United States v. Maley

• Decision Date: 03 March 2020
• Docket Number: Cr. No. 13-3696 RB/KK,Civ. No. 17-1225 RB/KK
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. MATTHEW MALEY, Defendant/Movant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. MATTHEW MALEY, Defendant/Movant.

Cr. No. 13-3696 RB/KK

Civ. No. 17-1225 RB/KK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

March 3, 2020

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on: (1) Defendant/Movant Matthew Maley's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 290) ("Section 2255 Motion"), filed December 13, 2017; and, (2) Plaintiff/Respondent the United States' Motion to Strike Response to Surreply (Doc. 329) ("Motion to Strike"), filed July 23, 2018. In her Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition (Doc. 380) ("PFRD") filed December 10, 2019, United States Magistrate Judge Kirtan Khalsa recommended that the Court deny Mr. Maley's Section 2255 Motion and deny the Government's Motion to Strike as moot. (Id. at 51.) Mr. Maley filed Objections to Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition ("Objections") on January 23, 2020 (Doc. 383), and these Objections are now before the Court as well.

I. Standard of Review

District courts may refer dispositive motions to a magistrate judge for a recommended disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). "Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the [magistrate judge's] recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In resolving objections to a magistrate judge's proposal,

[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). "[A] party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review." United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Further, "[i]n this circuit, theories raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's report are deemed waived." United States v. Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1031 (10th Cir. 2001); Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996).

Where a party files timely and specific objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation on a dispositive motion, "the statute calls for a de novo determination, not a de novo hearing." United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674 (1980). A de novo determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) "requires the district court to consider relevant evidence of record and not merely review the magistrate judge's recommendation." In re Griego, 64 F.3d 580, 584 (10th Cir. 1995). Although a district court must make a de novo determination of objections to recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the district court is not precluded from relying on the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676 ("[I]n providing for a 'de novo determination' rather than de novo hearing, Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.") (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)).

The Court will generally not review a proposed finding de novo where no party objects to it; instead, the Court will adopt the proposed finding unless it is "clearly erroneous, arbitrary,obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion." Moody v. Dollar Tree Store No. 2967, 402 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1108-09 (D.N.M. 2019) (ellipses, brackets, and quotation omitted). This review, which is deferential to the magistrate judge's work in the absence of objections, nonetheless provides some oversight in the interests of justice.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner who

claim[s] the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).

Relief under Section 2255 is available only if "the claimed error constituted a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (superseded by statute on other grounds). Courts must presume "that the proceedings leading to [a] conviction were correct"; the burden is on the movant to demonstrate otherwise. Klein v. United States, 880 F.2d 250, 253 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954)). Section 2255 requires district courts to hold an evidentiary hearing on a prisoner's motion "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

The Court has considered Mr. Maley's Section 2255 Motion, the Government's Motion to Strike, the PFRD, and Mr. Maley's Objections in light of the foregoing standards and its review of the record. On these bases, and as explained below, the Court finds that Mr. Maley's Objections should be overruled, Judge Khalsa's PFRD should be adopted, Mr. Maley's Section 2255 Motion should be denied, and the Government's Motion to Strike should be denied as moot.

II. Procedural and Factual Background

Mr. Maley filed his pro se Section 2255 Motion on December 13, 2017. (Doc. 290.) In it, he claims that his counsel in the underlying criminal case were ineffective for failing to seek suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of officers' entry into, and subsequent seizure and search of, his travel trailer. (Id. at 13-21.) The Government responded in opposition to Mr. Maley's Section 2255 Motion on March 6, 2018 (Doc. 298); Mr. Maley filed a pro se reply on May 7, 2018 (Doc. 309); with leave, the Government filed a surreply on June 1, 2018 (Doc. 315); and Mr. Maley filed a pro se surresponse on June 25, 2018 (Doc. 326). On July 23, 2018, the Government filed its motion to strike Mr. Maley's surresponse. (Doc. 329.)

The Court appointed Todd Coberly to represent Mr. Maley on December 10, 2018 (Doc. 342), and ordered supplemental briefing on December 11, 2018 (Doc. 343). Mr. Maley filed a supplemental brief on March 11, 2019 (Doc. 350); the Government filed a supplemental response on May 1, 2019 (Doc. 357); and Mr. Maley filed a supplemental reply on May 13, 2019 (Doc. 359).

On June 17, 2019, Judge Khalsa scheduled an evidentiary hearing for August 29, 2019, which was later continued to October 4, 2019 at the Government's request. (Docs. 364; 370; 371.) However, on September 23, 2019, the parties filed a Notice of Stipulation regarding whether the firearms admitted into evidence at Mr. Maley's criminal trial were in plain view when officers entered Mr. Maley's trailer. (Doc. 376.) In the notice the parties stated that, given the stipulated facts, they did not believe that the evidentiary hearing scheduled for October 4, 2019, would be necessary. (Id. at 1.) Accordingly, Judge Khalsa vacated the hearing. (Doc. 377.)

Neither party has objected to the PFRD's procedural history of this case, the underlying criminal case, or the related criminal case in the District of Arizona (Doc. 380 at 1-6); likewise,neither party has objected to the PFRD's detailed "Summary of Record Evidence Relevant to Mr. Maley's Section 2255 Motion."¹ (Id. at 6-19; see generally Doc. 383.) The Court has reviewed the procedural history and summary of record evidence and finds that they are not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d at 1060; Moody, 402 F. Supp. 3d at 1108-09. The Court will therefore adopt them, will assume the reader's familiarity with them, and will not restate their contents here except to highlight facts particularly relevant to the Court's analysis.

In his Section 2255 Motion, Mr. Maley argues that his attorneys in the underlying criminal case were ineffective because they failed to seek suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of officers' initial entry into, and subsequent seizure and search of, his travel trailer parked at 1920 West Gardner Lane in Tucson, Arizona, on November 17, 2013. (Docs. 290 at 13-21; 309 at 1-16.) According to Mr. Maley, a motion to suppress would have been meritorious and would have led to the exclusion at trial of all evidence obtained as a result of the officers' unlawful actions. (Id.) Mr. Maley further argues that the verdict against him would have been different had this evidence been excluded. (Id.)

In her PFRD, Judge Khalsa proposed to find that a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of officers' initial entry into Mr. Maley's trailer would have lacked merit, because officers had a valid warrant for Mr. Maley's arrest and reason to believe he resided and would be found within the trailer when they entered it. (Doc. 380 at 21-36); see Payton v. New York, 445U.S. 573, 603 (1980) ("[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within."). Thus, she reasoned, the initial entry was lawful and the incriminating items officers observed in plain view while searching the trailer for Mr. Maley were not subject to suppression. (Doc. 380 at 34-36.)

The magistrate judge...