United States v. McCain

• Decision Date: 10 September 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-4723,18-4723
• Citation: 974 F.3d 506
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Edward MCCAIN, Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

974 F.3d 506

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Edward MCCAIN, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 18-4723

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: January 31, 2020

Decided: September 10, 2020

ARGUED: Cameron Jane Blazer, BLAZER LAW FIRM, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, for Appellant. Michael Rhett DeHart, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sherri A. Lydon, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Dean H. Secor, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before KING, DIAZ, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Diaz joined.

RUSHING, Circuit Judge:

In 2010, Edward McCain received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for crimes he committed when he was 17. Six years later, McCain moved to vacate his sentence in light of the Supreme Court's intervening decisions in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). In those cases, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing schemes that mandate life imprisonment without parole for offenders who committed homicides before the age of 18, that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional for such an offender unless his crime reflects irreparable corruption, and that these new rules apply retroactively. See Miller , 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455 ; Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 734. The district court conducted a thorough resentencing and again sentenced McCain to life imprisonment without parole after concluding that he presents "one of those uncommon cases where sentencing a juvenile to the hardest possible penalty is appropriate." J.A. 260. On appeal, McCain argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable and that the district court plainly erred by not sua sponte vacating his murder conviction. We affirm.

I.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Over the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has determined that applying certain punitive measures to juvenile offenders—that is, persons under the age of 18 at the time they committed their crimes—violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. In Roper v. Simmons , the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for juvenile offenders. 543 U.S. 551, 578–579, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). In Graham v. Florida , the Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing juveniles who commit non-homicide offenses to life without parole. 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). And in Miller , the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids any sentencing scheme that mandates life imprisonment without parole for juvenile homicide offenders. 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455.

The Court in Miller reiterated that "children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing," both in terms of culpability and prospects for reform. Id. at 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Juveniles "have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking." Id. (quoting Roper , 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183 ). They " ‘are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers," because of their "limited ‘contro[l] over their own environment’ " and inability "to extricate themselves from horrific, crimeproducing settings." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Roper , 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183 ). And "a child's character is not as ‘well-formed’ as an adult's; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions [are] less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’ " Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Roper , 543 U.S. at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183 ). Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile offender, the Court reasoned, inappropriately precludes consideration of these "hallmark features" of juvenility such as "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences." Id. at 477, 132 S.Ct. 2455. It prevents the sentencing court from "taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him," "the extent of his participation in the [criminal] conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him," the ways in which youthful incompetency may have hindered him in dealing with the justice system or assisting his attorneys, and his capacity for rehabilitation. Id. at 477–478, 132 S.Ct. 2455. In short, "a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult." Id. at 477, 132 S.Ct. 2455. The Court therefore concluded that, before sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without parole, a sentencing court must take into account the offender's "youth and attendant characteristics," including how those characteristics "counsel against irrevocably sentencing [him] to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 480, 483, 132 S.Ct. 2455.

A few years later, in Montgomery , the Court held that Miller announced a new "substantive rule" of constitutional law that applies retroactively on collateral review to "juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller was decided." 136 S. Ct. at 725, 732. The Court clarified that "[a]lthough Miller did not foreclose a sentencer's ability to impose life without parole on a juvenile," that sentence is disproportionate "for all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruption.’ " Id. at 726 (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 479–480, 132 S.Ct. 2455 ). As the Court explained, Miller ’s substantive holding rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for the class of "juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth" as opposed to "those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility." Id. at 734. And Miller ’s procedural component requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender's " ‘youth and its attendant characteristics’ " to determine whether a particular offender is among "those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole" or "those who may not." Id. at 735 (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455 ); see Malvo v. Mathena , 893 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir. 2018) (recounting Miller ’s substantive and procedural components, as clarified in Montgomery ), cert. granted , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1317, 203 L.Ed.2d 563 (2019), and cert. dismissed , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 919, 206 L.Ed.2d 250 (2020) ; United States v. Under Seal , 819 F.3d 715, 719 (4th Cir. 2016) (same).

II.

A.

McCain committed his offenses in 2008, when he was 17 years old. At the time, McCain dealt heroin with Pierre Sanders in Georgetown, South Carolina. On November 14, 2008, Glen Crawford, Jr. and his nephew James Fannin picked up McCain in their car and drove to a park, ostensibly to purchase heroin. McCain and Sanders, however, believed that Crawford and Fannin were cooperating with law enforcement and planned to silence them. At the park, McCain exited the car and spoke briefly with Sanders. McCain then returned to the car and emptied his pistol into Fannin and Crawford. Seeing that at least one victim was still moving, McCain ran to his grandmother's house nearby to search for more bullets. Finding none, he hid the gun, grabbed a knife, and returned to the park to finish the job. But by the time he returned to the park, crowds and police had gathered at the scene. McCain was eventually found lying in a ditch and arrested.

Fannin died from his injuries, which included gunshot wounds

in the back of his head and upper back. As for Crawford, the police report stated he suffered two gunshot wounds to his head, two in his left arm, one in his chest, one in his right hand, and one in his back. He survived, but with permanent and disabling injuries.

McCain and Sanders were charged with Fannin's murder and the attempted murder of Crawford. McCain consented to a transfer for criminal prosecution as an adult, see 18 U.S.C. § 5032, and pleaded guilty to three counts of the indictment: witness tampering by murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (Count One); witness tampering by attempted murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (Count Two); and using and carrying a firearm during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 924(j) (Count Five).

By that time, McCain had amassed a serious juvenile record, which placed him in criminal history category IV of the Sentencing Guidelines. His run-ins with law enforcement began shortly after McCain turned nine and his mother was hospitalized for inpatient treatment of bipolar disorder

. With an absentee father, McCain was shuttled between his mother's and grandmother's homes, and was placed in foster care for a short time, until he was permanently placed in his grandmother's custody at age 16. He was first arrested at age 11 for causing a disturbance at school. At age 12, he was arrested for attempted armed robbery involving a gun. That same year, he was arrested for assault and battery and violating probation. At age 13, he was again arrested for assault and battery, this time for attacking a Hispanic classmate without provocation after telling the boy he hated all Mexicans. He was arrested twice at age 14—once for shoplifting and once for attempted second-degree burglary.

McCain's guilty plea included the opportunity to have the government move for a sentence below the otherwise applicable mandatory statutory minimum...