United States v. Lusk
Decision Date | 28 March 2022 |
Docket Number | Case No. 21-cr-20307-GAD-KGA-1 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Hugh Harold LUSK, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Carl D. Gilmer-Hill, Jihan M. Williams, U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.
Federal Community Defender, Public Defender, Detroit, MI, Claude M. Chapman, Claude M. Chapman Assoc., Detroit, MI, Bertram L. Johnson, Law Offices of Christian Ray & Associates, P.C., Dearborn, MI, David A. Nacht, Nacht & Roumel, PC, Ann Arbor, MI, for Defendant.
On May 5, 2021, a grand jury charged Defendant Hugh Harold Lusk, and his codefendants, with one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 246 and 841(a)(1). ECF No. 1. Lusk was subsequently charged in the First Superseding Indictment with an additional count of aiding and abetting in the distribution of a controlled substance resulting in death, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. ECF No. 75. Lusk has engaged in obstructionism, delay tactics, and other misbehaviors since the commencement of this criminal proceeding. For the following reasons, the Court finds Defendant in criminal contempt and imposes a thirty-day custodial sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 401(1).
The Court set out much of the relevant procedural background in its March 7, 2022 Order Granting Defense Counsel's Oral Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Defendant Lusk, Appointing the Federal Community Defender to Assign New Counsel, and Directing the Government to Schedule Arraignment of Superseding Indictment:
In addition to refusing to answer the Court's questions, Lusk also disrupted and delayed the motion hearing by repeatedly asking if he could move from the gallery into the well of the courtroom without forming a binding contract, asking the Court if it had any claims against him, walking back to confer with his companions in the audience, asking if he could sit on a particular bench without forming a binding contract, repeatedly asking if the court was on the record, and repeatedly asking the Court to spell its name for the record. Indeed, he was so disruptive that Court ultimately chose not to hear arguments on the oral Motion during the status conference when it was first made. Instead, the Court took a brief recess to allow Lusk's codefendants and their counsel to avoid having to sit through his shenanigans unnecessarily.
Lusk appeared before the Court on March 28, 2022 for another status conference. See ECF No. 118. During the conference, Lusk expressed that he would like to terminate his newly appointed counsel, David Nacht, in favor of representing himself. Again, Lusk misbehaved by delaying and disrupting the proceedings. He refused to enter the court room until one of his companions approved him doing so and then proceeded to repeat many of the same behaviors from his previous appearance. He also repeatedly interrupted the Court while it attempted to ask him the questions necessary to establish that he was knowingly waiving his right to counsel. In fact, the Court was only able to get a legitimate answer to one of the questions in the colloquy. Otherwise, Lusk responded with nonsensical "legal" jargon, such as that he was "here for full settlement and closure on the case."
The Court provided notice to Lusk that it has authority to punish him with contempt via summary disposition proceedings if he continued to engage in "misbehavior in the Court's presence that obstructs the administration of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 401(1). Nacht also advised Lusk that if he just calmly answered the Court's questions, he could achieve his goal of representing himself without issue. Instead of heeding the Court's and Nacht's warnings, Lusk continued to refuse to answer the Court's questions regarding his desire to proceed pro se. Thus, for the following reasons, the Court finds Lusk in criminal contempt and imposes a thirty-day custodial sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 401(1).
"The power to punish contempt is ‘inherent in all courts,’ allowing them to protect themselves against assaults on their authority." United States v. Arredondo , 349 F.3d 310, 316 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. , 481 U.S. 787, 795, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987) ). A federal court has the discretionary power to "punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, ... such contempt of its authority" caused by a defendant's "[m]isbehavior ... in [the Court's] presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice[,]" or due to the defendant's "[d]isobedience or resistance to [the Court's] lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command." 18 U.S.C. §§ 401(1) ; (3).
Criminal contempt sanctions require "constitutional protections ... just as they do in other criminal prosecutions." Arredondo , 349 F.3d at 316 ( ); United States v. Koubriti , 305 F. Supp.2d 723 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ( ). While the criminal contempt statute "carries upon its face the purpose to leave the courts ample power to protect the administration of justice against immediate interruption of its business[,]" Congress intended the courts to be "limited, in contempt cases, to ‘the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.’ " Vaughn v. Flint , 752 F.2d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Michael , 326 U.S. 224, 227, 66 S.Ct. 78, 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945) ).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 governs criminal contempt procedures. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. A district court "may summarily punish a person who commits criminal contempt in its presence if the judge saw or heard the contemptuous conduct and so certifies[.]" Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b) ; Arredondo , 349 F.3d at 316 ( )(quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b) ); cf. United States v. Delahanty , 488 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1973) ( ).
"The contempt order must recite the facts, be signed by the judge, and be filed with the clerk." Id. "This summary power is reserved for ‘exceptional circumstances ... such as acts threatening the judge or disrupting a hearing or obstructing court proceedings.’ " Id. (quoting Vaughn , 752 F.2d at 1167 ); see also Pounders v. Watson , 521 U.S. 982, 988, 117 S.Ct. 2359, 138 L.Ed.2d 976 (1997) (...
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