United States v. Lattimore
| Decision Date | 23 October 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 1879-52,1016-54.,1879-52 |
| Citation | 125 F. Supp. 295 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Owen LATTIMORE, Defendant (two cases). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Leo A. Rover, John W. Jackson, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
Thurman Arnold, Joseph C. O'Mahoney, Washington, D. C., for defendant.
The United States Attorney has filed an affidavit of bias and prejudice against me. A Special Assistant to the Attorney General has certified that the affidavit is made in good faith.1
The affidavit asserts that I have a "fixed opinion" that the defendant Lattimore is innocent, and therefore, in order to "insure * * * a fair and impartial trial", I should disqualify myself. In support of these charges the affidavit relies on certain language in the Memorandum Opinion setting forth my rulings dismissing certain counts of the original indictment. D.C., 112 F.Supp. 507.
The Government appealed from my rulings and our Court of Appeals, D.C. Cir., 215 F.2d 847, sitting en banc, reviewed them. Eight of our nine distinguished Appellate Judges sustained me in dismissing the most vital count in the indictment. Four of the nine Judges were for sustaining my action in toto. There is nothing, and the present affidavit makes no claim that there is anything, in any of the views expressed by any of our nine Appellate Judges that gives the slightest color to the charge of bias against me.2
The Government did not ask the Supreme Court to review the action of the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Government must have believed there was no valid basis within the judicial process for pursuing further review of my rulings in the case. The lack of such valid basis, however, neither exhausted nor restrained the resourcefulness of the Government's legal representatives in this litigation. They filed the present affidavit.
Under applicable law, I cannot concern myself with the truth or falsity, but only with the legal sufficiency of the allegations of fact on which the affiant bases his charge of bias and prejudice. I note, however, that these allegations, as distinguished from the inference of prejudgment that the affiant would derive from them, are plainly true. The factual allegations are simply that in taking judicial action in this case I used certain words. These words cannot reasonably be thought to "give fair support" to an inference of bias and prejudice. Moreover, the Supreme Court determined long ago "* * * that the bias or prejudice which can be urged against a judge must be based upon something other than rulings in the case." Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31, 41 S.Ct. 230, 232, 65 L.Ed. 481. Obviously, therefore, it must be based upon something other than the words the judge uses in setting forth his...
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