United States v. Manbeck, Crim. No. 80-278.
Decision Date | 12 May 1981 |
Docket Number | Crim. No. 80-278. |
Citation | 514 F. Supp. 152 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Robert John MANBECK, Thomas Manbeck, Kenneth Herring, Gary Gallopo, Mark Huiet Sale, David Martin Summerville, Lorenz Josephus Proden, Kermit Theodore Brogden, John O'Hare, Eddie Brantley, Thomas Earnest Folske, Thomas Sams Hightower, Timothy Alan Laxton, Harrel Lewis, Jr., John Isidore Stevens, Aaron Douglas Staetter, John Michael Iyoob, James Anthony Hastings, John Benjamin Barton, Jr., John Wesley Flannel, Jessie Lee Mallory, Arthur Duncan, and Gregory Michael Scott. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Lionel S. Lofton, Asst. U. S. Atty., Charleston, S. C. and Cameron B. Littlejohn, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Columbia, S. C., for plaintiff.
Mark Kadish, Rhonda A. Brofman, Kadish, Davis & Brofman, P. C., Atlanta, Ga., and Gedney M. Howe, III, Howe & Howe, Charleston, S. C., for defendants Thomas Manbeck and Herring.
Michael L. Pritzker, Marcia L. Smith, Stroup, Goldstein, Jenkins & Pritzker, Chicago, Ill. and Dennis E. O'Neill, Burkett, Guerard, Wooddy, Bargmann, Cisa & O'Neill, Mount Pleasant, S. C., for defendant Gallopo.
Edward Garland, Austin E. Catts, John R. Hesmer, Garland, Nuckolls & Catts, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants Sale and Proden.
R. David Botts, Harper, Wiggins & Botts, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant Summerville.
Gedney M. Howe, III, Howe & Howe, Charleston, S. C., for defendants Proden, Brogden and Summerville.
Arthur G. Howe, Paul Uricchio, Barry Krell, Uricchio, Howe & Krell, P. A., Charleston, S. C., for defendants O'Hare, Brantley, Folske, Hightower, Lewis, Laxton and Stevens.
Edwin Marger and Diane Marger, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants Staetter, Iyoob, Hastings and Scott.
Peden B. McLeod, McLeod, Fraser & Unger, Walterboro, S. C., for defendants Staetter, Iyoob, Hastings and Scott, Barton, Mallory and Duncan and Flannel.
Donald B. Walker, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants Barton, Mallory and Duncan.
Robert G. Fierer, Steven Westby, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant Flannel.
This case involves a four-count indictment1 against twenty-three defendants alleging various drug-related charges arising out of a drug smuggling operation which took place at Bennett's Point, South Carolina, in November 1980.
Numerous motions were filed by the defendants in this case. This order deals with two of these motions.
On March 23, 1981, Defendant Gallopo moved this court to dismiss the indictment pursuant to Section 3161(c)(1) of Title 18 of the United States Code ("speedy trial motion").2 The other defendants joined in the motion. Defendants contend that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., were violated given the delay between the time of arraignment and the commencement of the trial.
The Sixth Amendment secures the right to a speedy trial in a federal criminal prosecution. Section 3161, et seq., of Title 18 of the United States Code clarifies what period of delay is considered per se unreasonable and sets mandatory time periods in which a defendant must be brought to trial. It is defendants' position that the statutory minimums established by the Act so as to insure compliance with the Sixth Amendment have been violated.
Section 3161(c)(1) provides in relevant part:
In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
The indictment in this case was filed on December 2, 1980. William Sidney Baldwin, Jr.3 was the first defendant to make an appearance before the court in this case; he appeared at his arraignment on December 3, 1980. Thus, given the above quoted provision, the seventy day count would begin to run on December 3, 1980. This seventy-day period would have thus expired as of March 12, 1981.
"In passing the Speedy Trial Act, Congress recognized the need to provide flexibility to permit a trial court to coordinate the schedules of multiple defendants and their counsels." United States v. Edwards, 627 F.2d 460, 461 (D.C.Cir.1980). Thus, Congress provided in Section 3161(h)(1)(F):
According to the records of the Clerk of Court, Defendant Baldwin filed several motions on December 22, 1980, including a motion to dismiss, a motion to strike surplusage, and a motion for bill of particulars. These motions were disposed of by the court on February 12, 1981. Thus, in light of the provisions quoted above, the period of time from December 22, 1980, until February 12, 1981, should be excluded in the computation of the seventy-day period. With the seventy-day period beginning on December 3, 1980, and this exclusion being considered, it is clear that the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act were not violated when the trial commenced.4
This court's analysis, specifically set forth as to Defendant Baldwin, disposes of the matter as to Defendant Gallopo and all other defendants in light of Section 3161(h)(7) of Title 18 of the United States Code which provides:
No motion for severance was ever granted in this case. Moreover, this court finds that the period of delay experienced by the other defendants was a reasonable one.
This court granted a continuance in the proceedings on two occasions, and in view of the above-quoted provisions, orally stated during subsequent proceedings its reasons for continuing the case past the original trial date set for February 2, 1981, and the second trial date of March 2, 1981. See, United States v. Edwards, 627 F.2d 460, 461 (D.C.Cir.1980) ( ). This court specifically noted the complexities of the case due to the number of defendants in the case and the necessity to appoint another attorney to represent Defendant Robert Charles Michael5 immediately prior to the day the case was scheduled for trial.
Based on the foregoing, it is the finding of this court that there has been no violation of the Speedy Trial Act and, therefore, defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment is hereby denied.
Prior to calling this case for trial, the government advised the court and counsel for the defendants that the government intended to move to dismiss Count 4 of the indictment pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That Rule provides:
... The Attorney General or the United States Attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment,...
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