United States v. Mejia
| Decision Date | 23 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:10-cr-00256-RCL-3 |
| Citation | 502 F.Supp.3d 387 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Wilfredo MEJIA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Barry Wiegand, Laura R. Bach, Nihar Ranjan Mohanty, William John O'Malley, Jr., U.S. Attorney's Office, Seth Adam Meinero, Violent Crimes & Narcotics Trafficking Section, Laura Jean Gwinn, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Pleasant S. Brodnax, III, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
In December 2009, defendant-movant Wilfredo Mejia, a member of the violent street gang MS-13, orchestrated the armed robbery of a Washington, D.C., bordello. Proffer at 9–10, ECF No. 217. Mejia hoped to rob any patrons then inside and to force the bordello "to begin paying rent to MS-13." Id. at 9. Mejia drove four gang members to the site, and he waited in the getaway vehicle as his associates tied up the bordello's patrons and assaulted them with a gun and a knife. Id. A few minutes into the gangsters’ shakedown, however, the police arrived. Id. at 10. Officers managed to apprehend three of the perpetrators, but Mejia and his fourth associate slipped away. Id. at 10. A few months later, they too were arrested. Id.
In November 2011, the United States obtained a superseding indictment against Mejia that charged him with twenty-three felonies arising from the bordello incident: RICO conspiracy, kidnapping in aid of racketeering and aiding and abetting the same, four counts of kidnapping while armed in aid of racketeering and aiding and abetting the same, five counts of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering and aiding and abetting the same, five counts of armed robbery, five counts of kidnapping while armed, first-degree burglary while armed, and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same. Third Super. Ind., ECF No. 101. On July 20, 2012, Mejia and the government reached a plea agreement. Plea Agreement, ECF No. 216. Mejia would admit his guilt as to all counts and would enter a plea of guilty to Counts 1 (RICO conspiracy) and 23 (possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence), in exchange for the government's recommendation of a 141-month sentence of imprisonment. Id. Mejia signed that agreement and the government's factual proffer in support thereof, ECF No. 217, and he allocuted to the crimes charged in the indictment before the Court on the same day. See Appendix A. On October 5, 2012, the Court, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer presiding, sentenced Mejia to the agreed-upon 141 months’ confinement. Min. Entry of 10/05/2012.
Mejia now challenges his conviction for Count, 23, possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Supp. Mot. at 3, ECF No. 662. In 2016, Mejia filed an "abridged," one-page motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate that conviction under the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States , 576 U.S. 591, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), which invalidated the so-called "residual clause" of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Mejia filed a "supplement" to that motion on June 3, 2020, setting forth his legal arguments. ECF No. 671. The United States responded on September 9, ECF No. 671, and Mejia replied on September 24. ECF No. 672. The United States filed an unauthorized sur-reply on October 7, ECF No. 673, and Mejia retorted with an unauthorized sur-sur-reply on October 16. ECF No. 675. For the reasons discussed below, however, Mejia's motion to vacate no longer presents a live case or controversy under Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, his motion shall now be DISMISSED AS MOOT.
The Supreme Court has characterized the violation of § 924(c)(1) as a "combination crime." Rosemond v. United States , 572 U.S. 65, 75, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 188 L.Ed.2d 248 (2014). That is, a defendant commits a § 924(c)(1) offense when he commits some other crime (the "predicate crime") and, while so doing, possesses a firearm. Id. Section 924(c)(1) also specifies that that predicate must be a "crime of violence." § 924(c)(1). Section 924(c)(3), in turn, formerly defined "crime[s] of violence" as those that have "physical force" as an element of the offense (the so-called "elements clause"), and those that, "by [their] nature, involve[ ] a substantial risk [of the use of] physical force" (the so-called "residual clause"). § 924(c)(3)(A)–(B). In 2015, the Supreme Court invalidated a similarly-worded residual clause found in the ACCA. See Johnson , 576 U.S. at 606, 135 S.Ct. 2551. And building upon that decision, it later invalidated the residual clause directly relevant to Mejia's case— § 924(c)(3)(B). See United States v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019). Thus, in the wake of Davis , predicate crimes for § 924(c)(1) offenses must require the use of physical force against another as an element. And under a related Supreme Court precedent, that requisite "physical force" must be violent physical force, rather than merely offensive touching. See Curtis Johnson v. United States , 559 U.S. 133, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010).
