United States v. Mahoney, 12–1882.

Decision Date03 June 2013
Docket NumberNo. 12–1882.,12–1882.
Citation717 F.3d 257
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Brian E. MAHONEY, Defendant, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Robert B. Mann, with whom Mann and Mitchell, was on brief for appellant.

Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom John P. Kacavas, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and STAHL, Circuit Judges.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

Brian E. Mahoney (Mahoney) filed this interlocutory appeal from an order finding him incompetent to stand trial and committing him to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).

Mahoney makes four main arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the commitment order, read in light of the district court's expressions at the end of the competency hearing, must be understood to mean that the district court found him competent to stand trial, but incompetent to represent himself. Second, he claims that, to the extent the court predicated its finding of incompetency upon its determination that he had “misunderstandings of several procedural and constitutional concepts,” it applied the wrong legal standard. Third, he urges us to find that the district court's decision was clearly erroneous as it was not based on the opinion of the expert whose evaluation was the most thorough. Finally, Mahoney argues that, under Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), the district court had to find he suffered from severe mental illness in order to deny him the right to proceed pro se. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court's order.

I. Background

On January 19, 2011, Mahoney was charged with failing to register as required under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) due to a 1983 Massachusetts conviction for assault with intent to rape. See18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). On April 22, 2011, with the parties' acquiescence, the district court ordered Mahoney to undergo a mental competency evaluation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b). Mahoney was thus evaluated at the Federal Medical Center Devens in Massachusetts (“Devens”). A final report by Miriam Kissin, Psy.D. (“Dr. Kissin”), concluded that, even though Mahoney suffered from a chronic mood disorder, he was competent to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense. On October 11, 2011, the district court ordered an additional competency evaluation to be performed by Eric G. Mart, Ph.D. (“Dr. Mart”), a licensed psychologist.1 A competency hearing was held on March 27, 2012.

A. Dr. Kissin's Testimony

During the competency hearing, the government presented Dr. Kissin's testimony. She testified to having met with Mahoney a total of seven times. During the meetings, she was able to learn that Mahoney had a history of hyperactivity during childhood and throughout his adult life. He told her that he was able to interact with other people and was successfully employed for several years, although he also said that he was hyperactive in his interactions, which oftentimes led to interpersonal difficulties. At one point in his life, he sought outpatient treatment and received therapy and medication.

During the course of their meetings, Dr. Kissin performed structured interviews by asking questions aimed at assessing Mahoney's competency. She thus evaluated his (1) understanding of the facts surrounding the charges pending against him; (2) rational understanding of the potential implications of the charges; and (3) ability to make decisions based on information available to him. She observed that Mahoney had no difficulty answering questions related to the way the legal system works generally and that he had a sophisticated understanding of the court system because he had spent many years doing legal research on his own and had also enrolled in a paralegal course. Dr. Kissin further testified that Mahoney expressed displeasure with his attorney because the attorney did not want to go in the same direction as he did in relation to his defense and stated that he was better suited to represent himself.

Dr. Kissin testified that she did not observe any evidence that Mahoney suffered delusional thoughts while he was at Devens. She defined the clinical term “delusion” as “a belief an individual holds that is false and that does not change despite the individual being offered other information that disputes the false belief.” She also stated that she did not observe any evidence of “disordered thinking,” which she defined as a thought process that does not logically flow, but is rather interrupted by psychiatric symptoms.

Based on her observations, she concluded that Mahoney suffered from Bipolar Disorder II, a mood disorder that, although not as severe as Bipolar Disorder I, still causes patients suffering from it to experience mood swings ranging from mania to depression. She further diagnosed Mahoney as manifesting certain features of anti-social personality disorder, which she described not as a clinical disorder, but as a way to conceptualize the way a given patient interacts with other people. She observed, however, that he did not exhibit enough symptoms to receive the full diagnosis. Dr. Kissin also testified that Mahoney was given the mood stabilizer Oxcarbazepine, to which he responded well, as patients suffering from mood disorders often do, but that, even on medication, he continued to be hypomanic the entire time he was at Devens.

At the closing of her direct testimony, Dr. Kissin reported that, at the time she evaluated him, Mahoney was competent because he exhibited the capacity to understand the charges against him, consult with his attorney and make decisions in his case.

During cross-examination by Mahoney's attorney, Dr. Kissin testified that if someone held a delusional belief that he or she was specifically being targeted by his or her attorney acting in cahoots with the presiding judge, the delusion would certainly affect the defendant's competency. If the belief was not delusional, then the person's competency would not be compromised. She again stated that Mahoney had not exhibited any delusional thoughts while she examined him at Devens.

