United States v. Mason, 2:16-cr-00002-KJM-1
| Decision Date | 13 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:16-cr-00002-KJM-1 |
| Parties | United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Craig Mason, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Defendant Craig Mason pled guilty to one charge of manufacturing and dealing in firearms without a federal firearms license, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). He moves to withdraw his guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B). He wishes to proceed to trial on both charged offenses listed in the superseding indictment: the unlawful manufacturing and dealing in firearms charge, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) (count one), and manufacturing marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (count two). Mr Mason has not carried his burden to show a “fair and just reason” exists for withdrawal of his plea prior to sentencing. See United States v. Davis, 428 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2005). The motion is denied.
The government originally charged Mr. Mason with unlawful manufacturing and dealing in firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) (count one), and manufacturing marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (count two). See generally Indictment, ECF No. 11. These charges were based on his alleged involvement in the unlawful sale and manufacturing of firearms, in the greater Sacramento area, specifically AR-15-style firearms. See Presentence Rep. (PSR) ¶ 5, ECF No. 103. He also allegedly advertised on Craigslist in late 2011 seeking to reach people who wanted access to machine “80%” receivers.[1] Mr. Mason had never applied for or held a federal firearms license and was not licensed to manufacture or deal firearms. Id. After the indictment issued Mr. Mason was arrested and released on an unsecured appearance bond; he has been on pretrial supervision since December 11, 2015 without incident. Id. ¶ 6.
In August 2017, Mr. Mason's defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss count one of the indictment, arguing: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Mason because “a blank or 80% receiver is not considered to be a firearm”[2] under the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, Mot. to Dismiss (MTD) at 6-7, ECF No. 52, and (2) violation of the Constitution's ex post facto clause given that the indicted conduct allegedly happened in 2013, see MTD at 10-11 (invoking U.S. Const. art. 1 § 9). The government opposed the motion, contending it was improper for the court to evaluate evidence beyond the four corners of the indictment, see generally MTD Opp'n, ECF No. 53, and Mr. Mason replied, MTD Reply, ECF No. 54. The court heard oral argument on November 15, 2017, denied the motion without prejudice from the bench and then issued a confirming order. See Minutes, ECF No. 59; Order (Nov. 30, 2017), ECF No. 60. The court explained in its written order that when “reviewing pretrial dismissal motions” the court is “bound to the four corners of the indictment.” Order (Nov. 30, 2017) at 2 (citing United States v. Boren, 278 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2002)). As Mr. Mason did not argue that § 922(a)(1)(A) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the Indictment's “characterization of his conduct” the court found Mr. Mason's vagueness argument unavailing. Id. at 3 ().
On March 8, 2018, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment against Mr. Mason with the same two criminal counts originally charged, making two changes: (1) expanding the time period of the criminal activity in count one from “on or about April 25, 2013” to “beginning in 2011, and continuing until on or about October 9, 2013”; and (2) adding a detailed forfeiture allegation which sought to forfeit “any property” obtained “directly or indirectly” as a result of the criminal offense. Superseding Indictment at 1-2, ECF No. 62. It was a year later that defendant pled guilty to count one of the two-count superseding indictment. Plea Agreement, ECF No. 100; Change of Plea Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 137. As part of his plea agreement, defendant waived his right to collateral attack including a challenge to “any aspect of the guilty plea, conviction, or sentence.” Plea Agreement at 8:16-22.
On May 24, 2019, defendant filed a sentencing memorandum requesting a sentence of home confinement. See ECF No. 108. On August 19, 2019, the government filed a sentencing memorandum requesting the court impose a 51-month custodial sentence. See ECF No. 112. The Probation Officer recommended a 33-month custodial sentence, the low end of the guidelines range. See PSR at 3.
Nearly a year after entering his guilty plea, but before being sentenced, defendant filed the pending motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B). The parties briefed the matter and the court heard oral argument by videoconference on June 29, 2020. See Mot., ECF No. 130; Opp'n, ECF No. 141; Reply, ECF No. 142. Defendant was present out of custody; the court submitted the matter after hearing. See Minutes, ECF No. 146. The court resolves the motion below.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B) governs requests to withdraw a plea of guilty before sentencing if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” See United States v. Ruiz, 257 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 2001) (). Once the court has accepted a plea, “permitting withdrawal is, as it ought to be, the exception, not an automatic right.” United States v. Minasyan, 4 F.4th 770 (9th Cir. 2021). The decision to allow withdrawal of a plea is solely within the discretion of the district court. See United States v. Nagra, 147 F.3d 875, 880 (9th Cir.1998). The standard is applied liberally. Id. While the fair and just standard “is generous, ” United States v. McTiernan, 546 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008), a defendant may not withdraw his guilty plea “simply on a lark.” United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676-77 (1997). Mr. Mason “has the burden to show a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a plea.” Davis, 428 F.3d at 805 (9th Cir. 2005).
Mr. Mason argues the government offered him the plea agreement without disclosing to defense counsel two items: one, the district court decision in United States v. Jimenez, 191 F.Supp.3d 1038, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2016), and two, a 2016 letter by then-Attorney General Loretta Lynch to then-Speaker of the House of Representatives Paul Ryan discussing the Jimenez case, which granted a constitutional vagueness based on the statute's application to the lower receiver of an AR-15 style machine gun, and the merits of not appealing the decision. See Mot. at 6-9; id. Ex. C (Lynch Letter) at 1, ECF No. 130-3. Had he known about the district court's decision in Jimenez, Mr. Mason says he would have presented similar arguments in his defense in this case; also, had he known about the government's decision not to appeal Jimenez and the Lynch Letter, he would have changed his litigation strategy. See generally Mot.
The government argues it had no duty to disclose a court decision or public letter, and that Mr. Mason's motion is barred by the collateral attack waiver, that Mr. Mason knowingly and voluntarily signed the waiver, and that principles of contract law control the interpretation of the plea agreement. See Opp'n at 3 ().
Without resolving the collateral attack waiver issue, the court addresses the merits to determine whether the defendant has shown “a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Ruiz, 257 F.3d at 1033. Fair and just reasons for withdrawal include inadequate Rule 11 plea colloquies, newly discovered evidence, intervening circumstances, or any other viable reason for withdrawing the plea that did not exist when the defendant entered his guilty plea. See United States v. Turner, 898 F.2d 705, 713 (9th Cir. 1990) ().
Mr. Mason has not carried his burden to show that a “fair and just reason” exists for withdrawing his plea. He does not challenge the adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing nor does he claim he has located newly discovered evidence; instead he moves to withdraw his plea arguing that his not knowing about the Jimenez decision and Lynch Letter qualify as “any other reason” for withdrawal of his plea. Reply at 10. As noted above, in Jimenez, the district court resolved the vagueness challenge with respect to AR-15 lower receivers in that defendant's favor. 191 F.Supp.3d at 1043. The court found defendant “did not have any notice that buying the lower receiver of an AR-15 would subject him to criminal penalties under federal law.” Id. And Ms. Lynch's letter describes the unique “split receiver” mechanism of an AR-15 as a factor in the decision not to appeal. See generally Lynch Letter. In Mr. Mason's eyes the Jimenez decision and the Lynch Letter point out an “intractable problem” with applying § 922(a)(1)(A) to AR-15 blanks, which cannot be solved “without additional regulatory or legislative action.” See Mot. at 6-7.
Mr Mason argues he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to jury trial so that he too can challenge the vagueness of § 922(a)(1)(A) in this case. Spe...
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