United States v. Knight, Cr. No. 10696.
Decision Date | 17 December 1954 |
Docket Number | Cr. No. 10696. |
Citation | 127 F. Supp. 269 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Willie Lee KNIGHT, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Willie Lee Knight, pro. per.
On Jan. 22, 1953, Willie Lee Knight was sentenced by this Court to five years in prison for violating 26 U.S.C. § 2553 (a). He requested, and was granted a stay of mittimus for one day to take care of various business and personal effects. During this "day of grace" Knight committed two further violations of the law by attempting to dispose of an estimated $300,000 worth of narcotics by mailing same to San Francisco. This transaction was discovered by the Bureau of Narcotics. Knight was indicted on February 18, 1953, for violating 21 U.S.C.A. § 174 and 26 U.S.C. § 2553(a).
Being fully advised and having waived counsel, the record at the time of arraignment and plea on Feb. 20, 1953, shows the following with respect to the contentions made here by the defendant in this motion:
After being accorded a full opportunity to be heard prior to sentence, the defendant was thereafter, on the same day, sentenced to 10 years on each count, the sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively with the first sentence he was already serving.
Knight now moves the Court to correct the sentences pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2255. He alleges no written information was filed by the United States Attorney as required by 26 U.S.C. § 2557 (b) (1), the Boggs Act, and therefore the sentences given under this statute are illegal and excessive. He further alleges that an information cannot now be filed by the United States Attorney, as it would be a denial of due process, and that his sentence should be corrected to a five year term.1
This motion may be decided without requiring the production of the prisoner, as no issues of fact are presented, the only questions arising being of a legal nature. U. S. v. Hayman, 1952, 342 U.S. 205, 72 S.Ct. 263, 96 L.Ed. 232; Barrett v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 1950, 180 F.2d 510, 20 A.L.R.2d 965, certiorari denied 1950, 340 U.S. 897, 71 S.Ct. 234, 95 L. Ed. 650; U. S. v. Sturm, 7 Cir., 1950, 180 F.2d 413; U. S. v. Fleenor, 7 Cir., 1949, 177 F.2d 482.
There was no written information filed by the United States Attorney as should have been done pursuant to statute. However, the information required by 26 U.S.C. § 2557 (b) (1) is not of the usual technical legal type. Its function is not to charge the accused with a crime for which he will be prosecuted, the situation where the traditional information is used. In re Bonner, 1894, 151 U.S. 242, 257, 14 S.Ct. 323, 38 L.Ed. 149. Rather it is designed to inform the court with the seriousness of the defendant's repeated acts, to notify the defendant that he is exposed to heavy punishment, and to require the court to inflict a severe mandatory penalty if the defendant is in fact a second offender. As stated in the legislative history of 26 U.S.C. § 2557(b) (1), U.S.Code Congressional and Administrative Service, 82nd Congress, First Session 1951, Vol. 2, p. 2602, "The purpose of the bill is to make more stringent and more uniform the penalties which would be imposed". Because of the severity of the mandatory sentences involved, procedural safeguards were devised to protect the accused. The defendant can have a jury trial to determine his identity as a second offender — not to determine if he is guilty of a distinct crime.
The information involved here is thus one that should be interpreted in the ordinary dictionary sense of the word: to simply inform the court and defendant of a fact to be taken into consideration for sentencing purposes. In the present case the defendant admits in his pleading that he is a second narcotics offender and factually within the confines of 26 U.S.C. § 2557(b)(1). The basis of his claim is that a technical defect voided part of his sentence.
"It is well established that a sentence which does not comply with the letter of the criminal statute which authorizes it is so erroneous that it may be set aside on appeal." Bozza v. U. S., 1947, 330 U.S. 160, 67 S.Ct. 645, 648, 91 L.Ed. 818 in a similar vein, Reynolds v. U. S., 1878, 98 U.S. 145, 168-169, 25 L.Ed. 244. The basis of these decisions is that a defendant would be injured if this were not done. Here, however, the letter of the law as to his sentence was followed; the technical defect occurred in a procedural matter prior to the actual sentencing.
The defendant was not injured in any way by the omission of a written information. He admits being a second offender in the same court in the same district before the same judge, who found him guilty of his first offense just one month before his second conviction. The Boggs Act...
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