United States v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 09 November 1901
• Docket Number: 338.
• Citation: 111 F. 630
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. LEWIS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

111 F. 630

UNITED STATES v. LEWIS.

No. 338.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division.

November 9, 1901

Henry Terrell, U.S. Atty.

C. L Bates, for defendant.

MAXEY District Judge (charging jury).

The indictment preferred against Reuben Lewis, the defendant in this case, is for the murder of Samuel Brown. An important question affecting the jurisdiction of the court has arisen the disposition of which must, under the facts in evidence be remitted to your determination. It is alleged in the indictment that the offense was committed in the county of Bexar, within the Western district of Texas, at and within the limits of the United States military station of Ft. Sam Houston, in the city of San Antonio; and it is further alleged that the site of said military station of Ft. Sam Houston had been prior to the year 1900 ceded to the United States by the governor of the state of Texas, and, further, that said military post of Ft. Sam Houston was prior to February 7, 1900, and still is, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the offense charged against the defendant unless it be made to appear that the homicide was committed 'within any fort, arsenal, dock yard, magazine or any other place or district of country under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. ' Rev. St. U.S. Sec. 5339. Ordinarily offenses of this character are tried and determined by the courts of the respective states, and it is only when they are committed (following the words of the statute) in some 'place or district of country under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States' that the jurisdiction of the federal courts attaches.

It is insisted by counsel for the government that jurisdiction is complete in this case for the reason that the chief executive of the state of Texas, acting pursuant to a general law of the state, has, by public proclamation, ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the site or territory occupied by the military station or post of Ft. Sam Houston. A copy of that proclamation, duly authenticated by the secretary of state, has been admitted in evidence. You are charged, as a matter of law, that the instrument executed by the governor of the state of Texas which is in evidence before you cedes to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the lands therein particularly described. But in thus holding I do not mean to say to you that the offense charged against the defendant, if offense it be, was committed within the limits of the boundaries set forth in the instrument. That is a question of fact for you to determine from a consideration of the evidence, and, if you find that the homicide was not committed within the boundaries covered by or included within the cession, then it would be your duty to acquit the defendant. It devolves upon the government to prove to your satisfaction that the killing was done at a place within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, and in this case the burden is upon the government to show that the homicide was committed within the boundaries described in the cession made by the governor. See U.S. v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 65, Fed. Cas. No. 14,867; Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 533, 5 Sup.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264; Benson v. U.S., 146 U.S. 325, 13 Sup.Ct. 60, 36 L.Ed. 991; In re Ladd (C.C.) 74 F. 31; U.S. v. Meagher (C.C.) 37 F. 875.

If you are satisfied that the said Samuel Brown was killed by the defendant at or within a place under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, it will next be your duty to inquire into the circumstances of the homicide, in order to determine the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The specific offense charged against the defendant is murder. But the crime of manslaughter is included in that of murder; and if, after a careful investigation, you should conclude that the defendant is not guilty of murder, you may still find him guilty of manslaughter, if such finding be warranted by the evidence and the law as given in charge by the court (Rev. St. Sec. 1035; U.S. v. Carr, 1 Woods, 480, Fed. Cas. No. 14,732; Stevenson v. U.S., 162 U.S. 466, 16 Sup.Ct. 859, 40 L.Ed. 1039), or you may find him not guilty of any offense.

Your attention will first be directed to the offense specifically charged against the defendant, to wit, murder. There are only two kinds of felonious homicide known to the laws of the United States,-- one is murder and the other is manslaughter. Under the statutes of the United States there are no degrees of murder, nor do such statutes contain a definition of murder. To define it, resort must be had to the common law. By that law, 'murder is where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully and feloniously kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with malice prepense or aforethought, express or implied. ' Malice, you observe, is a necessary ingredient in the crime of murder, and its presence or absence marks the boundary which distinguishes the two offenses of murder and manslaughter. It is necessary, therefore, that you should understand its meaning. Malice, when attempted to be defined, has been necessarily given a more comprehensive meaning than enmity or ill will or revenge, and has been extended so as to include all those states of the mind under which the killing of a person takes place without any cause which will in law justify, excuse, or extenuate the homicide. McCoy v. State, 25 Tex. 39, 78 Am.Dec. 520. Malice, as applied to the offense of murder, need not denote spite or malevolence, hatred or ill will, to the person killed; nor that the slayer killed his victim in cold blood, as with a settled design and premeditation. Such a killing would, it is true, be murder; but malice, as essential to the crime of murder, has a more extended meaning. 'A killing flowing from an evil design in general may be of malice, and constitute murder; as a killing resulting from the dictates of a wicked, depraved, and malignant spirit-- a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent upon mischief-- may be of malice, necessarily implied by law from the fact of the killing without lawful excuse, and sufficient to constitute the crime of murder, although the person killing may have had no spite or ill will towards the deceased. Malice, as thus described, is either express or implied. Express malice is where one with a sedate and deliberate mind and formed design doth kill another, which formed design is evidenced by external circumstances, discovering that inward intention; as by lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do bodily harm. ' Jordan v. State, 10 Tex. 492; 3 Russ.Crimes (6th Ed.) 1, 2. It rarely, if ever, occurs that express malice is proved upon the trial of a case. The existence or nonexistence of malice is a matter to be determined by the jury from a consideration of all the facts in evidence. 'The proof of homicide, as necessarily involving malice, must show the facts under which the killing was effected, and from the whole facts and circumstances surrounding the killing the jury infers malice or its absence. Malice, in connection with the crime of killing, is but another name for a certain condition of a man's heart or mind, and, as no one can look into the heart or mind of another, the only way to decide upon its condition at the time of the killing is to infer it from the surrounding facts, and that inference is one of fact for the jury. ' Stevenson v. U.S., 162 U.S. 320, 16 Sup.Ct. 842, 40 L.Ed. 983; Wallace v. U.S., 162 U.S. 476, 16 Sup.Ct. 863, 40 L.Ed. 1043. 'Malice is to be inferred from all the facts in the case. If malice is found, it must be drawn as an inference from everything that is proved, taken together and considered as a whole. Every fact, no matter how small, every circumstance, no matter how trivial, which bears upon the question of malice, must be considered by the jury at the same time that they consider the use of the deadly weapon; and it is only as a conclusion from all those facts and circumstances that malice, if inferred at all, is to be inferred. ' U.S. v. King (C.C.) 34 F. 312. The malice which distinguishes the crime of murder must be aforethought. It implies premeditation,-- a prior intent to do the act. It may have existed but for a moment,-- an inappreciably brief period of time,-- or longer. No limit has been, nor can be, fixed as to its duration. If it in fact existed for any period, however brief, the killing would be murder; but, if malice was wanting, the homicide could not be of a higher grade of offense than manslaughter. If, then, upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances in evidence, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed Samuel Brown with malice aforethought, as above defined, it would be your duty to find him guilty of murder, as charged in the indictment. But, if you conclude that he is not guilty of murder, you will next determine whether he is guilty of manslaughter.

It is not necessary to read to you the words of the statute defining manslaughter, for the common-law definition is substantially the same as that...