United States v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 20 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-CR-143 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JEREMY EDWARD JOHNSON, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Pending before the court is defendant Jeremy Edward Johnson's motion to suppress statements pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P 12(b). (Doc. 94). The statements were made after he was taken into custody by officers on February 24, 2021, pursuant to a state probation violation warrant and, he was interrogated regarding the drug investigation relevant to this case. Johnson and his co-defendant, Susan Melissa Nickas, are charged with two counts in an Indictment, to wit Count 1, Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled Substances (heroin and fentanyl), Resulting in Death, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §846 and §841; and, Count 2, Distribution of a Controlled Substance Resulting in Death, in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1). (Doc. 1).[1] The alleged victim regarding the charges against the defendants is Joshua (“Josh”) Kiernan, and his date of death is December 11, 2020. Johnson seeks the court to suppress all of his incriminating statements made during his interrogation after he allegedly invoked his Miranda right to speak to a lawyer and officers allegedly failed to cease the interrogation.
For the reasons discussed below, and after consideration of the briefs and the evidence submitted, including the video and audio recording of the interrogation, Johnson's suppression motion will be DENIED IN ITS ENTIRETY without the need for an evidentiary hearing.
As a backdrop, detectives with the Monroe County DA's Office in conjunction with the PSP were investigating the death of Joshua Kiernan who died of a fentanyl/heroin overdose on December 11, 2020.
After Johnson was arrested on an outstanding Monroe County Court probation warrant on February 24, 2021, by detectives Lippincott, Vanluvender, and Luthcke, as well as PSP trooper De La Iglesia, (hereinafter the “officers”), he was taken into custody and transported to the Monroe County DA's Office to be interviewed regarding Kiernan's death. (See Doc. 79-6 at 6). Johnson was given his Miranda rights and asked to speak with officers regarding the drug charges in the instant case. The details of Johnson's interrogation that are at issue in his instant motion will be discussed below.
On May 25, 2021, the officers arrested Johnson pursuant to a warrant that was issued after he was federally indicted with Nickas in the instant case on May 18, 2021. (Doc. 1).
On June 17, 2022, Johnson filed, through his appointed counsel, his instant motion to suppress his statements. (Doc. 94). On July 1, 2022, he filed his supporting brief alleging that many of his statements to the officers were made after he invoked his Miranda rights to obtain a lawyer. (Doc. 104). Johnson submitted as an Exhibit to his motion a flash drive with his entire video recorded interrogation. .
On July 12, 2021, the government filed its brief in opposition to Johnson's motion to suppress statements with a DVD containing the video recording of Johnson's complete interview. (Docs. 118 & 119).
The joint trial of Nickas and Johnson is schedule to begin on July 25, 2022.
In U.S. v. Sater, 477 F.Supp.3d 372, 379 (M.D. Pa. 2020), the court discussed a defendant's 5th Amendment rights in the context of a suppression motion and stated:
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he privilege against selfincrimination protects individuals not only from legal compulsion to testify in a criminal courtroom but also from ‘informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning.'” Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed/ 2d 694 (1966)). To ensure a person's Fifth Amendment rights are protected, Miranda held that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination .” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
Here, Johnson argues that a large portion of his post-Miranda incriminating statements to the officers were made after he invoked his right to have a lawyer and that officers failed to stop the interview, and he contends that these statements should all be suppressed since he no longer waived his rights under the 5th and 6th Amendments.
In U.S. v. Whiteford, 676 F.3d 348, 362 (3d Cir. 2012), the Third Circuit explained:
The decision to waive one's Fifth Amendment rights must be the product of “a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010). A court will inquire first, whether “the relinquishment of the right [was] voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice,” and second, whether the waiver was made “with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135 (1986).
In United States v. Hodge, 2017 WL 1345219, *13 (D.V.I. Feb. 24, 2017), the court discussed a waiver of rights and stated:
To determine whether Miranda rights have been voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived, courts must “consider the totality of circumstances surrounding [the defendant's] statement.” Briscoe, 69 F.Supp.2d at 741 (quoting United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 1998)) (quotations omitted). Courts also must consider “the background, experience, and conduct of the [defendant], as well as any indicia of coercion.” Id. (citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 (1983)) (internal citations omitted). Examples of “traditional” indicia of coercion are the duration and conditions of detention, the attitude of the interrogators, the defendant's physical and mental state, and other pressures affecting the defendant's powers of resistance and self-control. Id. at 741 n.1. “Miranda rights will be deemed waived only where the totality of the circumstances reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension.” United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 749 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1253 (3d Cir. 1994)).
This court has jurisdiction over Johnson's motion to suppress under 18 U.S.C. §3231. A criminal defendant brings a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(C), in an effort “to show that evidence against him or her was unconstitutionally obtained.” U.S. v. Hernandez, 2015 WL 5123924, at *4 (M.D. Pa. 2015). The initial burden of proof is on the defendant who seeks to suppress evidence. United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995). However, after the defendant establishes a basis for his motion, such as in this case by alleging that his statements were made after he asked for counsel, the burden shifts to the government. Id.
Johnson seeks the court to suppress the portions of his incriminating statements that were allegedly obtained unlawfully after he invoked his right to counsel, about 25 minutes into the one hour and 48 minute interrogation. Johnson contends that all of his statements after he told officers, “I want a lawyer”, should be suppressed since he was in custody and being interrogated, and since officers continued to question him after he requested a lawyer. As such, Johnson contends that his statements made to officers after he unambiguously asked for a lawyer were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the 5th and 6th Amendments, since they were not the result of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ( that a defendant may waive his Miranda rights if his waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made).
The government has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Johnson's statements made after the 25 minute mark during his interrogation were voluntary after he asked for a lawyer. See Sater, 477 F.Supp.3d at 383. see also United States v. Paine, 2021 WL 3674616, *3 (E.D. Pa. August 19, 2021) (“The Government bears the burden of proving statements were ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice' by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1086 (3d Cir. 1989) ().
If the government fails to meet its burden, Johnson's involuntary statements are not admissible in evidence for any purpose. See Paine, 2021 WL 3674616, *3 (“Involuntary statements made to law enforcement are inadmissible.”). If the government fails to meet its burden, the defendant's statements made after he invoked his Miranda rights are not admissible in evidence for any purpose. “Due process requires a suspect's confession to be voluntary if it is to be admitted into evidence”, and “[a] confession is involuntary if the suspect's will was overborne in such a way as to render his confession the product of coercion.” Sater, 477 F.Supp.3d at 384 (internal citations omitted). Additionally, “[i]t is well established that an involuntary confession may result from...
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