United States v. Jones, 20-3701

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.
• Citation: 980 F.3d 1098
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 20-3701,20-3701
• Decision Date: 20 November 2020

980 F.3d 1098

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Michael JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-3701

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: November 20, 2020

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

The "compassionate release" provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3582 allows district courts to reduce the sentences of incarcerated persons in "extraordinary and compelling" circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). For over three decades, § 3582(c)(1)(A) allowed only the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to file motions for compassionate release. Because the BOP rarely did so, few compassionate release cases reached the federal courts. This drought of compassion concluded in 2020, when the forces of law and nature collided. The First Step Act of 2018's provision allowing incarcerated persons to file their own § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions coupled with COVID-19's pernicious presence in federal prisons triggered a massive upswing in imprisoned persons seeking compassionate release; 10,940 persons applied for compassionate release in the first three months of the pandemic

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alone.¹ Michael Jones is one of these legion petitioners. Jones is serving a ten-year sentence at Federal Correctional Institution Elkton, where one out of every four imprisoned persons has tested positive for COVID-19.² In his § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion, Jones's medical ailments—which expose him to COVID-19-related health complications—comprise the crux of his request for a sentence reduction.

The First Step Act and COVID-19 have redefined the compassionate release landscape. Because this court had little opportunity to examine compassionate release before this annus horribilis , technical questions regarding § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s requirements and standards of review long went unanswered. Our recent decision in United States v. Ruffin , 978 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2020), unravels some of these mysteries. In lockstep with Ruffin , we hold that sentence-modification decisions pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A) embody a three-step inquiry: district courts must "find" both that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant [a sentence] reduction"³ and that "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission" before considering all relevant sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We resolve a debate that we first teed up in Ruffin , holding that U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13 is not an "applicable" policy statement in cases where incarcerated persons file their own motions in district court for compassionate release. We also hold that the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard requires district courts to supply specific factual reasons

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for their compassionate release decisions.

Here, the district court found for the sake of argument that an extraordinary and compelling circumstance existed in Jones's case but that the § 3553(a) factors counseled against granting compassionate release. The district judge, however, did not refer to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 in rendering its extraordinary-and-compelling finding. Because Jones—not the BOP—filed a motion for compassionate release, the district court did not need to refer to § 1B1.13 in its decision. Further, the district court satisfied its obligation to explain its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. Thus, we AFFIRM .

I. BACKGROUND

Last year, Jones pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine base, R. 135 (Superseding Information), and the district court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of ten years in prison, R. 189 (Sent'g Hr'g at 12) (Page ID #1391).⁴ Jones is serving his sentence at FCI Elkton. R. 190–1 (Pro Se Mot. at 1) (Page ID #1398). In mid-2020, Jones filed a pro se emergency motion and a supplemental motion by counsel seeking compassionate release. R. 190 (Pro Se Mot.); R. 193 (Suppl. Mot.).⁵ Jones asserted that "[t]he outbreak of COVID-19 at Elkton is an extraordinary and compelling circumstance that justifies a reduction in [his] custodial sentence." R. 193 (Suppl. Mot. at 2) (Page ID #1404). Jones contended that he exhibited symptoms of COVID-19, "including a dry cough, lack of taste and smell, chills, respiratory trouble, and an intermittent fever," but was not tested until May 22, 2020, id. , "weeks after his symptoms began[,]" id. at 8 (Page ID #1410).⁶ Three medical factors may expose Jones to a high risk of complications associated with COVID-19: Jones may have respiratory issues due his exposure to tuberculosis in 2003, id. at 10 (Page ID #1412), he is over forty years old, id. , and he is obese, R. 202 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 1) (Page ID #1539). According to Jones, that "inmates at Elkton continue to die[ ] demonstrat[es] that the medical capabilities of the BOP are leading to otherwise preventable deaths." R. 193 (Suppl. Mot. at 2) (Page ID #1404). Accordingly, Jones requested that the district court "reduce his sentence to time served" and that he be placed on supervised release so that he could get the "appropriate diagnosis and

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treatment that he requires." Id. at 3 (Page ID #1405).

The district court denied Jones's motion. R. 202 (Dist Ct. Op. at 1) (Page ID #1539). The court explained that it "may reduce a prisoner's sentence if (1) ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction’ and (2) ‘such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission’ [pursuant to] 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)." Id. "[A]lso," the district court found that it "must consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ‘to the extent that they are applicable.’ " Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ). The district court acknowledged Jones's "several arguments for release[,]" including that Jones "is confined at FCI Elkton, one of the least-successful prisons in the fight against COVID-19"; "allegedly faces a high risk of virus-related complications due to obesity and a 2003 bout with tuberculosis"; and "[h]is crime of conviction was a nonviolent drug offense, and he has behaved well during his current incarceration[.]" Id. at 1–2 (Page ID #1539–40). "Nevertheless," the district court found, "early release is inappropriate in light of the Section 3553(a) factors." Id. at 2 (Page ID #1540). At no point did the district court refer to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, the Sentencing Commission's policy statement regarding compassionate release.

On appeal, Jones argues that the district court "abused its discretion in denying Mr. Jones's release based on an improper weighing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors." Appellant's Br. at 2, 6. Further, Jones and the Government take opposing positions on whether "[f]ederal courts have the ability under [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.13 to consider any extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, notwithstanding Application Note 1." Appellant's Reply Br. at 1; cf. Appellee's Br. at 20 ("[T]he relevant policy statement of the Commission is binding on the Court.").⁷

Jones's case raises three queries that are relevant to all compassionate release cases: what are the necessary components of a compassionate release decision; must a district court defer to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 in rendering its "extraordinary and compelling circumstance" decision; and what does it take for a district court to satisfy its obligation to explain the factual reasons undergirding its compassionate release decision? To answer these three questions, we start with a short historical review.

II. THE HISTORY OF COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

We begin with the origin of compassionate release. In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress abolished federal parole and forbade the federal courts from "modify[ing] a term of imprisonment once it has

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been imposed[.]" Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, Title II, ch. 2, § 212(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 1998 (enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) ). Congress carved out an exception known as compassionate release: federal courts could reduce a sentence when "warrant[ed]" by "extraordinary and compelling reasons[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (1984).

But two entities—the BOP and the Sentencing Commission—circumscribed the courts’ ability to reduce sentences under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See id. For thirty-four years, only the BOP's Director could file motions for compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (1984) and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2017). Yet the Director seldom wielded this significant power. The BOP approved only 6% of 5,400 compassionate release applications received between 2013 and 2017. See Christie Thompson, Frail, Old and Dying, but Their Only Way Out of Prison Is a Coffin , N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/us/prisons-compassionate-release-.html (citing data provided by the BOP). Between 2013 and 2017, 266 persons died in custody waiting for the Director to review their applications, half of whom were serving time for nonviolent fraud or drug crimes. Id. In 2018, only twenty-four persons were released under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: ONE YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION 47 & n.143 (Aug. 2020).

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 also provided that "[t]he [Sentencing]...