United States v. Jones, 71-1409.
| Citation | 450 F.2d 523 |
| Decision Date | 09 November 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 71-1409.,71-1409. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronnie JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
A. L. Hernden, Alan Brown, San Antonio, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
Seagal V. Wheatley, U. S. Atty., Wayne F. Speck, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before TUTTLE, INGRAHAM and RONEY, Circuit Judges.
This appeal raises the narrow question whether an airline ticket is a "security" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2311. Appellant Jones, who caused forged airline tickets to be transported in interstate commerce, was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2314 which proscribes the interstate carriage of "any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities." We reverse.
The case was tried by the court without a jury on stipulated facts. Jones, an employee of Braniff International Airlines, obtained through an acquaintance two blank airline tickets belonging to Braniff. Jones filled out and validated these tickets for use by third parties, although he had not been authorized by Braniff to do so. Subsequently the tickets were used by the third parties for roundtrip passage between San Antonio, Texas and Acapulco, Mexico.
As a matter of general business practice Braniff permits the redemption of its tickets for cash or for another ticket of equal value, should the ticket holder choose to cancel his reservation. In addition, although the tickets state that they are not transferable, Braniff does not ordinarily check the identification of its passengers, but will simply admit on board the holder of its ticket without requiring proof of ownership.
The District Court, 320 F.Supp. 578, found appellant guilty of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 which, among other things, makes it a federal crime for anyone with unlawful or fraudulent intent to transport in "interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited." Appellant here argues that airline tickets are not securities and that therefore he cannot be convicted of this particular crime. We agree.
The term "securities", as used in § 2314, is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2311 to include:
"* * * any note, stock certificate, bond, debenture, check, draft, warrant, traveler\'s check, letter of credit, warehouse receipt, negotiable bill of lading, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferrable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate; certificate of interest in property, tangible or intangible; instrument or document or writing evidencing ownership of goods, wares, and merchandise, or transferring or assigning any right, title, or interest in or to goods, wares, and merchandise; or, in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, warrant, or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing, or any forged, counterfeited, or spurious representation of any of the foregoing; * * *." (Emphasis added.)
The government argues that since a Braniff airline ticket is redeemable for cash, it is an "evidence of indebtedness" and, thus, a security within the meaning of the statute. However, the term "evidence of indebtedness" must be construed in the context of the entire definition. It is to be noted that "Securities" is defined with great particularity and that except for "evidence of indebtedness" each of the other documents listed in Section 2311 has a specific and commercially-cognizable referent. We therefore think it doubtful that Congress intended "evidence of indebtedness" to be viewed as a catchall rubric embracing any and all writings, not otherwise specifically listed, which represent an obligation on the part of the writer to do something for the holder.1
Of course, the term can have various meanings depending on the context of its use, Merrill v. United States, 338 F. 2d 763 (CA 5, 1964), but we do not think it should be stretched to include writings which in common commercial parlance would not be referred to as true evidences of indebtedness. Congress, in enacting § 2311, clearly manifested its intention to limit the meaning of security to specific commercial instruments and to those documents which commonly pass as securities. Tickets of any sort, including airline...
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...since such a decision does not place any pressure upon the right of an accused to a jury trial. Briefly, in United States v. Jones, 450 F.2d 523 (5th Cir.1971), this Court found that as a matter of law an airline ticket was not a security under section 2311. 5 Similarly, in Merrill v. Unite......
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