United States v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 19 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. CR15-3035-MWB,CR15-3035-MWB |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ARLYN DALE JOHNSON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Defendant Arlyn Dale Johnson (Johnson) has filed a motion (Doc. No. 17) to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. Plaintiff (the Government) has filed a resistance (Doc. No. 36). The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge, has referred the motion to me for preparation of a report and recommended disposition. I find that oral argument is not necessary and would cause undue delay. See N.D. Ia. L.R. 7(c). The motion is fully submitted and ready for decision.
On August 20, 2015, the Grand Jury returned a single-count indictment (Doc. No. charging Johnson with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). The indictment alleges as follows, in relevant part:
Doc. 2 at 1. Johnson has entered a plea of not guilty. His trial is scheduled to begin February 1, 2016.
Johnson filed his motion to dismiss on December 18, 2015. He relies on various medical records to establish certain facts and argues:
Doc. No. 17-1 at 10; Doc. Nos. 17-2 through 17-7. The Government filed its resistance on January 8, 2016.
Johnson does not identify the particular rule(s) of criminal procedure under which he presents his motion. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) authorizes pretrial motions to present "any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits." Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1). Certain defenses and objections are waived if not raised by pretrial motion, including "a defect in the indictment" and "failure to state an offense." Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B). Anindictment is defective, and thus subject to pretrial challenge pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B), if it alleges a violation of a statute that is unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 715 F. Supp. 2d 688, 689-90 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citing In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8-9 (1883)).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state an offense pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(v) may attack the sufficiency of the allegations but not the sufficiency of the evidence: "It has long been settled that an indictment is not open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate or insufficient evidence before the grand jury." United States v. Nelson, 165 F.3d 1180, 1182 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956)). Such a motion may be granted only if no reasonable construction of the indictment can be said to charge the offense. United States v. Nabors, 45 F.3d 238, 240 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Peterson, 867 F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1989)). This means an indictment will survive a motion to dismiss "if it contains all of the essential elements of the offense charged, fairly informs the defendant of the charges against which he must defend, and alleges sufficient information to allow a defendant to plead a conviction or acquittal as a bar to a subsequent prosecution." United States v. Carter, 270 F.3d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 2001). In reviewing the sufficiency of an indictment, the court must accept the Government's allegations as true. United States v. Steffen, 687 F.3d 1104, 1107 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012).
The rules of criminal procedure do not permit the functional equivalent of a motion for summary judgment, whereby a defendant may test the sufficiency of the Government's evidence in advance of trial. See, e.g., United States v. Ferro, 252 F.3d 964, 968 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing cases); accord Nabors, 45 F.3d at 240 (). Any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must await trial,when the defendant may move for acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 after the Government rests. Ferro, 252 F.3d at 968 (citing United States v. DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d 659, 661 (3d Cir. 2000)).
As noted above, Section 922(g)(4) prohibits the possession of firearms by "any person . . . who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). Thus, there are two alternative theories of statutory prohibition. The statute applies to any person who has either (a) been adjudicated as a mental defective (the adjudication theory) or (b) been committed to a mental institution (the commitment theory).
The indictment alleges that Johnson falls within both theories. That is, it asserts that Johnson possessed firearms while "having been adjudicated a mental defective and while having been previously committed to a mental institution." Doc. No. 2 at 1 [emphasis added]. In arguing for dismissal of the indictment, Johnson attacks both theories. He argues that the evidence does not support the indictment's allegation that he has been adjudicated as a mental defective. According to Johnson, this leaves only the commitment theory as potentially establishing criminal liability. While admitting that he has been previously committed to a mental institution, he argues that the application of Section 922(g)(4) to prohibit his possession of firearms violates his rights under the Second Amendment. In other words, Johnson argues (a) the adjudication theory does not apply to him and (b) the commitment theory cannot apply to him. The indictment must be dismissed if Johnson prevails on both arguments.
Johnson relies on various judicial and mental health records to argue that he has never been adjudicated as a "mental defective" within the meaning of Section 922(g)(4). I agree with the Government that this is a "summary judgment" style argument that is not appropriate for pretrial consideration in a criminal proceeding. Johnson clearly seeks a pretrial ruling, as a matter of law, that the evidence does not support the Grand Jury's allegation that he was previously adjudicated a mental defective. Johnson is not entitled to such a pretrial evaluation of the Government's evidence. Nelson, 165 F.3d at 1182; Ferro, 252 F.3d at 968. At this stage of the case, the court must accept the Government's allegations as true. Steffen, 687 F.3d at 1107 n.2.
The only relevant question, then, is whether the indictment properly states the charged offense. It does. Indeed, the indictment parrots the relevant statutory language, alleging that Johnson, "having been adjudicated a mental defective and having been previously committed to a mental institution," knowingly possessed certain, specified firearms in this district between June and August of 2015. Doc. No. 2 at 1. Accepting these allegations as true, as I must, I find that the indictment states an offense under both of Section 922(g)(4)'s alternative theories.
Johnson may be correct, as a matter of historical fact, that he has never been "adjudicated a mental defective" within the meaning of the adjudication theory. He is free to make that argument as part of a motion for acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion - after the Government rests. Ferro, 252 F.3d at 968. He is not, however, entitled to have the Government's evidence weighed in advance of trial. I must recommend the denial of Johnson's motion to dismiss the indictment to the extent it relies upon an argument that Johnson has never been adjudicated as a mental defective.
Johnson's argument regarding the commitment theory is the mirror image of his adjudication-theory argument. With regard to the commitment theory, Johnson admits (at least for purposes of his motion) that "he was twice 'committed to a mental institution' many years ago." Doc. No. 17-1 at 10. Thus, he is not attempting to test the strength of the Government's evidence as to the indictment's allegation that he was "previously committed to a mental institution." Doc. No. 2 at 1. Instead, he argues that the application of the commitment theory to criminalize his possession of firearms violates his Second Amendment rights in light of District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). This argument may be advanced in a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 562 (8th Cir. 2012).
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