United States v. Legree
| Decision Date | 22 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | 18-cr-224 (DLI) |
| Citation | 375 F.Supp.3d 222 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Malike LEGREE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Mildred M. Whalen, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., Brooklyn, NY, for Defendant.
Defendant Malike Legree ("Defendant") is charged by indictment with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Indictment, Docket Entry No. 7.) On June 25, 2018, Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the firearm found by the police in a potato chip bag at his feet during a traffic stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger. He also moved to suppress his statements that Defendant claims were elicited in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The Court held a suppression hearing on August 22 and 29, 2018. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is denied in its entirety.
At the suppression hearing, the government presented the testimony of three officers with the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"). At the time of the hearing, Detective Thaddeus Grandstaff ("Det. Grandstaff") had been a police officer with the NYPD for seven years, and a detective for approximately nine months. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, August 22 and 29, 2018 ("Tr."), 13:3-8.) Sergeant Kieran Fox ("Sgt. Fox") had been a police officer for over eighteen years, and a sergeant for six years. (Tr. 96:15-18.) At the time of the hearing, Detective Reginald Smith ("Det. Smith") had been employed with the NYPD for slightly over seven years. (Tr. 150:24-25; 151:1-9.) He had been assigned to the Brooklyn North Anticrime Unit for approximately two and a half years. (Tr. 151:2-12.) The Court finds the testimony of Det. Grandstaff, Sgt. Fox, and Det. Smith credible.
Defendant did not testify at the suppression hearing, nor did he present any evidence. He submitted an affidavit attached to his motion to suppress in which he states, among other things, that he "was not engaged in any criminal activity, nor was the driver or other passenger of the vehicle." (Docket Entry No. 14-1, ¶ 2.) The Court finds the Defendant's conclusory and self-serving affidavit not credible.
In the early morning hours of April 14, 2018, Det. Grandstaff and Sgt. Kiernan Fox were on patrol in an unmarked vehicle in Brooklyn's 73rd Precinct, which they knew suffered from a high volume of violent crime. (Tr. 76:3, 118:5.) The officers were aware of a "block party" going on in the neighborhood housing projects, and were in the area to address potential criminal activity. (Tr. 98:20-25.) The officers observed a silver Chrysler 300 with air fresheners hanging in the rearview mirror in violation of New York law. (Tr. 20:8-14.) The officers decided to follow the Chrysler after observing the car turn abruptly in what they suspected was an effort to avoid marked police cars in its path. (Tr. 21:5-8; 100:22-24.) Once behind the Chrysler, the officers noticed that the vehicle did not have proper lighting over the license plate in violation of New York law and repeatedly engaged the left turn signal without turning. (Tr. 26:3-28:1; 71:15, 103:3.) They initiated a traffic stop. (Tr. 23:6.)
Upon stopping the vehicle, Sgt. Fox approached the driver, Marlon Sealey ("Sealey"), and Det. Grandstaff approached the front passenger, Kizer Williams ("Williams"). (Tr. 30:1-7.) Defendant was seated in the rear of the vehicle behind the front passenger. (Tr. 30:11.) Sgt. Fox asked Sealey for his driver's license, and Sealey produced a tattered, illegible piece of paper that appeared to have been issued by the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. (Tr. 31:15-25.) Sgt. Fox also noticed the smell of marijuana and alcohol coming from the vehicle and that the driver's eyes appeared "watery." (Tr. 105:15-17.) In addition, Det. Grandstaff noticed that Williams's hand was shaking. (Tr. 34:12.)
When Sgt. Fox asked Sealey to turn off the engine Sealey refused, stating in substance that, if he turned off the engine, it would not start again. (Tr. 31:21-23.) Sgt. Fox radioed for backup. (Tr. 128:22-24.) Sgt. Fox then asked the driver to step out of the vehicle and walked him to the back of the car. (Tr. 109:4-7.) From there, Sgt. Fox witnessed Defendant lean back in his seat and reach downward toward his waist. (Tr. 109:10-14.) Sgt. Fox then leaned around the side of the vehicle to view Defendant through the rear window on the driver's side, which was open. (Tr. 105:13.) He saw Defendant remove a black object from his waistband, lean forward, and place the object into an open bag of Wise brand potato chips lying on his lap. (Tr. 108:11-14; 109:1-18; 132:6-12.) Sgt. Fox told Defendant to stop moving around in the backseat. (Tr. 34:24-25; 76:23-24.) Defendant responded, "I'm just grabbing my drink." (Tr. 108:14.) Sgt. Fox observed Defendant reach with his right arm across his body to retrieve a can of an Arizona brand drink from the center console. (Tr. 34:17-18.)
