United States v. Kirkland

• Decision Date: 13 October 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 3-75-178.
• Citation: 405 F. Supp. 1024
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Walter H. KIRKLAND, d/b/a Kirkland Brothers Distributors, and Casualty Reciprocal Exchange.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

405 F. Supp. 1024

UNITED STATES of America v. Walter H. KIRKLAND, d/b/a Kirkland Brothers Distributors, and Casualty Reciprocal Exchange.

Civ. No. 3-75-178.

United States District Court, E. D. Tennessee, N. D.

October 13, 1975.

W. Thomas Dillard, Asst. U. S. Atty., Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff.

David E. Smith, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge.

This case involves the question of whether the United States can maintain an action against an Armed Forces veteran's employer or workmen's compensation carrier for the value of hospital and medical services furnished free of charge to the veteran for injuries sustained in the course of his employment. All parties have moved for summary judgment on the issue of the Government's right to maintain this action. The facts, to the extent necessary to rule on the motions for summary judgment, have been established by the complaint, the answers, admissions, and the pre-trial order.

Daniel Stewart is a veteran who was injured on November 28, 1973, in the course of his employment with defendant Walter H. Kirkland, d/b/a Kirkland Brothers Distributors hereinafter "Kirkland". Defendant Casualty Reciprocal Exchange hereinafter CRE is Kirkland's workmen's compensation carrier under the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act, T.C.A. § 50-901 et seq. Stewart was hospitalized at University of Tennessee Memorial Hospital until January 22, 1974, when he was transferred to the Veterans Administration hereinafter "VA" Hospital in Memphis.¹ On February 14, 1974, VA obtained an assignment of all claims that Stewart might have by reason of workmen's compensation insurance. Kirkland was notified on the same date of Stewart's admission and the assignment. Stewart remained at the VA Hospital until June 7, 1974.

CRE paid the cost of Stewart's hospitalization at the University of Tennessee Memorial Hospital. The VA sent four bills to CRE for services rendered, the last of which was dated June 21, 1974 and stated an amount due of $10,073.64. CRE denied payment and the Government instituted the present action.

The present case represents one facet of a continuing controversy over the Government's right to be reimbursed by third persons for the cost of such hospital and medical services. The issues presently before the Court can be placed in proper perspective by reviewing four previous cases in which courts have addressed similar or closely related issues. The first such case is United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947).

In Standard Oil, a soldier was hit by a truck under circumstances creating tort liability in both the owner and driver of the truck. The Government bore the soldier's hospitalization expenses and continued to pay him his military salary during the disability period. The Government filed an action in District Court against the owner and driver of the truck to recover the money expended for hospitalization and military salary during the disability period. The District Court rendered judgment on the Government's behalf, 60 F.Supp. 807 (S.D.Cal.1945), and the Court of Appeals reversed, 153 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1946). Although the Government's claim amounted only to $192.76, the Supreme Court granted certiorari "because of the novelty and importance of the principal question," 332 U.S. 301, 302, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1605.

The Supreme Court considered the Government's claim as something more than the claim of a subrogee to the soldier's rights against the third party tortfeasors. Significantly, the Court found that the claim was predicated upon an independent liability owed directly to the Government for tortious interference with the Government-soldier relationship. Id. at 304, n. 5, 67 S.Ct. 1604. The Government's right in this situation, the Court reasoned, "comes down in final consequence to a question of federal fiscal policy." Id. at 314, 67 S.Ct. at 1611. Declining to exercise judicial power in that area, the Court stated:

"Whatever the merits of the policy, its conversion into law is a proper subject for congressional action, not for any creative power of ours. Congress, not this Court or the other federal courts, is the custodian of the national purse. By the same token it is the primary and most often the exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs. And these comprehend, as we have said, securing the treasury or the government against financial losses however inflicted, including requiring reimbursement for injuries creating them, as well as filling the treasury itself." Id. at 314-15, 67 S.Ct. at 1611.

