United States v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 11 April 2022
• Docket Number: 1:19-cr-307-RCL
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WILLIS LEWIS and BRITTANY JONES, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WILLIS LEWIS and BRITTANY JONES, Defendants.

No. 1:19-cr-307-RCL

United States District Court, District of Columbia

April 11, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Royce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge

Defendants Willis Lewis and Brittany Jones are charged with several offenses related to their alleged conspiracy to engage in the sex trafficking of minors. Lewis and Jones were charged in the same indictment for this overarching conspiracy and are joined for trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b). Even if their joinder under Rule 8(b) is proper, Rule 14 allows a court to sever co-defendants' trials if a consolidated trial would prejudice a particular defendant. Both Lewis and Jones move to sever their trials, proffering various theories of prejudice. Lewis's Mot., ECF No. 61; Jones's Mot., ECF No. 78. The government opposes both motions to sever. See ECF Nos. 69 & 82. After reviewing the parties' filings, the record, and the applicable law, the Court will DENY both motions to sever.

I. BACKGROUND

Lewis and Jones are both charged with offenses related to their conspiracy to traffick two minors, Z.S. and T.H.Y., and transport them over state lines for commercial sex work. Superseding

Indictment ECF No. 23. The operative Superseding Indictment alleges thirteen counts relevant here:

Counts I and II: Sex trafficking by force, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b)(1).

Count III and IV: Sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (a)(1), (a)(2), and (b)(2).

Count V: Conspiracy to sex traffick minors, in violation of 18U.S.C. § 1594(c).

Count VI and VII: Transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 2423(a).

Count VIII: Conspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(e).

Count IX and X: Transportation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (a).

Count XI: Interstate travel and transportation in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(A).

Count XII: Unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 922(g)(1).

Count XIII: Obstruction of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d).^[1]

Superseding Indictment 2-9. Jones is charged in Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and XI. Lewis is charged in all counts listed above. Originally, additional co-defendants were charged; now, only Lewis and Jones face trial.

Lewis moves to sever his trial from Jones's trial. Lewis's Mot. I. He argues that severance is required because (1) he would suffer a Bruton violation^[2] if Jones's statements were introduced; (2) there is more evidence against Jones than against Lewis and this disparity of evidence would prejudice him; and (3) Lewis's defense will conflict with Jones's defense. Id. Jones moves to sever her trial from Lewis's and moves to sever certain counts she alleges were improperly joined. Jones's Mot. 1. The government opposes. See ECF Nos. 69 & 82. These motions are now ripe.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Joinder

An indictment may charge multiple defendants together "if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses." Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). It is "difficult to prevail on a claim that there has been a misjoinder" in the D.C. Circuit-as long as there is a "logical relationship between the acts or transactions within the series," joinder is proper under Rule 8(b). United States v. Nicely, 922 F.2d 850, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Courts construe Rule 8(b) "broadly in favor of joinder." United States v. Williams, 507 F.Supp.3d 181, 194 (D.D.C. 2020);, An indictment may also join multiple charges in the same pleading. The D.C. Circuit has held that Rule 8(b) also governs the joinder of offenses in multidefendant cases. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 16 F.3d 423, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1994). There must be a "logical relationship between the acts or transactions within the series" for offenses to be properly joined under Rule 8(b). United States v. Perry, 731 F.2d 985, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Put it other words,

it is not enough for offenses to be similar in nature (like two, burglaries); they must be related. For example, joinder of offenses under Rule 8(b) is appropriate when "defendants are charged with conspiracy to conceal a crime that [other defendants] are charged with committing," or when "some defendants are charged with' transporting stolen goods in interstate commerce and others are charged with receiving the goods, so stolen and transported."

United States v. Lewis, No. 1:19-cr-307 (RCL), 2021 WL 2809819, at *3 (D.D.C. July 6, 2021) (quoting Perry, 731 F.2d at 990) (internal citations omitted).

B. Severance of Prejudicial Joinder

Even if a court finds that offenses or defendants were properly joined under Rule 8, severance may be appropriate under Rule 14 if "the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment... appears to prejudice a defendant or the government." Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). The defendant seeking severance under Rule 14 carries the burden of demonstrating that failure to sever would result in prejudice. United States v. Gooch, 665 F.3d 1318, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Severance under Rule 14 is appropriate only "if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993).

III. DISCUSSION

Lewis challenges his joinder with Jones for trial. He argues that, though joinder was proper under Rule 8(b), failure to sever will compromise his trial rights. Lewis's Mot. 1. Jones, on the other hand, argues both (1) that joinder of some of the offenses here was improper under Rule 8(b) and (2) that failure to sever certain offenses and her trial from Lewis will compromise her trial rights. Jones's Mot. 1. In response, the government argues that joinder was proper and that no trial rights will be compromised. ECF No. 82 at 9; ECF No. 69 at 5-7. The government also emphasizes the D.C. Circuit's policy "favoring joint trials of defendants indicted together." ECF No. 82 at 9 (quoting United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). For the reasons below, the Court will DENY both Lewis's and Jones's motions.

A. Lewis's Motion to Sever

Lewis does not dispute that he and Jones are properly joined for trial pursuant to Rule 8. To succeed in his motion to sever under Rule 14, he must show that that he will be prejudiced by a joint trial, Gooch, 665 F.3d at 1336, by demonstrating a "serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right... or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. Lewis argues that (1) a joint trial will violate his Confrontation Clause rights, (2) a joint trial will prejudice him based on the disparity of evidence between him and his co-defendant, and (3) Jones will act as a "second prosecutor" during their joint trial. Lewis's Mot. 1-4. But the Court finds his arguments meritless.

While the Confrontation Clause forbids the prosecution from introducing a statement by a non-testifying co-defendant that expressly implicates a defendant, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968), the mere proffer of a statement that implicates Bruton "does not automatically require severance." United States v. Ford, 155 F.Supp.3d 60, 68 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting United States v. Brodie, 326 F.Supp.2d 83, 95 (D.D.C. 2004)). When "(1) the jury is instructed to consider the confession against the declarant only, and (2) redactions are made such that the statement, together with other trial evidence, neither expressly identifies defendants nor creates any inevitable association between them and the criminal activity the statement describes, there is no Sixth Amendment violation." Id. Lewis has not identified any specific statements made by Jones (his only remaining co-defendant) that cannot be redacted to avoid expressly implicating him. The government represents that "redactions can be made to either remove [his] name and/or any other 'obvious pointers' to [his] identity" from any of Jones's statements. 'ECF No. 110 at 3. Combined with a "proper limiting instruction" and court-approved redactions that prevent any statements creating an "inevitable association with" Lewis, Lewis's Confrontation Clause rights will not be violated. United States v. Washington, 952 F.2d 1402, 1407 (DC. Cir, 1991); see Brodie, 326 F.Supp.2d. at 95 (denying severance because Bruton can be "complied with by redaction" (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987)).

Severing a defendant due to prejudice may be proper when defendants have "markedly different degrees of culpability." Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. This requires more than a showing that a defendant "might have a better chance of acquittal if tried separately." United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Instead, evidence against one defendant must be "'far more damaging' than evidence against the other defendant." Id. (quoting United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). There must be disparities in the "weight, quantity, or type" of evidence against the moving defendant and other co-defendants such that a jury could not "reasonably compartmentalize the evidence introduced against each individual defendant." United States v. Halliman, 923 F.2d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Manner, 887 F.2d at 317 and United States v. Hernandez, 780 F.2d 113, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).

Lewis argues that the evidence the government intends to introduce against Jones is ...