United States v. Limones-Valles, CR16-4060-LTS
Decision Date | 30 December 2016 |
Docket Number | No. CR16-4060-LTS,CR16-4060-LTS |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JAIME LIMONES-VALLES, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
This matter is before me on a Report and Recommendation (R&R) filed by the Honorable C.J. Williams, United States Magistrate Judge, in which Judge Williams recommends that I grant defendant's motion (Doc. No. 12) to dismiss the indictment. Doc. No. 33. The Government filed an objection (Doc. No. 44) and defendant filed a response (Doc. No. 47). The matter is fully submitted.1
On July 20, 2016, the Grand Jury returned an indictment against defendant Jaime Limones-Valles, charging him with illegal reentry by an aggravated felon. Doc. No. 2. Defendant filed his motion to dismiss the indictment on August 28, 2016. On September27 and September 30, 2016, Judge Williams held a hearing on the motion. Doc. Nos. 23, 29. Judge Williams filed his R&R on October 19, 2016.
A district judge must review a magistrate judge's R&R under the following standards:
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b). Thus, when a party objects to any portion of an R&R, the district judge must undertake a de novo review of that portion.
Any portions of an R&R to which no objections have been made must be reviewed under at least a "clearly erroneous" standard. See, e.g., Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) ( ). As the Supreme Court has explained, "[a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). However, a district judge may elect to review an R&R under a more-exacting standard even if no objections are filed:
Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judgeto review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.
After a de novo review of the record, including the transcript of the hearing (Doc. No. 48) and the parties' exhibits (Doc. Nos. 12-2 to 12-6 and 22-1 to 22-22), I adopt the findings of fact set forth in the R&R. See Doc. No. 33 at 3-8. In short, Limones-Valles is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States unlawfully as a teenager. He ultimately settled in Nobles County, Minnesota, where he lived with his wife and two children. In 2001, Minnesota authorities charged Limones-Valles with two counts of aggravated forgery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, one count was dropped and Limones-Valles pleaded guilty to the other count.
In its judgment, the Minnesota court noted that "the presumed sentence" would be "twelve months and one day." However, the court "stayed" imposition of judgment on condition that Limones-Valles "accept the supervision of a probation officer" for five years, avoid additional law violations and either pay a fine or perform 100 hours of community service work. Doc. No. 12-3 at 1-2. During the sentencing hearing, the court initially expressed a belief that the plea agreement called for a sentence of 90 days in jail. However, upon being advised that the parties had agreed to "no jail time," the court stated that this provision "will be stricken in the sentence then." Doc. No. 22-21 at 4-5. And, in fact, the written order of judgment makes no reference to a 90-day term of incarceration.
Shortly after being sentenced, Limones-Valles was deported by Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS)2 in an expedited manner pursuant to statutes applicable when an unregistered alien is convicted of an aggravated felony. As set out by Judge Williams, there is ambiguity in the record regarding the quality of the information Limones-Valles received during the removal process. Specifically, there is no evidence to suggest he was informed in Spanish that the reason for the expedited removal was that he had (allegedly) been sentenced to more than a year in jail.
Limones-Valles returned to the United States at some point prior to 2004 and moved to Colorado. A Fort Collins, Colorado, police officer encountered Limones-Valles during a roadside stop on July 22, 2004. Limones-Valles provided his real name and the officer identified him as an alien who had previously been deported. Limones-Valles was arrested and ICE began removal proceedings. Authorities used more-standardized removal procedures during the 2004 removal, including communicating with Limones-Valles in Spanish.3 Limones-Valles was then removed from the country for a second time.
At some point after 2004, Limones-Valles again returned to the United States. He was arrested in Iowa in 2016 and has been charged him with illegal reentry by an aggravated felon.
In moving to dismiss the indictment, Limones-Valles argues:
Mr. Limones-Valles's two removals from the United States were predicated on immigration authorities' erroneous conclusion that he had an aggravatedfelony conviction. As a result of that error, Mr. Limones-Valles suffered a due process violation - one that is perpetuated by the instant prosecution. The indictment must be dismissed.
Doc. No. 12-1 at 1-2. Specifically, Limones-Valles argues that because the imposition of judgment for his Minnesota conviction was "stayed," he was never convicted of an "aggravated felony" and should have had the opportunity to voluntarily remove himself before compulsory removal occurred. He further argues that because the initial removal was faulty, so too was the subsequent removal in 2004, and that a conviction for illegal reentry by a deported alien would violate his due process rights pursuant to United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987). According, Limones-Valles argues that the indictment must be dismissed.
Judge Williams correctly described the applicable legal framework. Doc. No. 33 at 8-11. In Mendoza-Lopez, the Supreme Court held that due process considerations prohibit the conviction of a previously-deported alien for illegal reentry if the deportation proceedings were fundamentally unfair and there was no meaningful opportunity for review. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 841. Congress then codified the standard:
In a criminal proceeding under this section, an alien may not challenge the validity of the deportation order described in subsection (a)(1) of this section or subsection (b) of this section unless the alien demonstrates that-- (1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.
8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). "The defendant must meet all three requirements in order to successfully collaterally attack the prior removal order." United States v. Tamayo-Baez, 820 F.3d 308, 313 (8th Cir. 2016). Put another way:
United States v. Avila, 522 F. App'x 369, 371 (8th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) citing United States v. Rodriguez, 420 F.3d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 2005) and Mendez-Morales, 384 F.3d at 931-32. "When the defendant satisfies all of § 1326(d)'s requirements, the district court must dismiss the illegal reentry charge." United States v. Lopez-Collazo, 824 F.3d 453, 458 (4th Cir. 2016)
Judge Williams noted that the Eighth Circuit has not yet determined which party has the burden of showing that a defendant's waiver of rights was voluntary. Judge Williams concluded that because a defendant generally has the burden of proving defects in his removal, the defendant also has the burden of showing the waiver was not voluntary. Doc. No. 33 at 10 (citing United States v. Sanchez, No. Cr. 14-51, 2014 WL 3952367, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2014)). I agree. Accordingly, the burden is on the defendant, in all aspects, to show that his previous removals violated his due process rights and, therefore, that the present indictment should be dismissed.4
Judge Williams...
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