United States v. Lumumba, 83 Cr. Misc. 1 p. 46 (RWS).
Decision Date | 11 December 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83 Cr. Misc. 1 p. 46 (RWS).,83 Cr. Misc. 1 p. 46 (RWS). |
Citation | 598 F. Supp. 209 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Chokwe LUMUMBA, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Rudolph W. Giuliani, U.S. Atty., S.D.N.Y. by Stacey S. Moritz, Robert Litt, Asst. U.S. Attys., New York City, for U.S.
Hill, Lewis, Adams, Goodrich & Tait, Detroit, Mich. by Anthony Adams, Detroit, Mich., of counsel; Edison, Davis & Lumumba, Detroit, Mich. by Harry Davis, Detroit, Mich., of counsel, for defendant.
Remand of this criminal contempt was ordered by the Court of Appeals in its July 27, 1984 reversal of the Honorable Kevin T. Duffy's judgment of conviction of Chokwe Lumumba ("Lumumba") entered pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 401. Motions were invited by the court and were heard to determine the scope of the remand and the nature of the proceedings to be held upon remand. The retrial will be governed by the procedure as described below.
The Court of Appeals stated that where the contempt charged occurred in the presence of the court but the adjudication and punishment were deferred, and where there may be some residue of personal antipathy between the alleged contemnor and the presiding trial judge, the alleged contemnor must be given an opportunity to be heard before a judge other than the one presiding at trial, before a final adjudication of the contempt conviction. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 4 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974). The Circuit opinion concluded: U.S.A. v. Chokwe Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12 at 17 (2nd Cir.1984). Of course, as noted in the opinion of this court filed November 17, 1983, Lumumba did explain his actions and presented arguments in mitigation, including an immunity defense. 578 F.Supp. 100 (N.Y.1983). Obviously, in view of the reversal, something more is required.
Both the Government and Lumumba's counsel submitted papers and argued orally about the procedures to be followed in connection with the mandated hearing. Lumumba urges he be given written notice of the charges, a jury trial, and discovery of the evidence to be introduced by the Government. The Government has resisted these demands and stated its intention to rely upon the record of the trial conducted by Judge Duffy, in the course of which Lumumba was cited and convicted of contempt in the presence of the court.
The Second Circuit has held, in In re Sadin, 509 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir.1975), that where there is actual knowledge of pending contempt charges, formal notice is not necessary in order to satisfy due process requirements.
Appellant further claims that the contempt order of July 17, 1974, should be vacated because he was not given proper notice. In State v. Handler, supra, 476 F.2d 709 at 713 2d Cir.1973, we held, in light of the witness's actual knowledge of the nature of the contempt proceeding against him, that there was no denial of due process by failure to provide formal notice. Here, appellant and his court-appointed counsel had adequate notice of the July 19, 1974 hearing. Moreover, notice is provided for in Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in order to allow a reasonable time for the preparation of a defense. The notice here was adequate for, as we found above, appellant had a reasonable time to prepare his defense.
See also Musidor, B.V. v. Great American Screen, 658 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S.Ct. 1440, 71 L.Ed.2d 656 (1982).
The actual notice in this case is sufficient to satisfy due process requirements, and no additional formal notification of the nature of the pending charges is therefore required.
The requirement of a jury trial does not attach to "petty" criminal offenses. As the Supreme Court explained in its opinion cited by the Court of Appeals:
Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 495-6, 94 S.Ct. at 2701-2. Further, of course, I have previously held that contrary to his contention, Lumumba was not entitled to a jury trial, and there is no indication from the Court of Appeals that its reversal was directed to that aspect of my determination. Its reference to a hearing other than "a full blown trial" in my view supports my prior ruling that a jury trial is not required. Consequently, the hearing mandated by the remand will be held without a jury.
The Government has stated its intention to base its case upon the transcript of...
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