United States v. Masters
| Decision Date | 30 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:12-cr-00145-MMD-GWF |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. RYAN MASTERS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
(Defendant's Motion to Preclude the Government
from Offering into Evidence E-mail Inquiry to
American Databank Group - dkt. no. 74)
(Defendant's Motion to Exclude Untimely
Disclosed Audio Files - dkt. no. 75)
(Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude
Electronically Stored Evidence or in the
Alternative Allow for Voir Dire of the Witnesses
Introducing Electronic Evidence Outside the
Presence of the Jury - dkt. no. 81)
(Defendant's Motion to Reconsider - dkt. no. 82).
Before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Preclude the Government from Offering into Evidence E-mail Inquiry to American Databank Group (dkt. no. 74), Motion to Exclude Untimely Disclosed Audio Files (dkt. no. 75), Motion in Limine to Exclude Electronically Stored Evidence or in the Alternative Allow for Voir Dire of the Witnesses Introducing Electronic Evidence Outside the Presence of the Jury (dkt. no. 81), and Motion to Reconsider (dkt. no. 82). For reasons stated below, all motions are denied.
Defendant Masters was indicted in the above criminal case involving counts of Possession of Fifteen or More Counterfeit or Unauthorized Devices. The basis for this prosecution involved the arrest and prosecution of Masters in state court. In that case, Masters was detained and arrested at a local BestBuy. During the local police's investigation, the police obtained a search warrant for Masters' vehicle and discovered numerous electronic devices, including laptops. Sometime thereafter, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) took possession of these devices and conducted a forensic analysis on them. The government alleges that the forensic analysis establishes that Defendant was involved in illegally accessing certain electronic devices. The government used the information from the electronics, as well as other evidence, to obtain the indictment.
Three out of the four pending motions are motions in limine. A motion in limine is a procedural device to obtain an early and preliminary ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Black's Law Dictionary defines it as Black's Law Dictionary 1109 (9th ed. 2009). Although the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE") do not explicitly authorize a motion in limine, the Supreme Court has held that trial judges are authorized to rule on motions in limine pursuant to their authority to manage trials. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n. 4 (1984).
A motion in limine is a request for the court's guidance concerning an evidentiary question. See Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 570 (7th Cir. 1999). Judges have broad discretion when ruling on motions in limine. See Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002). However, a motion in limine should not be used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence. See C & E Servs., Inc., v. Ashland, Inc., 539 F.Supp. 2d 316, 323 (D.D.C. 2008). To exclude evidence on a motion in limine "the evidence must be inadmissible on all potential grounds." See, e.g., Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004). "Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context." Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T Tech., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993). This is because although rulings on motions in limine may save "time, costs, effort and preparation, a court is almost always better situated during the actual trial to assess the value and utility of evidence." Wilkins v. Kmart Corp., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1219 (D. Kan. 2007).
In limine rulings are provisional. Such "rulings are not binding on the trial judge [who] may always change his mind during the course of a trial." Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n. 3 (2000); accord Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 (). Ind. Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
The government has produced a copy of an e-mail (government's proposed Exhibit 112) in which a "Mr. Zeigler" made an inquiry to a company called American DataBank Group for a "Nationwide Wants and Warrants for Ryan Masters." Defendant argues that the e-mail is either not relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401 or constitutes inadmissible hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 802.
The government argues that this information is relevant because when Defendant was arrested, he repeatedly asked an FBI agent when his federal arrest warrant wasissued. The agent eventually told him the date and asked him why it mattered; Defendant responded that it mattered because he subscribed to a service that would tell him if an arrest warrant was issued. The government argues that the e-mail is relevant to confirm that the HP Pavilion dm4-3055dx laptop it was found on belongs to Masters. The government also argues that Exhibit 112 is relevant to prove that Defendant knew his acts were criminal.
Evidence is relevant if it makes a fact of consequence more or less probable. Fed. R. Evid. 401. The e-mail makes it more likely that the laptop in question, which contains many of the files relevant to this case, belonged to Masters. This is because, as the government explains, the e-mail demonstrates that "(a) Masters said he subscribed to a service that would tell him if a warrant was issued for his arrest, and (b) Exhibit 112 is an E-mail that was found on this computer, and (c) the E-mail itself refers to a service that notifies the user of "Nationwide Wants and Warrants for Ryan Masters."
Nor does Exhibit 112 contain hearsay. First, so long as the government can establish that the "Mr. Ziegler" was in fact a pseudonym for Mr. Masters, the document is clearly non-hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), which holds that party admissions are not hearsay.1 Second, the government is correct that the e-mail chain records an agreement between two parties, which is a non-verbal act and non-hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) advisory committee's notes. American Databank confirms receipt of a request for service, offers to provide services if Mr. Ziegler accepts this offer via e-mail, and Mr. Ziegler accepts the agreement.
Third, the evidence is not hearsay because it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. It is unimportant whether or not the contents of the e-mail are true; as the government asserts, the e-mail goes towards demonstrating that the laptop inquestion belonged to Masters. It is therefore enough that Masters sent the e-mail in question; the truth of its contents is not important under this theory of relevance.2
For these reasons, Defendant's Motion to Preclude is denied.
On October 22, 2012, eight days before trial, the government informed Defendant that it gained possession of approximately forty-one telephone calls made by Masters while he was in pretrial custody in May 2011. These calls were recorded and now exist on compact disk. The disk contains hours of audio recordings. The calls were not on the government's proposed exhibit list, but the government plans to introduce two of the phone calls as part of its rebuttal case.3 (Dkt. no. 83 at 3.)
Defendant argues that the government should have disclosed these files at the outset of this case as the government or its agents have been in possession of the recordings since the April 2012 indictment. Moreover, Defendant argues that the late disclosure violates Local Rule 16-1 and the parties Joint Discovery Agreement (dkt. no. 14). The Joint Discovery Agreement states that no later than ten days before trial, the parties "will identify recordings, transcripts of recordings, or portions thereof, that will beoffered at trial." (Dkt. no. 14 at 2.) However, that same document includes a limitation stating that the disclosure deadline applies to objects, documents, and other disclosure matters that are in the possession, custody, or control of the parties at the time the obligation to disclose arises. (Id. at 3.)
The government asserts that it only recently became aware of the audio files, and immediately produced them upon discovery.
Defendant incorrectly cites to several cases holding that the Ninth Circuit requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Disclosure is not at issue here; the government has, in fact, disclosed the audio tapes. Rather, timely disclosure is the issue.
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963), the Supreme Court recognized a prosecutor's obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence, whether substantive or for impeachment purposes, when such evidence is material to the defense. "To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that the evidence was favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; the evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution, willfully or inadvertently; and the defendant was prejudiced by the non-disclosure." Dotson v. Scribner, 619 F. Supp. 2d 866, 873 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,...
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