United States v. Matthews
| Decision Date | 04 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Crim. No. 20-976 (KM) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Hadrian MATTHEWS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Naazneen Bashir Khan, Assistant US Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney District of New Jersey, Newark, NJ, for United States of America.
Anthony J. Pope, Jr., The Anthony Pope Law Firm, P.C., Newark, NJ, for Hadrian Matthews.
Defendant Hadrian Matthews is charged with narcotics and firearms offenses. Now before the Court is his motion to suppress evidence (DE 29) Briefing is complete. (See DE 31, 33) On March 29, 2022, the Court convened a hearing, at which counsel agreed that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary, but proffered oral argument on the motion. The court reserved decision. (DE 39)1 For the reasons stated herein, the suppression motion is granted as to the items seized from the garage, but otherwise denied.
On October 8, 2019, members of the East Orange Police Department Narcotics and Violent Crimes Task Force, as part of an ongoing narcotics investigation, set up surveillance focusing on a multi-residential apartment building at 630 Williams Street (the "Residence"), where defendant Matthews occupied Apartment # 1. A white Honda Accord pulled up to the building. The driver, Sebastian D. Swaby, got out of the Honda and walked to the front porch of the Residence, carrying a black backpack. The defendant here, Mr. Matthews, came out of the Residence and spoke with Swaby. Swaby handed Matthews some money and the two entered the Residence.
An hour later, Swaby emerged from the Residence with a small item in his hand, which he appeared to sniff and place in his right front pants pocket. He drove off in the Honda, followed by some of the officers, who conducted a traffic stop. Approaching the Honda, they smelled marijuana. The officers recovered 17 grams of marijuana from Swaby's right front pocket. Swaby was arrested and charged, and also issued a traffic summons for illegally tinted windows.
About an hour later, the other officers saw Mr. Matthews leave the Residence with a maroon backpack and get into the driver's seat of a silver Nissan 370-Z. The officers followed the Nissan and conducted a traffic stop. The defendant admitted he did not have his driver's license with him. The officers smelled marijuana, and saw in plain view two marijuana cigars or "blunts" in the front cupholder. From the backpack, which was on the front passenger seat, they recovered approximately 10 grams of marijuana.2 Mr. Matthews was charged locally, and $600 was recovered in a search incident to arrest.
The officers obtained telephonic approval for a search warrant from the Hon. M. Hawkins-Taylor of the East Orange Municipal Court, Essex County. The warrant authorized a search of 630 William Street, Apartment #1 East Orange, New Jersey (i.e., the address of the Residence), as well as a 2009 Nissan 370Z, NJ Registration JN1AZ44EX9M404777 (i.e., the automobile in which Mr. Matthews was arrested). The application was based on the essential facts related in the preceding three paragraphs.
Executing the warrant at the Residence, the officers recovered the following:
As a result of the search, Mr. Matthews was charged locally with a variety of drug and firearms offenses under New Jersey law. Those charges were dropped in favor of federal prosecution.
Mr. Matthews was initially charged federally in a criminal complaint. On November 6, 2019, Matthews was charged in a three-count Indictment, comprising Count One (possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(D) ); Count Two (possession of four handguns in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) ); and Count Three (possession of a short-barrel shotgun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(i) ).
Mr. Matthews seeks suppression of the firearms, ammunition, and drugs recovered from the Residence and garage on several grounds.
Mr. Matthews first challenges the basis for the initial automobile stop of Swaby, which he characterizes as the source of all the searches that followed.
Mr. Matthews lacks standing to challenge the search of Swaby's car. It is axiomatic that Fourth Amendment rights are personal. A person may obtain suppression based on violation of that person's own privacy rights, not the privacy rights of another. Thus, in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the Supreme Court denied standing to a criminal defendant who challenged the search of a car owned by another.4 The Court observed that "[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed." Id. at 134, 99 S.Ct. 421. Rakas explicitly rejected the so-called "target theory" that a person could challenge a search based solely on the fact that it yielded evidence to be used against that person. Evidence is not "tainted" for all purposes by an illegal search and seizure. The person who seeks to invoke the exclusionary rule must be the person whose privacy rights were violated by the search and seizure. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980) ().
At oral argument, counsel for Matthews necessarily conceded those standing principles. But there, and in his briefing, he suggested a distinction: He was not, he said, challenging the auto stop as such. Rather, he was arguing that evidence obtained in the illegal Swaby automobile stop contributed to probable cause for the search warrant, which yielded evidence against Matthews. That latter evidence, Matthews argues, was the "fruit" of the "poisonous tree" that was the illegal Swaby auto stop. The "poisonous tree" doctrine, however, is premised on the initial evidence being validly suppressed (i.e., on the tree having been "poisonous"), and extends the scope of the exclusionary rule to the "fruits" (i.e., the evidence derived therefrom). The poisonous tree doctrine does not negate the principle that the initial search, must have violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the person seeking suppression, and not someone else.5 I therefore find the proffered distinction unconvincing.
The motion to suppress, insofar as it is premised on the allegedly illegal stop of Swaby's car or evidence derived therefrom, is therefore denied.
As noted above, the officers later stopped the Nissan driven by Mr. Matthews. Matthews moves to suppress evidence directly obtained during that stop, as well as the fruits of the search warrant that relied on that evidence for probable cause. Because the Nissan was driven and owned by Matthews, standing is not an issue. I rule, however, that the stop was not illegal because it was supported by reasonable suspicion, and that the officers did not exceed the permissible scope of the stop when they seized the marijuana evidence.
A person may be subjected to a brief investigative stop based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The principles of Terry apply to police traffic stops, whether based on reasonable suspicion that the occupants are engaged in criminal activity, see Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U. S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ; United States v. Mathurin, 561 F.3d 170, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2009), or reasonable suspicion of violation of the traffic laws, see United States v. Delfin–Colina , 464 F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 2006).
We determine whether reasonable suspicion existed to support a stop under an objective standard and a totality of the circumstances approach. See [ Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88...
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