United States v. Legros

• Docket Number: Criminal Action 18-223-01
• Decision Date: 12 November 2021
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOHN HOMER LEGROS, JR.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOHN HOMER LEGROS, JR.

Criminal Action No. 18-223-01

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Lake Charles Division

November 12, 2021

KAY MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

MEMORANDUM RULING

DONALD E. WALTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before the Court is a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed by Petitioner John Homer Legros, Jr. ("Legros"). See Record Documents 121, 123 and 130 (which include supplements to his original motion). The Government filed a response, to which Legros replied. See Record Documents 133 and 137. For the following reasons, Legros's motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this matter have been well-summarized by the United States Court of Appeals in its ruling regarding the appeal taken by Legros of his proceedings and are as follows:

Legros pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute oxycodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. His probation officer prepared a presentence report ("PSR") that cast Legros responsible for 395 oxycodone pills. The officer determined the pills' converted drug weight was 2, 646.5 kilograms correlating to a base offense level of 30. The PSR recommended a two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) because Legros had a firearm, and another two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.1(c) based on his supervisory role in the conspiracy. The PSR calculated an adjusted offense level of 34. Because his offense concerned controlled substances, however, and because Legros had prior drug-trafficking convictions, the PSR found Legros qualified as a "career offender" under U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.1 (b)(3). His offense level under the career-offender guideline was 32, but because that offense level was lower than his otherwise applicable level under § 2D1.1, the PSR stated the higher level of 34 applied. After a three-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility his total offense level was 31. With a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of VI, the resulting sentencing range was 188-235 months.

Both the Government and Legros objected to the PSR. The Government challenged the calculation of the converted drug weight, explaining that the correct figure was 661.625 kilograms, correlating to an offense level of 27. Because that offense level was lower than the one supplied by the career-offender guideline, the Government argued that career-offender status should determine Legros's sentencing range, instead of drug quantity. The Government argued, however, that his range remained 188-235 months even under the career-offender guideline. For his part, Legros argued that the converted weight was between 60 and 80 kilograms, correlating to a base offense level of only 20. He also challenged application of the firearm enhancement, arguing that the weapon was recovered from his home and that there was no evidence drug-trafficking activity occurred there.

In an addendum to the PSR, the probation officer defended his initial calculations on converted drug weight and his application of the firearm enhancement. In response to both parties' objections, however, he noted that if the court were to determine the career-offender provisions controlled, Legros's guideline range would be 151-188 months.

At sentencing, the Government conceded error in the drug-quantity conversion but argued this was moot because the career-offender provision should govern, making Legros's range 151-188 months. Legros disagreed with the Government about the impact of the drug-quantity error, but ultimately agreed that the proper range under the career-offender guideline was 151-188 months, raising no objection to his career-offender status. . . .

Record Document 120 at 2-3.

This Court found that the career criminal calculation was correct and overruled the objections to the PSR. Legros was sentenced to 144 months imprisonment, just below the advisory range. Legros did not object to his sentence, nor did he request that his PSR be amended to reflect any corrected drug conversion weights or to remove the firearm enhancement. The statement of reasons provided that the Court had "adopted the presentence report with the following changes," namely that "[t]he government and the defense agreed to hold the defendant accountable for a drug weight that was less than originally determined, [and] therefore [the] career offender guideline was used for sentencing purposes." Record Document 104.

Legros appealed, challenging the inclusion of the converted drug weight in his PSR and the failure of this Court to make a finding on his objection to the firearm enhancement. On appeal, the parties agreed that neither mistake had any effect on Legros's sentence. The Fifth Circuit held that this Court did not err in either respect. Legros now seeks to hold his attorney accountable for these actions by filing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, arguing that his attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge his career offender status and to insist that the Court correct the presentence report.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Section 2255 And Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence imposed by a federal court when: (1) "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States," (2) "the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence," (3) "the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law," or (4) the sentence "is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); United States v. Scruggs. 691 F.3d 660, 666 (5th Cir. 2012). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Young, 77 Fed.Appx. 708, 709 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

"Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy and will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.'" Bouslev v. United States. 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 1610 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Rather, after a defendant is convicted and exhausts the right to appeal, a court is '"entitled to presume that [the defendant] stands fairly and finally convicted.'" United States v. Shaid. 937 F.2d 228, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Fradv. 456 U.S. 152, 164, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592 (1982)).

Courts may consider claims for ineffective assistance of counsel brought for the first time in a Section 2255 motion. See United States v. Gaudet. 81 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1996). To successfully state an ineffectiveness claim, the petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Failure to establish either prong of the Strickland test will result in a finding that counsel's performance was constitutionally effective. Id. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; see also Tucker v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1997). In determining whether counsel's performance is deficient, courts "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance" Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. "[T]he defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). If a tactical decision is "conscious and informed . . . [it] cannot be the basis for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so ill chosen that it permeates the entire trial with obvious unfairness." Crane v. Johnson. 178 F.3d 309, 314 (5th Cir. 1999).

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. A defendant is not prejudiced if "the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him." Lockhart v. Fretwell. 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 844 (1993). Moreover, "[m]ere conclusory allegations in support of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue." Green v. Johnson. 160 F.3d 1029, 1042-43 (5th Cir. 1998).

The prejudice element requires affirmative proof. See United States v. Thompson, 44 F.3d 1004, 1995 WL 10515, at * 2 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision). In analyzing the claims herein, the Court bears in mind that "the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial." Fretwelh 506 U.S. at 369, 113 S.Ct. at 842 (quotations and citation omitted).

B. Application Of Law To Facts.

1. Failure To Object To Career Offender Status.

Legros contends that he was denied effective counsel at sentencing as his counsel failed to object to Legros being classified as a career offender for the instant offense of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. While Legros acknowledges that the Government addressed his argument in its response, he asserts in his reply brief that the Government "failed to reach Legros's true argument, i.e. the instant^[1]offense would not support the career offender enhancement under Section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing...