United States v. Lancaster

• Decision Date: 07 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-6571,20-6571
• Citation: 997 F.3d 171
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Christopher LANCASTER, Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

997 F.3d 171

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Christopher LANCASTER, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 20-6571

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: March 9, 2021

Decided: May 7, 2021

ARGUED: Eric Joseph Brignac, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Quattlebaum joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

Christopher Lancaster, who was sentenced in 2010 to 180 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to traffic in crack cocaine and cocaine powder, filed a motion in February 2020 under the First Step Act of 2018 to have his sentence reduced to the sentence that would have been imposed had the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 been in effect at the time of his offense. The district court denied Lancaster's motion, concluding on the merits that it would have imposed the same sentence on him had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect. The district court did not, however, "recalculate [Lancaster's] Guidelines range" in light of "intervening case law," United States v. Chambers , 956 F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 2020), and apparently did not consider the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in light of current circumstances. Lancaster argues that had the district court conducted that analysis, he would have received a reduced sentence mainly because he no longer qualifies as a career offender for purposes of sentencing. We agree with Lancaster that additional analysis was required and vacate the district court's order, remanding for further consideration of his motion.

I

In 2009, Lancaster pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine powder and 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The mandatory minimum sentence for that crime was 10 years’ imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). Prior to sentencing, the Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report, which stated that Lancaster was responsible for 6,500 grams of cocaine powder and 11,339 grams of crack cocaine, resulting in a Sentencing Guidelines offense level of 38. The presentence report stated that Lancaster was also a "career offender," as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, resulting in an alternative offense level of 37. When Lancaster objected to some drug quantities attributed to him in the presentence report, the district court sustained the objection but did not make its own findings as to drug weight. Instead, it opted to calculate Lancaster's Guidelines range based on his status as a career offender. This, along with a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, led to a recommended Guidelines range of 262 to 367 months’ imprisonment. On January 6, 2010, the court imposed a downward variance sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment, which Lancaster is now serving.

Later that same year, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced the sentences for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) involving crack cocaine and, derivatively, § 846 for conspiracy to violate § 841(a). Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). It did so by raising the quantity of crack cocaine required to trigger § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) ’s 10-year mandatory minimum sentence from 50 grams to 280 grams and the amount required to trigger § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) ’s 5-year mandatory minimum sentence from 5 grams to 28 grams. Thus, after the Fair Sentencing Act, a violation involving 50 grams of crack cocaine would trigger § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) ’s 5-year mandatory minimum sentence.

In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018, § 404 of which made the Fair Sentencing Act sentence reductions retroactive. Pub L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). It did so by authorizing district courts to impose a reduced sentence on specified "covered offenses" as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time the offenses were committed. Id . § 404(b).

Relying on the opportunity provided by the First Step Act, Lancaster filed a motion in February 2020, requesting that the district court impose a reduced sentence because "he [was] eligible for relief under Section 404 of the First Step Act."

After Lancaster filed his motion, the Probation Office prepared a Sentence Reduction Report, which stated that "the guideline range remains the same and it appears the court would have imposed the same sentence had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced." Lancaster objected to the report, contending that the Guidelines range would not be the same because, under current law, he no longer qualified as a career offender. Thus, he argued, the district court should calculate his Guidelines range based on drug weight, which, when paired with a variance proportional to the one that the court applied at his sentencing, would result in a sentence of 103 months’ imprisonment, 77 months shorter than his original sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. And because he had already served more than 103 months at the time he filed his motion, he requested that his sentence be reduced to time served and that he therefore be released.

The district court denied Lancaster's motion, explaining:

Although the defendant pleaded guilty to a covered offense, the court has considered the defendant's motion on the merits and, in its discretion, denies the motion. Had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect at the time of his original sentencing, the court would have imposed the same sentence.

From the district court's order dated April 21, 2020, Lancaster filed this appeal.

II

Lancaster's 15-year sentence is now over 11 years old, and in furtherance of the important interest of finality, it generally should not be disturbed. Indeed, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) provides that a court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." But that provision also contains exceptions, one of which allows a court to "modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute." Id . § 3582(c)(1)(B). And by enactment of the First Step Act of 2018, Congress provided such an exception, which we now address. See United States v. Wirsing , 943 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that § 3582(c)(1)(B) is the appropriate vehicle for consideration of First Step Act motions).

Section 404 of the First Step Act authorizes district courts to "impose a reduced sentence" for specific "covered offense[s]." First Step Act, § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222. And the Act defines a covered offense to be "a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, that was committed before August 3, 2010." Id . § 404(a) (citation omitted). Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act, in turn, reduced the sentences for trafficking in crack cocaine by raising the threshold quantity of crack for a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence from 50 grams to 280 grams and the threshold quantity for a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence from 5 grams to 28 grams. Fair Sentencing Act, § 2, 124 Stat. at 2372; 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B)(iii). Finally, the First Step Act provides that the court "may ... impose a reduced sentence as if" § 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act "were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed." First Step Act, § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222. But the First Step Act makes clear that such a decision is discretionary. Id . § 404(b), (c).

Accordingly, a district court presented with a First Step Act motion to reduce a sentence must first determine whether the sentence qualifies for reduction — i.e., whether it is "eligible" for consideration "on the merits." United States v. Gravatt , 953 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wirsing , 943 F.3d at 185 ). This eligibility determination is not a function of discretion but simply of applying the explicit criteria set forth in the First Step Act. First , the sentence sought to be reduced must be for a "covered offense" — that is, "a violation of a Federal criminal statute the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, and that was committed before August 3, 2010." First Step Act, § 404(a), 132 Stat. at 5222 (citation omitted). We have concluded that a "covered offense" includes violations under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B)(iii), and (b)(1)(C). See Wirsing , 943 F.3d at 186 ; Gravatt , 953 F.3d at 259 ; United States v. Woodson , 962 F.3d at 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2020). Second , the motion for a reduction must be addressed to the court that imposed the subject sentence. First Step Act, § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222; cf . 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (requiring that § 2255 motions challenging sentences be made to "the court which imposed the sentence"). And third , the sentence must not have been "previously imposed or previously reduced" under the Fair Sentencing Act and must not have been the subject of a motion made after enactment of the First Step Act that was denied "after a complete review of the motion on the merits." First Step Act, § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222; see also Wirsing , 943 F.3d at 186 ; Woodson , 962 F.3d at 814.

Upon determining that a sentence qualifies for review on the merits, the court is then given discretion to impose a reduced sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act...