United States v. Jones

Decision Date30 June 1887
Citation31 F. 718
PartiesUNITED STATES v. JONES.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

Dupont Guerry, U.S. Atty., for prosecution.

Hill &amp Harris and Dessau & Bartlett, for defendant.

SPEER J.

(charging jury.) The patient carefulness and attention which you have manifested throughout this lengthy trial has greatly simplified, shortened in volume, and lessened in detail the instructions which I must give you. For this faithfulness the court is naturally very much obliged to you.

The prisoner is charged, by indictment in two counts, with the violation of a statute of the United States directed against larceny or theft of the mails, or from the mails. This crime is defined by section 5467 of the Revised Statutes, which has already been read and explained to you. The accusation against the prisoner presents a charge of aggravated larceny. While the main elements of the crime of larceny or robbery from the mails, namely, the fraudulent or forcible taking and carrying away of the personal goods of another, with intent to steal the same, are essential to the existence of the crime defined by this statute, there is a general distinction which the jury should understand and bear in mind. The postal system is established by law to secure the safe and speedy means of intercommunication between the people; the safe and certain transmission of money, and written instruments representing money, and other articles of convenient size. The custody of the post-office officials is the custody of the law, not only for the benefit of the sender of mail matter, but for the benefit of the person to whom it is sent; and one who steals from the mail, while it is in process of transmission, in fact steals property in which ordinarily more than one person is interested. Now, in every indictment for larceny, it is necessary to allege that the property taken has an owner, and that it has been taken with criminal intent. Where, however a letter is stolen from the mails in process of transmission, since generally both the sender and receiver have an interest in the letter, and either would generally be entitled to a right of action for the theft or wrongful appropriation by a third party, if it is charged in the indictment that it is the property of the person to whom it is addressed, in the absence of proof that he had no interest in the letter or its contents, the averment in the indictment would be sufficient.

Further, if it be charged in the indictment that the stolen letter and its contents are the property of the person to whom it is addressed, and if it appears from the proof that they were stolen while they were in process of transmission by the mails, such proof will support the allegation that the letter and contents were the property of such person, if it also appears that the letter and contents were sent for the benefit of the person to whom the letter was addressed. Again, if it appears in proof that a person has a special property in stolen goods, it may be alleged in the indictment that they are his; and, if the proof shows that he had certain trusts or duties to perform with reference to the article, it will support the allegation of ownership in him. Roscoe, Crim. Ev. 637; Ellis v. State, 76 Ala. 90, 7 Crim.Law.Mag. 397; State v. Heaton, 23 W.Va. 773, 7 Crim.Law Mag. 821; Hill v. State, 11 Tex.App. 132, 4 Crim.Law Mag. 133; State v. Everage, 33 La.Ann. 120, 3 Crim.Law.Mag. 597; 3 Chit.Crim.Law, 947b.

Now, in the indictment against the prisoner it is alleged that he stole from the mails a check which was the property of S. T. Coleman & Co. If you believe from the evidence that the defendant did, as charged, steal from the mails the check, and that the witness Williams had mailed a letter containing the check to S. T. Coleman & Co., with authority to them to collect the amount due thereon, and place it to his (Williams') credit on their account against him, or with authority to credit his account with the amount of the check, the averment in the indictment is proper, and the proof will support the indictment, and you ought to find the defendant guilty.

It is insisted by the prisoner's counsel that because the debtor must be authorized by the creditor to make his remittance by mail before the law will change such remittances against the creditor, in case they are lost or stolen in the mails, the creditor has no interest in property to sent, and therefore, they insist, it could not be properly said to be the creditor's. This does not follow. The creditor is not bound to charge himself with a remittance sent him by the mail, unless he authorizes that method of communication; but he has nevertheless a certain interest, amounting to a right of property, and a certain duty connected with it, which in the case before the court, assuming the facts to be true, made the check sent by Williams, to Coleman & Co. the special property of the latter. In the first place they, and they alone, had the right to receive it; and a letter and its contents are presumed to belong to that person who is entitled to receive it; and this presumption is so strong that, after such letter has left the mailing office, it will not, except on the order of the postmaster general, be delivered to any other person. Being entitled to receive it, Coleman & Co. had such a right of property in it that the sender (Williams) could not retake it without their consent. If they declined to give Williams credit for it, they, as trustees for him, were responsible to him for its safe keeping and return. In the illustration well put by the district attorney, Williams may have attempted to close his account with a promissory note. This would not be payment unless the note itself was paid, but nevertheless the note so sent would be the property of Coleman & Co., and the evidence of their debt against Williams, and, if stolen either in the mails or otherwise, it would be proper to allege in the indictment that the note was their property.

If the testimony of Mr. Burden be accurate, according to the usage of the firm, it was their duty to pass the check provisionally to Williams' credit, and then attempt to collect it. All these facts, if true, and the question of their truth or untruth is for you to determine, I charge you, as a matter of law, gave to Coleman & Co. a special property in the check, if not for their own benefit, then for the benefit of Williams, which is sufficient to support the allegation of ownership in this indictment. It must be borne in mind that this is a charge of stealing from the mails where the letter and its contents are not in the possession of either the sender or the person to whom they are sent, but are in the possession of the post-office department for the benefit of both; and I charge you that the indictment is good, and, if the witnesses who testify to the facts I have recited are credited by this jury, you will be justified in finding the ownership of the check in Coleman & Co., and you will advance to the next matter for your consideration, and that is, has it been satisfactorily shown that the prisoner stole the check as alleged in the indictment?

In this, as in all criminal cases, the burden of proof is on the government to make it satisfactorily appear to the jury that the charge of crime against the accused is true. In determining this question, you will give your attention to all the evidence that has been offered on both sides.

In the first place, the check was in proof. I charge you, gentlemen that check is accurately described in the bill of indictment; and if you find, from the proof, that other indorsements, not mentioned in the indictment, were written on this check after it was stolen, (if you find it was stolen,) that will not make a variance between the indictment and the proof which would authorize you to acquit the defendant, because the stolen property must be described in the condition it was at the time it was stolen, and subsequent alterations will not affect the question. Now, what was the testimony of the witnesses about this check? Walker identifies it as the check which he received. He testifies that he indorsed it, and traded it to Williams. Williams testifies that he was the deputy-postmaster at Temperance; that he inclosed this check in a letter directed to S. T. Coleman & Co., with authority to them to credit it or its amount upon a debt due by him to them; that ...

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    • United States
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    • January 18, 1916
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