United States v. Maney
| Decision Date | 28 May 1894 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. MANEY. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
F. P Blair, for petitioner.
Col Thomas F. Barr, Judge Advocate, for the United States.
I shall assume that all the allegations of fact presented in this application for a writ of prohibition are true; that it sets forth succinctly everything that has transpired up to this time. I have listened very attentively to the argument of counsel in this case. It is a very interesting one. The argument has been an exhaustive one upon the subject presented, and many questions have been discussed which, it seems to me, it is not necessary to decide. The application for the writ of prohibition, as stated by counsel, is a novel proceeding. I think this is the first time that the circuit court of the United States has been asked to employ this remedy for the purpose indicated in this petition. In the case cited by counsel (Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S 167, 6 Sup.Ct. 570), the supreme court of the District of Columbia was asked to employ the writ of prohibition. While it presents a very novel and interesting question, and there is great doubt in my mind of power in the court is issue a writ of prohibition, I shall concede that there is power in this court, upon an application in a proper case, to issue the writ. This court has no inherent power, it is true, to issue the writ of prohibition, and there is nothing in the statutes of the United States which confers, in express terms, such power. Section 716 of the Revised Statutes does authorize this court, in aid of its jurisdiction, to issue all writs which may be necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction, and 'agreeable to the usages and principles of law. ' The power imparted by this statute must be exercised under the qualifications indicated by the law. It is a very doubtful question, but I shall concede, for the purposes of this decision, that this court, even to a court-martial, has the power to issue the writ.
Now what is the claim made by the counsel for the petitioner? He asks this court, upon the petition presented here, to restrain the court-martial now in session, trying the petitioner for a military offense, as alleged, from further proceeding in that case-- First, for the reason that the court has no jurisdiction of the offense; second, that the court is proceeding in excess of its jurisdiction. In other words, that the first charge is the charge of murder, and that the military court has no jurisdiction to try an officer, in time of peace, for murder, except in cases of mutiny. Counsel claims that, although the charge is 'conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline,' the specification which informs the accused party of the acts which are set up to be proved states acts showing homicide by the accused, and that, consequently, murder is charged. I cannot agree with counsel in such a construction of this charge and specification. There is nothing in the charge itself alleging that Lieut. Maney has committed murder. It is only by reading the specification that we find homicide alluded to. The manner of stating it is a question of pleading rather than of jurisdiction. The charge against Lieut. Maney is 'conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline. ' The military court has jurisdiction to try that charge, and it is for the court having such jurisdiction to decide upon the validity and sufficiency of the pleadings necessary to bring that charge before the court. It is a question of pleading over which this court has no control, and which the military court must decide.
Upon the other point raised by the counsel for the accused, to wit, that the court is proceeding in excess of jurisdiction, I have very little doubt of the principle upon which that must be decided. The supreme court of the United States in many cases has decided what constitutes jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the right to hear, try, and determine a cause. I have jotted down, in a memorandum I have here, a definition of jurisdiction which is found in Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 338. The court in that case said:
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Second Injury Fund of the State Treasurer v. Lupachino
...Winter, 64 Ala. 410, 38 Am. Rep. 13 [1879]; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 43 U.S. 319, 11 L.Ed. 283 [1844]; United States v. Maney, C.C.D.Minn., 61 F. 140 [1894]." Buckman v. United Mine Workers of America, 80 Wyo. 199, 210, 339 P.2d 398 The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion th......
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Bigrow v. Hiatt
...1920 Reprint, page 132 (*188). 12 Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Ed., 1920 Reprint, page 135 (*192). 13 United States v. Maney, C.C.Minn., 1894, 61 F. 140, 142; see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 17, 66 S.Ct. 14 1899, 22 Op.Atty.Gen. 589. 15 Johnson v. Biddle, 8 Cir., 12 F.2d......
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Buckman v. United Mine Workers of America, 2903
... ... § 158(b)], and that therefore the Congress of the United States has pre-empted the field, thereby depriving the State of Wyoming and its Courts from jurisdiction herein ... [80 Wyo. 210] '(d) That the picketing, ... 547; Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410, 38 Am.Rep. 13; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 43 U.S. 319, 11 L.Ed. 283; United States v. Maney, C.C.D.Minn., ... 61 F. 140. There can hardly be any doubt in this case, as shown by a cursory examination of the complaint hereinbefore set out, ... ...
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State ex rel. Meador v. Williams
...prohibition would not issue to prevent his being tried a second time when the inferior court possessed jurisdiction of the cause. [U. S. v. Maney, 61 F. 140; State rel. v. Evans, 88 Wis. 255, 60 N.W. 433; State v. Braun, 31 Wis. 600.] We conclude that the writ should be denied, though some ......