Dr. Kissin was also briefly cross-examined by Mahoney himself. He asked if she recalled calling the prosecutor and his attorney on the phone to find out whether he had been found not guilty of “aggravated felonious sexual assault.” 2 Dr. Kissin answered that she recalled both of them stating that Mahoney was in fact acquitted of that particular charge. After hearing the doctor's response, Mahoney became agitated and expressed that he should not be asked to respond to charges of which he had been acquitted.3 The district court judge then asked Mahoney if he believed his attorney was involved in a conspiracy against him and Mahoney responded, [a]bsolutely.”

Once Mahoney's intervention was over, Mahoney's counsel resumed Dr. Kissin's cross-examination. He inquired whether, due to his mood disorder, Mahoney could be competent at one point and incompetent at another point. Dr. Kissin responded that, if Mahoney was especially symptomatic, his ability to comport himself in the courtroom could be affected. She concluded, [c]ompetency is point in time. So it is possible that he can be less or more able to comport himself and be less or more in control of his mood disorder, that could be to his competency, yes.”

B. Testimony of Dr. Mart

Dr. Mart testified that he met with Mahoney three times. During the first meeting, Dr. Mart was unable to understand exactly what Mahoney's intentions were. He understood that Mahoney's plan was to be found competent, try the case himself (because he could do so better than anyone else), and then plead temporary insanity.

During the second meeting, Dr. Mart observed that Mahoney exhibited pressured speech, often talked about things and events he assumed Dr. Mart knew about and rapidly jumped from topic to topic. During this meeting, Dr. Mart administereda test called the “Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–2.” The result of that test was invalid because Mahoney gave variable answers to questions aimed at assessing a single point, which led Dr. Mart to believe that his thinking was confused and fragmented.

During that meeting, Dr. Mart also administered Mahoney the MacArthur Competency Interview for Criminal Adjudication (“Mac–CAT–CA”), which is aimed at measuring understanding, reasoning and appreciation. The section regarding understanding is aimed at measuring the extent to which the testee understands the role of those involved in a criminal proceeding (i.e. the judge, the prosecutor, etc.). The second section tests the ability to reason and distinguish which facts are more important in a hypothetical situation. Mahoney obtained perfect scores on both of these sections. The third section tests a person's appreciation for his or her own legal situation. Mahoney's results fell in the clinically impaired range in this section. His answers indicated that he believed his attorney and the district court judge were conspiring against him.

Dr. Mart diagnosed Mahoney with Bipolar Disorder not otherwise specified with psychotic features and personality disorder not otherwise specified with anti-social narcissistic features. He believed that Mahoney suffered from high levels of manic excitement that distorted his thought processes. He also observed that people with bipolar disorders may at times cycle between moods rapidly. Finally, he testified that Mahoney exhibited feelings of grandiosity, which affected his appreciation of his situation given that he believed he understood the law better than anyone and no lawyer would know as much as he did. At the end of the second meeting, Dr. Mart believed Mahoney was not competent, but that he might improve with medication.

Dr. Mart had a third meeting with...

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10 cases
  • State v. O'Neill
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • May 26, 2020
    ...nationwide. Federal jurisdictions uniformly review a district court's competency finding for clear error. See United States v. Mahoney , 717 F.3d 257, 265 (1st Cir. 2013) ; United States v. Gigante , 166 F.3d 75, 83–84 (2d Cir. 1999) ; United States v. Green , 544 F.2d 138, 145 (3d Cir. 197......
  • Mahoney v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 15-13023-NMG
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • November 7, 2016
    ...pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) and he was confined at Devens Federal Medical Center in Ayer, Massachusetts. See United States v. Mahoney, 717 F.3d 257, 261-262 (1st Cir. 2013). As noted above, Mahoney was subsequently committed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). Title 42, United States Code,......
  • United States v. Brown, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 12-0367
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • April 8, 2015
    ...that "[a] district court may rely on one of two competing competency opinions given by qualified experts"); United States v. Mahoney, 717 F.3d 257, 264-66 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that the district court did not err by relying on the testimony of one expert and its own observations rather t......
  • United States v. Zendran
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • December 30, 2020
    ...States v. Widi, 684 F.3d 216, 220-21 (1st Cir. 2012). The inquiry into competency is "intensely fact based," United States v. Mahoney, 717 F.3d 257, 266 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotations marks omitted), and is "often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuan......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Review Proceedings
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • August 1, 2022
    ...Compare Pierce v. Blaine, 467 F.3d 362, 370 (3d Cir. 2006) (commitment order not immediately appealable), with U.S. v. Mahoney, 717 F.3d 257, 262-63 (1st Cir. 2013) (order committing defendant to custody immediately appealable because it is def‌initive, distinct from merits, and affects int......

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