United States v. Lopez

Decision Date10 January 2019
Docket NumberNo. 16-10261,16-10261
Citation913 F.3d 807
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lashay Marie LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Lashay Marie Lopez was convicted on three federal charges stemming from her purchase of a firearm through the use of false identification (ID). Because Lopez admitted to the offense conduct, the only issue before the jury was the affirmative defense of duress. Lopez claims that she purchased a handgun for Hector Karaca using her identical twin sister’s ID in violation of her probation and federal law because Karaca threatened to harm Lopez and her family if she failed to acquire a gun for him.

In support of her duress defense, Lopez asked the district court to allow her to introduce expert testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) and the effects of past abuse. Lopez, who had been physically and sexually abused by her stepfather, contended that this evidence would "help provide context" to the jury regarding her fear of Karaca and why she did not seek help from the police. Lopez similarly asserted that the expert’s description of the "characteristics of [a] domestic violence victim" would help explain her "counterintuitive" behavior regarding Karaca. The court, however, excluded this evidence in a series of oral rulings, concluding that BWS evidence is incompatible with the duress defense’s use of an objective reasonable-person standard.

We join the weight of authority in holding that such expert testimony may be used by a defendant to support her duress defense and rehabilitate her credibility. We therefore find that the district court committed legal error in precluding Lopez’s expert witness from testifying and conclude that this decision was prejudicial to her defense. Accordingly, we vacate her conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new trial.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A

Lopez, who was twenty-seven years old at the time of the crimes at issue, dated Karaca when the two were teenagers. The relationship ended when Karaca was sentenced to eight-years imprisonment in 2006 for a convenience-store shooting.1 Karaca was released from prison during the Fall of 2013, but mere weeks later, police were searching for him in connection with a double homicide in Phoenix, Arizona.

In November 2013, Karaca arrived at Lopez’s home in Tucson, where she lived with her mother, her identical twin sister, her sister’s two young children, and a teenage sibling. Karaca and Lopez spoke for several hours and drank together. Karaca eventually admitted to Lopez that night that he was "on the run" from the police due to a shooting and asked her if she knew where he could get a gun. She told him she did not, and Karaca accepted her answer. He later began making sexual advances towards Lopez, suggesting that they restart their relationship. Lopez initially rejected these overtures, telling Karaca that she was currently involved with someone else. Lopez "push[ed] him away" and "told him no ... but he didn’t stop" and "so [Lopez] just gave in." Karaca eventually left without further incident.

Two days later, however, Karaca returned to Lopez’s home and again asked her about acquiring a gun. She explained to him at this point that she could not purchase a gun or "be around" one because she was on probation on a felony drug conviction. Karaca responded by grabbing Lopez by the arm and threatening that, if she failed to get him a gun, "he[ ] [would] come back and shoot up [her] house and he [would] hurt [her] family." Several days later, Karaca returned to Lopez’s home and was limping. He told her that he was in a "shootout" in the desert during a drug deal and was shot in the leg. Lopez later testified at her trial that Karaca’s reference to a "shootout" made her believe that he already had a gun, which increased her fear that he would harm her family.

Four days later, Karaca returned and demanded that Lopez purchase a gun for him that day from a nearby pawnshop. She again responded that she was on probation. Karaca then insisted that Lopez pose as her identical twin sister during the purchase, demanding that they go to Lopez’s home and retrieve her sister’s ID. After Lopez made various excuses as to why she could not obtain the ID that day, Karaca grabbed her again and threatened: "I already told you what I was going to do if you don’t get this gun for me. I know you don’t want anything happening to your mom or your sisters." The two retrieved the ID and went to the pawnshop that same day, where Lopez purchased a Ruger pistol using the ID and her sister’s identifying information. Shortly after she left the store, Karaca grabbed her purse, removed the gun, and walked away.