Det. Smith arrived at the scene in response to the call for backup. From opposite the driver's side, near the rear passenger, Det. Smith noticed a folding knife on the floor of the backseat. (Tr. 158:15-25.) He ordered Defendant to "stop reaching for that knife," to which Defendant responded, "It's just a knife." (Tr. 36:19-23; 158:20-23; 159:7-9.) Within moments thereafter, Sgt. Fox shoved Det. Smith aside, opened the back door of the vehicle, and brought Defendant around to the back of the car. (Tr. 111:1-7; 159:10-13.) The timespan from the moment Sgt. Fox brought Sealey to the back of the car to the time he pulled Defendant out of the car was about "a minute, minute and a half." (Tr. 111:23.) Once Defendant was secured outside the car, Sgt. Fox searched the floor of the backseat and discovered a loaded 9mm Smith and Wesson semi-automatic pistol in the potato chip bag. (Tr. 112:1-10.) The officers arrested all three occupants and brought them to the 73rd Police Precinct for processing. Upon his arrest, Defendant spontaneously stated, (Tr. 86:25-87:7; 90:9-10.) He also stated "fuck, I just had a daughter." (Tr. 86:21-22; 90:12.)
As Det. Grandstaff was taking pedigree information from Defendant, he overheard Defendant tell Sealey and Williams (Tr. 45:6-8; 87:12-14.) Before Defendant made this statement to Sealey and Williams, Det. Grandstaff had not asked Defendant any questions other than for pedigree information. Contrary to the credible police officer testimony at the suppression hearing, Defendant's affidavit submitted with his Motion to Suppress self-servingly states:
After I arrived at the 73rd police precinct, NYPD officers again questioned me. I made statements in response to those questions. I made these statements in response to the officers' questions before they read me my Miranda rights.
(Docket Entry No. 14-1, ¶ 18.)
After Det. Grandstaff obtained Defendant's pedigree information, Defendant was brought into an interview room and read his Miranda warnings. (Tr. 46:9-10.) Defendant then asked for a lawyer. (Tr. 46:14-15.) The interview ceased, and Defendant was brought downstairs and placed in a cell without being questioned by an officer. (Tr. 46:16-19.) About two hours later, Det. Grandstaff went to the cell where the detainees were kept and asked, in substance, "Is everything alright?" (Tr. 46:23-47:1.) Defendant responded, in substance, (Id. ) Det. Grandstaff brought Defendant upstairs. Other detectives observed Det. Grandstaff bring Defendant upstairs and stopped him, saying in substance, (Tr. 446:25-47:1.) At that point, Det. Grandstaff returned Defendant to his cell downstairs and did not question him.
On June 25, 2018, Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress the firearm and his statements. (Def's Mot. to Supp, Docket Entry No. 14.) The government opposed the motion. (Govt's Mem. in Opp'n, Docket Entry No. 15.) Defendant waived his right to reply. (Def's Ltr. dated July 20, 2018, Docket Entry No. 17.)
The suppression hearing was held on August 22 and 29, 2018. The parties submitted post-hearing briefing. (Def's Post-Hrg Br., Docket Entry No. 32 ; Govt's Post-Hrg Br., Docket Entry No. 33 ; Def's Reply to Resp., Docket Entry No. 34.) Defendant argues that the firearm and his statements should be suppressed because: (1) the initial traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion; (2) the officers lacked probable cause to search the backseat of the vehicle; and (3) his statements at the scene and at the precinct were the product of custodial interrogation in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. This protection extends to vehicles. Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). "[T]he Fourth Amendment requires that an officer making a traffic stop have probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the person stopped has committed a traffic violation or is otherwise engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity." United States v. Wilson , 699 F.3d 235, 242 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A passenger may challenge the constitutionality of a traffic stop. See Brendlin v. California , 551 U.S. 249, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007).
Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court finds that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. At the suppression...
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