United States v. Lorenzo
| Decision Date | 21 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. CR:10–417 (DRD).,CR:10–417 (DRD). |
| Citation | 798 F.Supp.2d 371 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Diana LANTIGUA LORENZO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
798 F.Supp.2d 371
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Diana LANTIGUA LORENZO, Defendant.
No. CR:10–417 (DRD).
United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.
July 21, 2011.
[798 F.Supp.2d 372]
Elba I. Gorbea–Padro, United States Attorneys Office, District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Hector E. Guzman–Silva, Federal Public Defender's Office, Hato Rey, PR, Mauri De Waun Gray, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Jose C. Romo–Matienzo, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.
Pending before the Court is a request for the suppression of certain statements made by codefendant, Diana Lantigua Lorenzo (“Diana Lantigua”) (Docket No. 98). Diana Lantigua, and her brother Breidy Lantigua, took a one-week cruise aboard the Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines vessel, the Serenade of the Seas, from October 17th to October 24th, 2010. The statements in questions were made when she was referred to secondary Customs and Immigration inspection after disembarking in San Juan, Puerto Rico on October 24, 2010. The inspection took place at the Pan American dock, specifically in the San Juan Bay Marina dock, a facility located east of the José V. Toledo U.S. Post Office and Courthouse in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico.
The facts that are considered by the Court as to the suppression of statements are based exclusively on the facts known by the Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) officers at the time of the initial and secondary inspection. Gloria Alvarez, a CBP inspector officer, received a referral from another CBP officer, Denise Cruz. Denise Cruz testified that she referred the sister and brother duo for secondary inspection because two young siblings taking a family vacation together is not a common practice. Further, both siblings appeared to have a nervous demeanor.1
Diana and Breidy Lantigua were thus sent to secondary inspection where Officer Alvarez continued the investigation. Diana Lantigua initially told Officer Alvarez that she cleaned offices six days a week.2 CBP Officer Josefina Collazo aided Officer Alvarez with Diana Lantigua's secondary inspection.
Officer Alvarez assigned male passenger Breidy Lantigua to male CBP Officer Joel Rivera. Breidy told Officer Rivera that he was a student, and later told another inspector that he was washed cars. Diana and Breidy Lantigua each had two pieces of luggage and Diana Lantigua also had a purse.
The Court proceeds to narrate the relevant facts from Diana Lantigua's secondary inspection. Diana Lantigua drafted
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and signed a Customs and Inspection form stating that she traveled on a cruise ship to various Carribean Islands and was accompanied by another family member. Officer Alvarez was on one side of the secondary inspection room performing her duties as to Diana, while Officer Rivera, was on the other side of the room questioning Breidy Lantigua. Officer Rivera was at least three to four long aluminum inspection desks away from Officer Alvarez 3 with a middle corridor area for the general public in between each aluminum inspection desk.4
Officer Alvarez originally asked Diana Lantigua general questions and took notes based upon her answers. These notes were written on the reverse side of her Customs and immigration form.5 Officer Alvarez asked questions related to the purpose of Diana's trip, such as whom she was traveling with and what kind of work did she perform. Diana Lantigua stated that she cleaned offices and took care of the elderly, all for a term of six days a week. Diana Lantigua also stated that her brother was 20 years old and was a high-school student.
Initially, however, Diana Lantigua stated that she wanted to leave as her “husband was waiting outside with [her] baby.” The Court specifically inquired about why she was referred to secondary inspection. Officer Alvarez asked the same question to the referring agent, Officer Cruz, and was told that the “brother and sister were acting nervously. That was it.”
Officer Alvarez asked Diana Lantigua if the two pieces of luggage were hers. One of the pieces was red and rectangular in shape, and the other piece was a blue/black duffle bag as seen in the photograph ( [Officer Alvarez testified that, in person, the duffle bag was actually black/grey in color] ). Diana Lantigua also had a black purse (photograph I.D. number 12). Officer Alvarez had the following exchange with Diana Lantigua:
Question: Is this your luggage?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Did you pack everything yourself.
Answer: Yes.
Question: Are you carrying anything [other than for yourself] including packages?
Answer: No.
