal offenses should have been merged.
Alleged violations of the merger statute are reviewed for corrections of errors at law. State v. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d 41, 43 (Iowa 1994). Double jeopardy claims are reviewed de novo. Id.
A. Positions of the Parties. Stewart raises two challenges to her conviction for possession. First, she asserts that to convict her of both introduction and possession of a controlled substance violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 See U.S. Const. amend. V (). Second, she asserts that her conviction of both crimes violates the merger statute found in Iowa Code section 701.9 (). The sum and substance of her argument under both her constitutional and statutory theories is that under the test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932) (), it is legally impossible to be convicted of introduction of a controlled substance without also possessing that controlled substance. Further, she asserts the legislature did not intend for two separate crimes to arise when it is impossible to commit the greater crime without also committing the lesser crime. As a result, she argues her conviction of the lesser offense, possession, must be reversed.
In her analysis, Stewart focuses on the language of several Iowa statutes. She notes Iowa Code section 719.8 prohibits the introduction of controlled substances into detention facilities, Iowa Code section 706.3 prohibits a conspiracy alternative, Iowa Code section 703.1 presents an aiding and abetting alternative, and Iowa Code section 703.2 creates a joint criminal conduct crime. She asserts that because she was only charged under Iowa Code section 719.8, we must analyze legal impossibility solely under the terms of this statute. According to Stewart, we cannot consider the possibility of liability on a conspiracy, aiding and abetting, or joint criminal conduct theory because Stewart was not charged under these statutes, but only under Iowa Code section 719.8, which she labels “the direct commission alternative.” She notes that under our caselaw where a statute provides alternative methods of committing a crime, “it does not matter that some alternatives of [the greater offense] can be committed without necessarily committing [the lesser included offense] because those alternatives were not charged by the State.” State v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583, 594 (Iowa 2014).
Stewart recognizes that in State v. Caquelin, 702 N.W.2d 510, 512–13 (Iowa Ct.App.2005), the court of appeals held introduction and possession of a controlled substance were two separate crimes. Stewart argues Caquelin was wrongly decided and should be reversed by this court.
Stewart also recognizes that even where legal impossibility may possibly be present, our precedent suggests that dual convictions might nonetheless be affirmed if there is clear evidence the legislature intended two punishments to apply to the same acts or omissions. See State v. Bullock, 638 N.W.2d 728, 732 (Iowa 2002) (); State v. Perez, 563 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Iowa 1997) (); State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Iowa 1995) (). Stewart asserts there is no evidence the legislature intended dual punishments under the statutes involved in this case.
In the alternative, Stewart contends we should abandon the approach in our cases and instead follow Justice Carter's special concurrence in State v. Daniels, 588 N.W.2d 682, 685–86 (Iowa 1998) (Carter, J., concurring specially). Justice Carter noted Id. Stewart asserts that under Iowa Code section 701.9, the only requirement for merger is legal impossibility, period. According to Stewart, there is no suggestion in the statute that once legal impossibility is established, a court should engage in an exploration of legislative intent. Although the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Iowa Code section 701.9 address the same subject, Stewart essentially asserts that we have improperly imported the round federal constitutional peg into the square hole of state statutory interpretation.
The State counters it is legally possible to commit the crime of introduction without also committing the crime of possession of a controlled substance. For example, the State asserts a defendant could cause a controlled substance to be introduced into a detention facility through a third party but not possess the contraband. The State argues the very issue in the case was decided in Caquelin, a decision supported in Iowa and federal precedent. See, e.g., State v. Grady, 215 N.W.2d 213, 214 (Iowa 1974) ; United States v. Campbell, 652 F.2d 760, 762–63 (8th Cir.1981) (per curiam). Further, the State emphasizes the test for determining whether merger occurs is one based on legal impossibility (whether it is theoretically possible in any case for the defendant to commit the greater crime without also committing the lesser) and not impossibility based upon the facts of a specific case. See State v. Hickman, 623 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 2001) (); State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 737–39 (Iowa 1988) (). In the alternative, the State argues that even if Stewart has demonstrated legal impossibility, the legislature clearly intended multiple punishments for introduction and possession of a controlled substance and, as a result, the conviction for both offenses is valid.
B. Analysis. We begin our analysis by outlining several principles that guide our...
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