United States v. Long Pumpkin
| Decision Date | 30 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-2743, No. 20-2770 |
| Citation | 56 F.4th 604 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Ranson LONG PUMPKIN, Defendant - Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Moses Crowe, Defendant - Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of appellant Ranson Long Pumpkin, and appeared on the appellant's brief, was John R. Murphy, of Rapid City, SD.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of appellant Moses Crowe, and appeared on the appellant's brief, was Eric T. Davis, of Sturgis, SD. The following attorney(s) also appeared on the appellant's brief; Nathaniel F. Nelson, I, of Sturgis, SD.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee and appeared on the appellee's brief, was Eric D. Kelderman, AUSA, of Rapid City, SD.
Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Ranson Long Pumpkin and Moses Crowe were convicted of committing a carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury. Under a separate count, they were convicted of using and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, the carjacking. Crowe was also convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Long Pumpkin and Crowe appeal and raise several issues. We conclude that there was no error in the court's challenged evidentiary rulings or jury instruction, and that sufficient evidence supported the carjacking convictions, but that the convictions for discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence must be reduced to convictions for simply using a firearm during the carjacking.
The charges arose from events on October 12, 2017, and the evidence is described here in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. The trouble began while Phillip Moore and Saul Crowe were shopping at a Walmart store in Rapid City with Zach Perry, Vanessa High Pipe, and Jessica Maho. Saul Crowe and Moore argued after Saul accused Moore of falsely calling him a thief. The accusation arose because an amplifier was stolen from Moore's van during a time when Saul Crowe and Maho had borrowed the vehicle.
After leaving the store, the group entered Moore's van, and Moore began to drive. Saul Crowe spoke on the telephone with someone, then drew a handgun and pointed it at Moore's head. Saul directed Moore to drive to the Ramkota Hotel, and Moore complied.
When the van reached the Ramkota Hotel, Saul Crowe told Moore to turn off the van, and everyone but Moore hurried out of the vehicle. Saul told Jessica Maho to call for Long Pumpkin and Moses Crowe. Moore attempted to shift the van into reverse and flee, but he was stopped by Moses Crowe and Long Pumpkin. Moses Crowe ran up to the driver's side of the van and punched Moore in the face. Long Pumpkin jumped into the back seat of the van, dragged Moore out of the driver's seat, and choked him to the point of unconsciousness while Saul Crowe held a gun on Moore.
Saul Crowe then drove the van to a location on Nike Road on the outskirts of Rapid City. Long Pumpkin, Vanessa High Pipe, Zach Perry, and the victim Moore were inside the van. Moses Crowe followed in another car. Moore regained consciousness a few times during the ride, but each time Long Pumpkin choked him again until he fell unconscious.
Once at Nike Road, Moses Crowe struck Zach Perry in the head with a handgun and told him to leave. Moses Crowe and Long Pumpkin then pulled Moore from the vehicle and beat him while he was on the ground. Moore testified that he fought with Saul Crowe and Long Pumpkin. Moses Crowe yelled at Saul and Long Pumpkin that they should "kill him and leave no witnesses," but Long Pumpkin objected. Two of the perpetrators then fired shots that sailed to the right of Moore. Moore was then punched again, and he fell unconscious. When he awakened later, the others were gone, and he could not find the keys to the van. Investigators at the scene later found shell casings that matched the caliber of firearms carried by Saul and Moses Crowe.
A grand jury charged Long Pumpkin and Moses Crowe with committing a carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury, see 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2), and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (i.e. , carjacking), see id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), as well as aiding and abetting both offenses. See id. § 2. The indictment also charged Moses Crowe with unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon, based on a seizure made at a later date. See id. § 922(g)(1). The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found Long Pumpkin and Moses Crowe guilty on all counts. Saul Crowe entered guilty pleas and was not a party to the trial. As Moses Crowe is the only Crowe who is a party to this appeal, we will refer to him hereafter as "Crowe."
On appeal, Long Pumpkin and Crowe first argue that the district court violated their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them by restricting their ability to ask about drug use by Vanessa High Pipe and Jessica Maho. During trial, the district court determined that High Pipe and Maho would invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination if questioned about their drug use. The court then prohibited the defense from asking each woman about her own drug use. Long Pumpkin and Crowe argue that this ruling was constitutional error that requires a new trial on all of the offenses of conviction.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right includes the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses, but there are occasions when a defendant's right to cross-examine may conflict with a witness's constitutional right against self-incrimination. When such a conflict occurs, this court has said that the district court must strike an appropriate balance between the two rights. United States v. Jackson , 915 F.2d 359, 360 (8th Cir. 1990).
In fashioning a permissible accommodation, "[a] critical inquiry is whether the witness’ invocation of the testimonial privilege materially prejudices the defendant." Ellis v. Black , 732 F.2d 650, 656 (8th Cir. 1984). "When the defendant is unable to test the truth and accuracy of the witness’ direct testimony, his sixth amendment right to cross-examination is violated." United States v. Rubin , 836 F.2d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 1988). But when the defendant is precluded "from inquiring merely as to collateral matters such as credibility, as opposed to substantive matters about which the witness testified on direct examination, the defendant's sixth amendment right is not violated." Ellis , 732 F.2d at 656. "[I]f the defendant has available effective alternative means of exploring relevant matters on cross-examination, sixth amendment rights remain intact." United States v. Singer , 785 F.2d 228, 242 (8th Cir. 1986). "Prejudice has generally been found only in those instances in which the defendant is precluded from inquiring into substantive matters about which the witness testified on direct examination." Rubin , 836 F.2d at 1100.
Long Pumpkin and Crowe contend that if High Pipe and Maho had admitted on cross-examination that they habitually used drugs, including on the night of the carjacking, then the defense could have raised doubt concerning the ability of the women to perceive and recall the events about which they testified. The district court ruled that the proposed questioning concerned only a collateral matter of credibility, and that the restrictions did not violate the defendants’ confrontation rights. The court also observed that the defense had other means to inform the jury that High Pipe and Maho abused drugs, including on the night of the carjacking, so it was unnecessary to elicit that information directly from the witnesses. The court further explained that the defense had other methods to impeach the witnesses based on prior convictions for felonies or crimes of dishonesty, inconsistent statements, reputations for untruthfulness, and potential bias.
We conclude that the district court's ruling did not violate the rights of Long Pumpkin and Crowe under the Sixth Amendment. The witnesses were required to answer all questions about the actions of Long Pumpkin and Crowe that the witnesses described on direct examination. The only limitation concerned drug use by the witnesses. We have characterized a witness's drug use as a matter pertaining to the credibility of the witness, see United States v. Hodge , 594 F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2010), and others likewise have said that the issue of a witness's drug use "has considerable relevance to credibility." United States v. Banks , 520 F.2d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 1975). But our decisions on the Sixth Amendment establish that where a witness's right against self-incrimination requires limits on questions about collateral matters such as credibility, the restrictions do not violate a defendant's right to confrontation. Singer , 785 F.2d at 242 ; Ellis , 732 F.2d at 656.
The dissent posits a distinction between "credibility" and "reliability." The stability of such a distinction in this context is questionable. The dissent's own quotation about a witness's "reliability" concerned a witness's "credibility." See Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) () (emphases added), quoted in Singer , 785 F.2d at 242 ; see also Hodge , 594 F.3d at 618 () (emphases added); Banks , 520 F.2d at 630 (...
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