Officer Alvarez proceeded to inspect the piece of red luggage. The Officer first removed soiled clothes, then garlic cloves, followed by baby wipes. The baby wipes were smothered with a common room deodorant used to clean bathroom floors; this deodorant stained the wipes red with a cherry-like color. Officer Alvarez was very surprised and originally concerned that the red substance was blood. Officer Alvarez asked Diana Lantigua if she had cut herself and the Officer expressed to
[798 F.Supp.2d 374]
the Court that “if it was blood, I did [sic] not want to touch it.”
According to Officer Alvarez, Diana Lantigua responded, “No, no. It is deodorant ... it is room deodorant.” Officer Alvarez later testified that “It was an alarm for us;” the Court later referred to this alarm as a “suspicion.”
Officer Alvarez asked Diana Lantigua “Why do you have this here?” referring to the deodorant liquid which was almost pooling at the bottom of the suitcase/duffle bag. Officer Alvarez stated that Diana Lantigua “provided [ ] three different answers” to this question. First, Diana Lantigua stated, “I didn't know,” but Officer Alvarez insisted on receiving an answer.6 Next, Diana Lantigua replied that she decided to “purchase the deodorant in Aruba [because] it was very cheap.” Finally, Diana Lantigua stated that somebody left it in her bag. [It was there in an empty bag.] These statements constitute the heart of the pending motion to suppress.
Officer Alvarez proceeded to open the duffle bag.7 Officer Alvarez found mostly shoes with identical room deodorant spread on the bottom of the duffle bag along with black cloves, garlic cloves, and pieces of soap inside multiple pairs of shoes.
Officer Alvarez then asked, “Why do you have so many shoes?” Diana Lantigua did not answer. Diana Lantigua merely insisted on leaving the secondary inspection area because her husband was waiting outside with the baby.
In essence, Diana Lantigua seeks to suppress all of the statements she made after Officer Alvarez opened the initial piece of luggage and found the deodorant, cloves, and red colored baby wipes at the bottom of the luggage.
The issue in the instant case is whether the questions asked by Officer Alvarez to Diana Lantigua, within the confines of a border inspection, constituted “custodial questions” that should have triggered a prior Miranda warning under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477–78, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). This inquiry boils down to deciding “whether the circumstances of the encounter [ ] were of the ‘nature and setting of ... [a] custody interrogation.’ ” United States v. Pratt, 645 F.2d 89, 90 (1st Cir.1981)(citing Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602)).
Since Pratt, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “police are not required to give Miranda warnings to everyone they question.” Id. (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). This admonition has special application to airport Customs inspections and port vessels Customs inspections sites because individuals are aware of the greater necessity for an inspection at these locations and are accustomed to such routine inspection at these locations. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (Psychological impact of official intrusion lessened when “all are subject to a show of police power of the community”). Further, “any person required to submit to a secondary Customs search may apprehend some increased level of suspicion.”
[798 F.Supp.2d 375]
Pratt, 645 F.2d at 90 (citing United States v. Henry 604 F.2d 908 (5th Cir.1979)(emphasis added)).
The Pratt Court then concluded that the “confining character of a customs questioning cell, combined with isolation with two probing inspectors, also creates an oppressive atmosphere [which cannot be] ignore[d].” Pratt, 645 F.2d at 90. Nevertheless, the Court found that even questions in a cell, in the presence of two officers, are not, per se, illegal. The Court held that the other factors presented caused an override of the cell questioning. Specifically, the Court found three factors to be determinative, as modified by later First Circuit jurisprudence.8
The Court deems pertinent to examine the cases of United States v. Ventura, 85 F.3d 708 (1st Cir.1996), (“ Ventura I ”) and United States v. Fernandez–Ventura, 132 F.3d 844 (1st Cir.1998)(“ Ventura II ”), as the Court considers said cases outcome determinative to the present inquiry.9
In Ventura I, the Court stated that the ultimate “inquiry” as to the need for a Miranda warning “is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 85 F.3d at 710 (internal citations omitted). In order to assess an individual's restraint on their freedom of movement, the Court must, objectively, examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. “The only relevant inquiry is “how a reasonable man in the suspect's shoes would have understood his situation. The subjective beliefs held by the interrogating officers or the person interrogated are not germane.” Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Stansbury...
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