Congressional response to Standard Oil was slow in coming. Fifteen years later Congress enacted the Medical Care Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2651-53, which conferred an independent federal right of recovery on the Government.²

Whether the Medical Care Recovery Act created an independent federal right against workmen's compensation carriers was squarely addressed in Pennsylvania National Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 445 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1971). In Pennsylvania National, the Fifth Circuit held that the Medical Care Recovery Act applies only "in tort situations and does not apply where the source of the claim is workmen's compensation." 445 F.2d at 575. Relying on Standard Oil, supra, the Court declined to fashion a rule creating a federal right of recovery against a workmen's compensation carrier and held that legislative rather than judicial action was appropriate.

The Pennsylvania National Court, however, left open the question of whether the Government could obtain an assignment of a veteran's workmen's compensation claim and successfully maintain an action on that basis. Id. at 576. The Veterans Administration has promulgated a regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 17.48(d)³ which, if valid, would enable the Government to procure an assignment of the veteran's workmen's compensation claim as a condition to his admission to a VA Hospital. The regulation presumably was intended to allow the Government to seek reimbursement on the basis of the assignment alone. The facts in Pennsylvania National, however, precluded the Court from considering the regulation, for the VA did not obtain an assignment from the veteran covered by workmen's compensation insurance. The Court held that it could not "impute to the framers of the regulation an intent that it be invoked in the absence of an assignment." Id. at 576.

Two district courts subsequently addressed the question of whether the Government could maintain an action against an employer or his workmen's compensation carrier on the basis of an assignment procured pursuant to 38 C. F.R. § 17.48(d). Both courts reached opposite conclusions, largely because of their disagreement on whether the VA had the authority to promulgate § 17.48(d).

In United States v. Chicago White Metal Casting Co., Civ. No. 73 C 2424 (N.D.Ill., Jan. 16, 1974), the Government brought an action against a veteran's employer after obtaining from the veteran an assignment of his workmen's compensation claim. The Court first held that § 17.48(d) was valid, as it was based upon the authority of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs to make necessary rules and regulations, 38 U.S. C. § 210(c), and to prescribe rules, procedures, and limitations concerning hospital care, id. § 621. Pennsylvania National, supra, was also relied on by the Court as "indirect support" for this holding. The Court considered the Fifth Circuit's statement that "any right of the Veterans Administration to recover was conditioned upon the procurement of an assignment," 445 F.2d at 574, as an implicit holding that recovery would have been allowed had an assignment been procured.

The Court then concluded that the action could be maintained on the basis of an assignment alone, even though workmen's compensation claims were not assignable under state law. The Court reasoned that state law, to the extent it purported to prohibit the assignment, was invalid because of the supremacy clause.

In Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. United States, 390 F.Supp. 142 (N.D. Tex.1975), however, the Court held that § 17.48(d) was invalid to the extent that it created a right of recovery in the VA against a workmen's compensation insurance carrier. Id. at 148. The Court reasoned that to allow the VA to sue on the basis of an assignment would, in effect, permit an administrative agency to "create `a new substantial legal liability' affecting `the federal fiscal policy'" Id. Unlike the Court in Chicago White Metal Casting, supra, the Texas Employers Court concluded that the Fifth Circuit's statement in Pennsylvania National merely indicated that it did not consider whether § 17.48(d) gave the VA authority to prosecute a claim by virtue of an assignment. Id. at 148-49.

Finally, the Court rejected the Government's argument that the state statute prohibiting assignment of workmen's compensation claims was superseded by the supremacy clause. The Court reasoned that the anti-assignment provision was an integral part of the workmen's compensation contract, and that the "Workmen's Compensation Act is a package deal, and must be accepted as such by any litigant seeking to recover benefits under it." Id. at 150.

The first issue before the Court in the present case is whether § 17.48 (d), if valid, creates a right of recovery in the Government. An examination of the regulation shows that it defines the circumstances in which a veteran suffering from a non-service-connected disability will be furnished hospital, medical and surgical care at Government expense. The only reasonable construction that can be placed on § 17.48 is that it provides that veterans will not be treated free of charge in situations in which there is liability for such treatment in an employer or workmen's compensation carrier unless VA can enforce that liability by taking an assignment.⁴ If VA cannot be reimbursed on the basis of an assignment, the veteran presumably must be...