United States v. Mateen
| Decision Date | 03 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-4165,14-4165 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER J. MATEEN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 15a0263p.06
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 2:12-cr-00041—Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., Chief District Judge.
Before: SILER, CLAY, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
ARGUED: Kevin M. Schad, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Benjamin C. Glassman, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kevin M. Schad, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Benjamin C. Glassman, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. A federal statute prohibiting the sale, distribution, and possession of child pornography includes a sentencing enhancement that applies to offenders with a prior conviction "under the laws of any State relating to . . . sexual abuse." 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). Christopher Mateen pled guilty to possession of child pornography in violation of section 2252, and he appeals the district court's decision to apply the statutory sentencing enhancement. At issue is whether Mateen's 2006 Ohio conviction for gross sexual imposition in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.05 qualifies as a conviction under a state law relating to sexual abuse. We conclude that his conviction for gross sexual imposition under Ohio law triggers enhancement under section 2252(b)(2) and affirm the district court's judgment.
In 2012, police found child pornography on Christopher Mateen's computer, and he pled guilty to possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252. A few years prior, Mateen had pled guilty to gross sexual imposition in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.05. This law prohibits sexual contact that is non-consensual by virtue of (a) force or threats of force, (b) the administration of drugs or other intoxicants, (c) a victim less than thirteen years old, or (d) a victim substantially impaired in his ability to resist or consent. Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.05(A).
Based on this Ohio conviction for gross sexual imposition, the government sought application of a sentencing enhancement. A violation of section 2252(a)(4) carries a maximum sentence of ten years for first-time violators, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), but the federal statute also includes a sentencing enhancement for offenders with certain qualifying convictions. One aspect of the enhancement, relevant here, applies to an individual with a prior conviction "under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward." 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). Such a person "shall be . . . imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years." Id. Though the government sought application of this enhancement, Mateen, in his plea agreement, reserved the right to contest its applicability to him.
At sentencing, the district court applied the categorical approach of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and found that Mateen's gross sexual imposition conviction "categorically qualifies to enhance his sentence under § 2252(b)(2)." Op. and Order, United States v. Mateen, No. 2:12-CR-41, at 4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2014), ECF No. 60. The court defined "sexual abuse" based on its ordinary meaning, following the approaches of the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. Specifically, the district court defined "abuse" as "misuse . . . to use or treat so as to injure, hurt, or damage . . . to commit indecent assault on." Id. (quoting United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004)). It then defined "sexual" as "intent to seek sexual or libidinal gratification." Id. (citing United States v. Sonnenberg, 556 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Sinerius; 504 F.3d 737 740-41 (9th Cir. 2007)). Based on this definition, the court held that every section of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.05 relates to sexual abuse. It concluded that the sentencing enhancement of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 applied and sentenced Mateen to 130 months' imprisonment.
Mateen first argues that his prior Ohio conviction for gross sexual imposition, Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.05, does not qualify as a federal generic offense for which the sentencing enhancement under § 2252(b)(2) must be imposed. "This court reviews de novo a district court's legal conclusion that a prior conviction triggers a mandatory minimum sentence." United States v. Gardner, 649 F.3d 437, 442 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. McGrattan, 504 F.3d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 2007)).
When deciding whether a prior state-law conviction triggers an enhanced sentence, we begin with a categorical approach. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013). We look first to the "fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense"—not the facts underlying the conviction—to determine the nature of the crime. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602; United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 769, 774-75 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). If the state crime of conviction has the same elements as the generic offense—"the offense as commonly understood"—then the prior conviction can serve to enhance the federal sentence. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281, 2283.
The statutory enhancement at issue here applies to an offender with a prior state conviction "relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward." 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). An offender sentenced under the section 2252(b)(2) enhancement is subject to a mandatory ten-year minimum sentence rather than a ten-year maximum sentence. Id. Because the government's sole argument is that the section 2252 enhancement for state convictions relating to sexual abuse applies, we need only analyze whether Ohio's gross sexual imposition statute "relat[es] to . . . sexual abuse."
Applying the Taylor framework, we begin by defining the generic offense of "sexual abuse." See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281. Mateen urges us to look to the statutory definition of sexual abuse from 18 U.S.C. § 2242, located in chapter 109A of the Federal Criminal Code, in construing 18 U.S.C. § 2252, found in chapter 110. The government, however, advocates the adoption of the ordinary meaning of sexual abuse, the approach of the district court. In United States v. Dattilio, another case involving Ohio's gross sexual imposition statute, we declined to address which approach is appropriate. 442 F. App'x 187, 190 n.4 (6th Cir. 2011).
We now reject Mateen's argument that we should determine whether Ohio's gross sexual imposition statute relates to sexual abuse by reference to the sexual abuse definition in chapter 109A. As the Ninth and Second Circuits have observed, "[section] 2252[(b)(2)] employs broader language when defining state convictions that qualify as a predicate sex offense[] than it does when defining predicate federal offenses, such as those located in chapter 109A." United States v. Barker, 723 F.3d 315, 322 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Sinerius, 504 F.3d at 743). While enhancing a sentence for a prior federal offense under section 2252(b)(2) requires an offender to commit a specified crime, including crimes listed in chapter 109A, a prior state conviction requires only that the defendant have been convicted of a state offense "relating to . . . sexual abuse." Id. Other circuits have broadly interpreted the phrase "relating to" as triggering sentence enhancement for "any state offense that stands in some relation, bears upon, or is associated with that generic offense." United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 638 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Sinerius, 504 F.3d at 743); Barker, 723 F.3d at 322-23 (quoting Sinerius with approval); United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012) (same); see also United States v. Colson, 683 F.3d 507, 511-12 (4th Cir. 2012) ();1 Sonnenberg, 556 F.3d at 671 ().2
Analyzing the sentencing enhancement for repeat offenders in chapter 109A also indicates that the state statute of conviction need not mirror the chapter 109A definition of sexual abuse in order to trigger enhancement under section 2252(b)(2). Chapter 109A defines "prior sex offense conviction" with reference to section 2426(b). 18 U.S.C. § 2247(b). This section provides that prior offenses triggering the mandatory minimum include any conviction "under State law for an offense consisting of conduct that would have been an offense [under chapter 117, chapter 109A, chapter 110, or section 1591] if the conduct had occurred within" federal territorial jurisdiction. Id. at § 2426(b); Barker, 723 F.3d at 323. Thus, when a sentence enhancement based on a state conviction requires the state statute to mirror the federal one, the enhancement statute is explicit. Section 2252(b)(2)'s "relating to" language, however, requires only that the state statute be associated with sexual abuse.
Based on the language of section 2252(b)(2) and the approaches of our sister circuits, we define the generic federal offense of "sexual abuse" using its common meaning. The penalty provisions of section 2252 appear in Chapter 110, which contains a definition section but does not define "sexual abuse." See 18 U.S.C. § 2256. "When the text of a statute contains an undefined term, that term receives its ordinary and natural meaning." Limited, Inc. v. Comm'r, 286 F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, ...
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