United States v. Ledbetter, Case No. 2:15-CR-080
| Decision Date | 20 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:14-CR-127,Case No. 2:15-CR-080 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT B. LEDBETTER, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT B. LEDBETTER, et al. Defendants.
Case No. 2:15-CR-080
Case No. 2:14-CR-127
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
August 20, 2015
Judge Algenon L. Marbley
OPINION & ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' motions to dismiss various charges due to a purported lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.1 Defendants argue that the Government has overstepped its bounds by prosecuting purely local, street-level crimes under federal statutes without a sufficient showing that the crimes affected interstate commerce. Defendants contend that their prosecution exceeds the federal government's power under the Commerce Clause and thus deprives this Court of jurisdiction. Defendants, however, have miscast their argument. Whether the Government can prove the necessary interstate commerce nexus for the crimes alleged goes to the sufficiency of the Government's evidence at trial—not to this Court's power to hear the case. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants' motions to dismiss.
Page 2
On June 23, 2014, a federal grand jury returned a twenty-five count Indictment in Case Number 2:14-cr-127, charging seventeen defendants with a number of violations under federal law connected to the defendants' alleged involvement in the Short North Posse, an alleged criminal organization in the Short North area of Columbus, Ohio. (Doc. 14). The first count in the Indictment alleged the existence of a RICO conspiracy from 2005 until 2014, in which members and affiliates of the Short North Posse committed murder, attempted murder and robbery, distributed and possessed with the intent to distribute controlled substances, tampered with witnesses, and committed acts of extortion, robbery, and retaliation against witnesses. The remaining counts included eleven counts of murder in aid of racketeering, one count of murder through the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, four counts of murder through the use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, one count of conspiracy to murder a witness, one count of use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, four counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and one count of possession with intent to distribute heroin.
On October 20, 2014, the grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment adding three new defendants and thirteen counts, bringing the total to twenty defendants and thirty-eight counts. (Doc. 300). These thirteen new counts included one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, five counts of use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, murder in aid of racketeering, four counts of possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and one count of witness tampering. The three new defendants were Andre M. Brown, Johnathan Holt, and Christopher V. Wharton.
Page 3
On April 2, 2015, the grand jury returned another Indictment that was later assigned as a separate case—Case Number 2:15-cr-080. The 2015 Indictment named four defendants (Robert B. Ledbetter, Christopher A. Harris, Rashad A. Liston, and Deounte Ussury), all of whom were charged previously in the Superseding Indictment in Case Number 2:14-cr-127. The 2015 Indictment also included two new counts: one for murder in aid of racketeering and one for murder through the use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime—both related to the murder of Marschell Brumfield, Jr. in 2007. Due to the similarity of the charges in both cases and the fact that all four defendants also were charged in Count One of the Superseding Indictment for their role in the RICO conspiracy, this Court joined Case Number 2:15-cr-080 with Case Number 2:14-cr-127 under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 13. (Doc. 595).
In total, fourteen defendants are charged in the RICO conspiracy count, which includes 112 overt acts allegedly committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Government, moreover, has reserved the right to adduce evidence of any overt act about which it has evidence, regardless of whether the Superseding Indictment specifically identifies that overt act. The six defendants who do not face the conspiracy charge are all charged with at least one count of murder in aid of racketeering relating to their membership and/or association with the Short North Posse, among other charges. Under the Superseding Indictment in Case Number 2:14-cr-127 and the 2015 Indictment in Case Number 2:15-cr-080, the defendants collectively face a total of forty counts. Although fourteen defendants initially faced a potential capital prosecution, the Government recently informed the Court and the defendants of its intent not to seek the death penalty for any of the defendants. (Doc. 563).
Page 4
Defendants argue that several charges lack a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce and thus deprive this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Defendants challenge the Court's ability to adjudicate the following charges: RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); murder in aid of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1); and murder through the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j). Defendants expressly disclaim making a facial challenge to the constitutionality of these statutes. Instead, Defendants challenge the constitutionality of the statutes as applied in the instant prosecution. Defendants argue that the crimes alleged, while "violent and meaningless," are nevertheless "local" crimes, whose prosecution belongs in state court. (See, e.g., Doc. 226).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) provides that "[a] motion that the court lacks jurisdiction may be made at any time while the case is pending." Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2).2 Rule 12(b)(1) circumscribes this power, however, by limiting the pretrial defenses a party may raise to those "the court can determine without a trial on the merits." Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1) (emphasis added). Courts can resolve motions to dismiss without a trial if they "involve[] questions of law instead of questions of fact on the merits of criminal liability." United States v. Craft, 106 F.3d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir. 1997). In other words, courts may rule on a pretrial motion to dismiss, and may make preliminary factual findings necessary to decide questions of law raised therein, so long as the court's conclusions "do not invade the province of the jury." Id.
Page 5
Against this procedural backdrop, it is well settled that defendants cannot base a pretrial motion to dismiss on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument because such a motion raises factual questions best left for the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 468 & n.2 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[A] defendant may not challenge an indictment on the ground that it is not supported by sufficient evidence [before the grand jury], as observed by the dissent." (quotation omitted)); United States v. DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d 659, 660 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Unless there is a stipulated record . . . a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment is not a permissible vehicle for addressing the sufficiency of the government's evidence."); United States v. Brown, 481 F.2d 1035, 1041 (8th Cir. 1973) ("There is no authority under Rule 12, however, to dismiss on the basis of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence defense . . . ."). Hence, "if a defendant's pretrial motion requires the court to find facts that make up the elements of the case which would normally be reserved to the jury . . . the motion should be denied." United States v. Cumberland Wood & Chair Corp., Nos. 91-6058 to 91-6060, 978 F.2d 1259, 1992 WL 317175, at *3 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision).
Defendants argue that a trio of Supreme Court decisions delineating the reach of the Commerce Clause forecloses their prosecution in federal court because the charges they face lack a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce. (E.g., Doc. 226 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000))). Defendants argue that these cases require a showing that the crimes alleged "had a substantial effect on interstate commerce." (Id.) Defendants further contend that absent such a showing, which "simply cannot be made," this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over their prosecution. (Id.)
Page 6
Although Defendants frame their argument as a threshold jurisdictional challenge, which the Court properly can resolve on a pretrial motion to dismiss—Defendants actually attack the sufficiency of the Government's evidence, which the jury ultimately must decide. See United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 535 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Defendants err in asserting that the interstate commerce argument goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction."). While courts frequently refer to the interstate commerce nexus as a "jurisdictional" element, this requirement "does not affect subject matter jurisdiction [and] the...
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