United States v. Ruffin

• Decision Date: 26 October 2020
• Docket Number: No. 20-5748,20-5748
• Citation: 978 F.3d 1000
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Keith Paris RUFFIN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

978 F.3d 1000

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Keith Paris RUFFIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-5748

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: October 21, 2020

Decided and Filed: October 26, 2020

ARGUED: Matthew Ahn, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant. Debra A. Breneman, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Matthew Ahn, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant. Debra A. Breneman, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, Donald Wayne Taylor, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Greeneville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Before: BATCHELDER, GRIFFIN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Keith Ruffin, a federal prisoner serving a lengthy prison term, suffers from many health conditions that he asserts increase his COVID-19 risks while in prison. He thus seeks "compassionate release" under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Traditionally, only the Bureau of Prisons could file compassionate-release motions, but the First Step Act of 2018 now permits defendants to file them too. This relief has always required the movant to identify "extraordinary and compelling reasons," a phrase that the Sentencing Commission has defined in commentary accompanying its relevant policy statement. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)–(D) (2018). Ruffin makes no claim that he qualifies for relief under any of the "extraordinary and compelling reasons" identified in the Commission's commentary. He instead argues that, after the First Step Act, district courts may find extraordinary and compelling reasons beyond those listed in this commentary. Although Ruffin raises an important legal question that has divided the courts, we need not resolve it in this case. Even when extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, the statute leaves district courts with discretion to deny relief under a balancing of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). And here, the district court denied relief to Ruffin not just because no extraordinary and compelling reasons existed, but also because the § 3553(a) factors weighed against his release. The district court did not abuse its discretion when balancing those factors, so we affirm on that alternative discretionary ground.

I

A

Along with several coconspirators, Ruffin participated in a broad drug-trafficking scheme out of Johnson City, Tennessee. United States v. Miller , 562 F. App'x 272, 277–79 (6th Cir. 2014). In 2010, a jury convicted him of four offenses: conspiring to distribute at least five kilograms of powder cocaine, conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, conspiring to launder illicit drug proceeds, and conspiring to tamper with a witness. The district court calculated Ruffin's guidelines range as between 30 years’ and life imprisonment. It chose a 30-year sentence. Id. at 279.

We affirmed Ruffin's convictions. See id. at 286–90, 312. But we vacated his sentence. Id. at 310–11. The district court had held that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010—which increased the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger certain mandatory-minimum sentences—did not apply to Ruffin. Id. at 311. The Supreme Court later clarified that the Act applied to defendants, like Ruffin, whose illegal conduct occurred before the Act's passage but whose sentencing arose after it. Dorsey v. United States , 567 U.S. 260, 263–64, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012). While the Act did not change Ruffin's guidelines range, we noted that the district court might still consider a downward variance in light of the Act's purposes. Miller , 562 F. App'x at 311. We also pointed out that Ruffin's counsel had argued that "his medical condition merited special consideration." Id.

On remand, the district court again calculated Ruffin's guidelines range as between 30 years’ and life imprisonment. And Ruffin's counsel again argued for a downward variance based on his serious health conditions. Ruffin had a blood disorder

that had caused him to suffer four strokes. He also regularly used a wheelchair due to paralysis on his left side.

When balancing the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court chose a below-guidelines sentence of 25 years in prison. Starting with the nature of the offense, the court explained that "this was a major drug trafficking conspiracy" and that Ruffin had trafficked in far greater quantities than the minimum amounts identified in the jury verdict. It also expressed concern over Ruffin's witness-tampering conviction, describing how Ruffin had discussed sending "goons" to attack a cooperating witness. Turning to Ruffin's characteristics, the court highlighted his many prior convictions and acknowledged that he was "suffering from the effects of strokes." But it discounted the mitigating value of his health conditions because they predated his current offenses and had not hindered his ability to commit them. The court nevertheless opted to grant a downward variance for two other reasons: because of Ruffin's rehabilitation efforts in prison and because of a pending guidelines amendment that would decrease his guidelines range.

B

Ruffin has now served 10 years of his 25-year sentence. The Bureau of Prisons anticipates it will release him in November 2031. In May 2020, however, Ruffin sought early "compassionate release" under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Like many others, Ruffin understandably worries about the risks from COVID-19. Unlike many others, he says that his health conditions exacerbate those risks. In addition to the blood disorder

that caused his strokes and partial paralysis, Ruffin suffers from heart problems, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and blood clots. He thus argued that the general risks from COVID-19 combined with his unique health problems provided the "extraordinary and compelling reasons" needed for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The district court initially found that Ruffin failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he had not waited 30 days from the time that he sought relief with the Bureau of Prisons before seeking judicial relief. It held his motion in abeyance.

After 30 days passed, the district court denied Ruffin's motion on the merits. It invoked three grounds. The court initially held that Ruffin's health concerns did not provide "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for relief. The Sentencing Commission defined this phrase to cover only medical conditions that substantially diminish a defendant's ability to provide "self-care" in prison. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(ii). Ruffin could adequately care for himself. And COVID-19 did not change things because the Bureau of Prisons’ preventive measures had contained the spread of the disease in the prison housing Ruffin.

Next, the court noted that the Sentencing Commission's guidance required Ruffin to show that, if released, he would not be a "danger" to the community. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). The court found that Ruffin also could not satisfy this element because of his extensive criminal record.

Lastly, the court held that the § 3553(a) factors counseled against reducing Ruffin's sentence. The court reiterated that Ruffin had only served a fraction of that sentence and that his immediate release would not reflect the seriousness of his offenses.

II

Since the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, federal law has generally prohibited a district court from "modify[ing] a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) ; Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, ch. II, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1998. Section 3582(c) does, however, identify a few exceptions. As relevant here, a court may grant so-called "compassionate release" by reducing a defendant's sentence in "extraordinary" circumstances:

[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (The statute includes a separate basis for compassionate release tied to the defendant's age and years in prison, but Ruffin does not rely on this provision. Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).) Section 3582(c) ’s text identifies both the process for bringing these reduction-of-sentence motions and the substantive requirements for granting them.

A

We start with the process. Over the years, district courts rarely considered these motions. See United States v. Rodriguez , 451 F. Supp. 3d 392, 395–96 (E.D. Pa. 2020). That is because § 3582(c)(1)(A) historically permitted a court to grant relief only "upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012). When the Bureau of Prisons refused to file a motion, therefore, a defendant could not separately file one. See United States v. Alam , 960 F.3d 831, 834–35 (6th Cir. 2020). Not only that, the defendant could not use other causes of action (such as a habeas petition) to obtain judicial review of the Bureau of Prisons’ refusal to file the reduction-of-sentence motion. See Crowe v. United States , 430 F. App'x 484, 485 (6th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing cases).

Things changed with the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. It amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow defendants to...