The supplemental brief Mejia filed on June 3, 2020 sought to invalidate his § 924(c)(1) conviction by invoking those precedents. Supp. Mot. at 3, ECF No. 662. It conceded that Mejia's § 924(c)(1) offense was predicated upon at least one valid crime of violence (assault with a dangerous weapon), but claimed that it was also based on other invalid predicates, like kidnapping, that are not always crimes of violence. Id. It then set forth a convoluted argument that the Court must presume, under the "modified categorical approach," that solely the invalid predicates supported the § 924(c)(1) conviction, and thus that Mejia's conviction for Count 23 was void. Id. at 11–12. The government's response, filed on September 9, 2020, countered that assault with a dangerous weapon remains a valid predicate, and thus that Mejia's § 924(c)(1) conviction still stands. Opp'n at 1, ECF No. 671. And it further claimed that Mejia was procedurally barred due to his failure to assert a void-for-vagueness challenge on direct appeal. Id. at 11–13.
In his September 24 reply, Mejia's counsel then raised what were admittedly new arguments. Reply at 1, ECF No. 672. Counsel explained that he had "initially overlooked a critical document—the government's proffer of proof in support of the [sic] Mr. Mejia's guilty plea[.]". Id. Counsel explained that the government's proffer stated that had the case gone to trial, the government could have proven that the "[d]efendant committed the crime of armed robbery." Id. at 1; see also Proffer at 2, ECF No. 217. Thus, counsel reasoned, the proffer's reference to "armed robbery" meant that Mejia's § 924(c)(1) offense was predicated solely upon the crime of D.C. armed robbery pleaded at Counts 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 of the third superseding indictment. Third Super. Ind., ECF No. 101. And because D.C. armed robbery is apparently not a crime of violence, counsel urged that Mejia's § 924(c)(1) conviction thus lacked a valid predicate. Reply at 1–2, ECF No. 672. Without obtaining leave of court, the government filed a sur-reply objecting to Mejia's new arguments and contending that they, too, were procedurally barred and meritless. Sur-Reply, ECF No. 673. Mejia's counsel then filed an unauthorized sur-sur-reply, further propounding Mejia's novel arguments about the proffer and disputing the government's claims about harmless error and procedural bar. Sur-Sur-Reply, ECF No. 675.
As the parties exchanged broadsides in their billowing submissions, neither apparently gave much thought to the issue of mootness. Mejia's counsel pointed out in his June 3 "supplement" that Mejia was "set to be released from custody on June 5, 2020." Supp. Mot. at 5, ECF No. 662. But, counsel argued, "[h]is release from custody does not render the matter moot[,] because he still has an invalid § 924(c) conviction that must be vacated."1 Id. at 5 n.1. The government later represented that Mejia was "on supervised release after completing the incarceration term of his sentence." Opp'n at 1, ECF No. 671. Mejia plainly would have possessed a litigable interest in the duration of his supervised release, and thus an interest in the validity of his § 924(c)(1) conviction, had the government's statement been accurate.
As it turns out, though, it was not. Mejia, a native of El Salvador, originally was present in the United States on a green card, and, after his arrest, was subject to a detainer from the Department of Homeland Security. Final PSR at 2, ECF No. 243. After committing his string of felonies, Mejia became a deportable alien under the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227. Unsurprisingly, the Court was eventually advised that after his release from custody, Mejia was deported from the United States on June 12, 2020—just nine days after the filing of his § 2255 petition and several months before the submission of the parties’ later, voluminous briefing. Joint Dec, ECF No. 667. For the reasons explained below, Mejia's removal, combined with his unchallenged felony conviction for RICO conspiracy and his admission to having committed other, serious felonies, moots his present objection to his § 924(c)(1) conviction.
Article III, § 2 of the federal Constitution provides that the "judicial Power shall extend" to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2. From that provision, the Supreme Court has derived a variety of "justiciability" doctrines that operate to constrain the subject-matter jurisdiction of Article III courts. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System 49 (7th ed. 2015). Federal courts may not opine through "advisory opinions" on...
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