Two days later, Lopez saw Karaca one last time before her arrest. The two went together to a family barbeque hosted by her twin sister’s ex-husband, who was also Karaca’s friend. The three left the party at one point to go to the store, where Karaca accused Lopez of flirting with her sister’s ex-husband and slapped her in the face. Karaca initially left but eventually returned to the party. Later that evening, Karaca grabbed Lopez’s arm and told her he would "f--- [her] up, and no one will do anything about it."

Twelve days after purchasing the gun for Karaca, Lopez met with her probation officer and a U.S. Marshal, who was searching for Karaca. Lopez initially denied knowing Karaca, but after the probation officer found the pawnshop receipt in Lopez’s purse, she admitted that she had purchased a gun for Karaca. Lopez also stated she was seeing Karaca romantically, referring to him at one point as "my man." Lopez did not explain to the officers at this juncture why she had bought the gun for Karaca and did not claim that Karaca had threatened her. After refusing to provide them with any specifics on Karaca’s location, Lopez was sent to jail. She later explained at trial that she was afraid that Karaca would harm her if he discovered she had spoken to the authorities.

The following day, two agents with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) interviewed Lopez in a private room in the jail. For the first time, Lopez claimed that she had purchased the gun for Karaca because he had threatened her and her family. She also informed the agents that Karaca had told her he had another gun. At trial, Lopez claimed that she only told the ATF agents these details—as opposed to her probation officer the previous day—because she felt "safer in the jail": "[Karaca] can’t get me when I’m ... in jail. There is no way of him getting ahold of me and finding out what I’m saying" to the agents. Shortly thereafter, the police located Karaca in Tucson. He stole a vehicle using the gun purchased by Lopez and led the police on a lengthy car chase, which ended with Karaca taking his own life.

B

In late 2014, Lopez was indicted on three federal charges: (1) false statement during the purchase of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6), 924(a)(2) ; (2) aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1), (c)(3) ; and (3) felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The case proceeded to a jury trial. Lopez stipulated to many of the elements of these offenses and conceded that she purchased the firearm using the false ID. Her trial strategy thus consisted entirely of proving that she acted under duress as a result of Karaca’s threats against her and her family.

"Duress is not a statutory defense, but a common-law defense that allows a jury to find that the defendant’s conduct is excused, even though the government has carried its burden of proof." United States v. Kuok , 671 F.3d 931, 947 (9th Cir. 2012). In order to establish the defense, a defendant bears the burden of proving three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: "(1) [s]he was under an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, (2) [s]he had a well grounded fear that the threat would be carried out, and (3) [s]he had no reasonable opportunity to escape." Id. ; (see also United States v. Navarro , 608 F.3d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Johnson , 956 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1992), superseded by regulation on other grounds ; United States v. Contento-Pachon , 723 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1984) ). If successful, a defendant is "legally excuse[d]" of the crime committed and must be found not guilty. Navarro , 608 F.3d at 532–33.

Prior to trial, Lopez advised the district court of her intent to introduce testimony from Dr. Cheryl Karp, an expert "on issues of trauma, domestic violence, and victim behaviors." Lopez asserted that Dr. Karp’s testimony would assist the jury "in understanding the evidence because ... the trial [would] involve evidence as to coercion and threats of violence leading up to the day Karaca took her from her home and forced her to purchase a firearm for him." Lopez further contended that Dr. Karp’s testimony regarding "behaviors of victims of domestic violence" would "help provide context" to her duress defense, including whether her fear of Karaca was "well-grounded" and whether she had a "reasonable opportunity" to escape from him. Finally, Lopez asserted that Dr. Karp’s testimony would "liken to that of standard government expert testimony in a domestic violence case where there is the counter-argument that the victim’s behavior was not consistent or credible victim behavior."

The government moved in limine to exclude this testimony, primarily arguing that the testimony would be irrelevant because the duress defense applies an objective standard. In an oral ruling, the district court described the issue as "pretty close" but ultimately granted the government’s motion: "I don’t see how [Dr. Karp] can do anything to tell this jury how a reasonable person would have acted under the circumstances, so I’m not letting her in for that purpose."...

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