United States v. McLeod, Civ. A. No. 3188.

• Decision Date: 19 March 1964
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3188.
• Citation: 229 F. Supp. 383
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Blanchard McLEOD et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

229 F. Supp. 383

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Blanchard McLEOD et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 3188.

United States District Court S. D. Alabama, N. D.

March 19, 1964.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, D. Robert Owen, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Vernol R. Jansen, Jr., U. S. Atty., S. D. of Alabama, Mobile, Ala., John Doar and David Norman, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

McLean Pitts, Pitts, Pitts & Jackson, Selma, Ala., J. E. Wilkinson, Jr., Wilkinson, Wilkinson & Russell, Selma, Ala., T. G. Gayle, Selma, Ala., for defendant.

DANIEL HOLCOMBE THOMAS, District Judge.

This cause comes on to be heard on petition of the United States of America, Plaintiff, for: (1) A preliminary injunction restraining defendants McLeod, Reese, Clark, Houston, Hare and Wilkinson their agents, servants, officers, employees and attorneys, and all persons acting in concert or participation with them, from commanding, by any means, the attendance before the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court of Dallas County, Alabama, at any time, of certain attorneys of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice; (2) A preliminary injunction restraining Defendant Clark, his agents, employees, officers, and all persons acting in concert or participation with him, from intimidating, threatening, coercing or attempting to intimidate, threaten or coerce any person for the purpose of interfering with the right of that person or persons to vote in Dallas County for candidates for Federal office, or punishing any person for having registered or attempted to register to vote and voting for such candidates, whether by arrest, threatened arrest, holding in custody, prosecuting or attempting to prosecute any person, stationing deputies inside voter registration meetings, stationing deputies along voter lines, or by any other means; (3) A preliminary injunction restraining the defendants McLeod, Hare, Reese, Wilkinson and Houston, their agents, officers, employees and all persons acting in concert or participation with them from intimidating, threatening, coercing, or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for the purpose of interfering with the right of that person or any other person to become registered to vote and to vote in Dallas County for candidates for Federal office; and (4) A preliminary injunction restraining defendants Dallas County White Citizens Council, Jones, Rentz, Beers, Waugh, Sims, Arrington, and Hicks, their agents, etc., from essentially the same thing.

On an oral motion of the Attorney General of Alabama a severance was granted as to Defendants McLeod, Reese, Clark, Hare, Houston and Wilkinson on one side, and Dallas County Citizens Council, Jones, Rentz, Beers, Waugh, Sims, Arrington and Hicks on the other. The Court proceeded to hear evidence on the former, with a hearing as to the latter to be set.

This matter was first brought to the attention of the Court on November 12, 1963, when the Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order pending hearing on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court refused to issue an ex parte temporary restraining order and denied the motion, it being the considered judgment of the Court that there was no clear showing that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage would result to the applicant before notice could be served and a hearing had thereon, as required by 65(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff immediately filed notice of appeal from the order denying plaintiff's motion or application for a temporary restraining order.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals promptly convened and at 3:00 p. m., November 13, 1963, reversed the order of this Court, and ordered "The District Court shall forthwith enter an order restraining each of the above named appellees, their agents, servants, officers, employees, and attorneys and all persons acting in concert or participating with them from commanding or attempting to compel the attendance before the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court of Dallas County, Alabama, Fall Term 1963, on November 13, 1963, or any other day, of Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General, John Doar, First Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, Richard Wasserstrom, Attorney, David H. Marlin, Attorney, Arvid A. Sather, Attorney, and Kenneth McIntyre, Attorney, attorneys of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, by serving or enforcing or attempting to enforce the subpoenas bearing the return date of November 13, 1963, previously issued, or from arresting or holding in custody or attempting to arrest or hold in custody any of the aforesaid attorneys of the Department of Justice as a result of any action or by or under the authority of any of the aforesaid appellees or as a result of any failure on the part of any said attorneys to appear before said Grand Jury, the said restraining order to remain in effect until the disposition by said court of the application now pending before it for a temporary injunction which is set for hearing on December 5, 1963."

Pursuant to the above order, this Court, on November 14, 1963, issued a restraining order as directed, to remain in effect until disposition could be had on the application for temporary injunction.

The hearing on the application for a temporary injunction commenced December 5, 1963. The plaintiff called numerous witnesses and introduced numerous exhibits, during the days of December 5, 6, 16 and 18, 1963. Upon the resting of its case by the plaintiff, an oral motion for a directed verdict, pursuant to Rule 50, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was directed on behalf of each defendant, separately and severally, to each count or claim set forth in the complaint. The motion was also written and filed with the Court. The motion for a directed verdict was taken under submission and the Court recessed. On December 20, 1963, defendants filed a motion to deny plaintiff's application or petition for a temporary injunction. It is on these motions that the cause is now considered...