United States v. Mills
Decision Date | 12 July 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No. 16-cr-20460 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Edwin MILLS, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Louis Crisostomo, Linda Aouate, United States Attorney's Office, Aldous Brant Cook, U.S. Department of Justice, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.
Gerald J. Gleeson, II, Miller Canfield Paddock & Stone, PLC, Troy, MI, Jean deSales Barrett, Ruhnke & Barrett, Montclair, NJ, Federal Defender, Federal Defender Office, Michael A. Rataj, Sanford A. Schulman, Christopher W. Quinn, II, Detroit, MI, Jacqueline K. Walsh, Walsh & Larranaga, Seattle, WA, Judith S. Gracey, The Gracey Law Firm, Keego Harbor, MI, Richard H. Morgan, Jr., Law Office of Richard H. Morgan Jr., Pontiac, MI, Avraham C. Moskowitz, Moskowitz, Book and Walsh, LLP, New York, NY, Stephen T. Rabaut, Clinton Township, MI, Michael O. Sheehan, Sheehan and Reeve, New Haven, CT, Sanford Plotkin, Sanford Plotkin, P.C., Ann Arbor, MI, James A. Waske, Southfield, MI, John M. McManus, McManus Law, Royal Oak, MI, Vincent J. Toussaint, Toussaint Law, Southfield, MI, for Defendants.
OPINION & ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CARLO WILSON'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY REGARDING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT CLAIM (Dkt. 941)
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Carlo Wilson's motion to compel discovery in anticipation of filing a motion to strike the notice of intent to seek the death penalty based on a racially selective law enforcement claim (Dkt. 941).1 The Government filed a response in opposition to the motion (Dkt. 946), to which Wilson replied (Dkt. 949).2 For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the motion.
Because the Court has previously described the factual and procedural background of this case in greater detail in other opinions, it need not do so again for purposes of the present motion. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 378 F. Supp. 3d 563 (E.D. Mich. 2019) ( ); United States v. Mills, No. 16-cr-20460, 2019 WL 1915762 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2019) ( ); United States v. Mills, 367 F. Supp. 3d 664 (E.D. Mich. 2019) ( ).
In his motion, Wilson contends that the Detroit Field Office of the FBI "engages in racially selective investigations of murders committed in relation to criminal enterprises under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 and 1959 and 21 U.S.C. § 848, and criminal groups of more than one person under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) or any other criminal statute with a penalty of death," which supposedly includes its investigation of his case. Def. Mot. at 9; see also Def. Reply at 2 (). To demonstrate that his selective enforcement claim has merit, Wilson requests a court order compelling the Government to produce the following discovery:
Def Mot. at 18-20. To the extent he is not entitled to all of the broad discovery he has requested, Wilson alternatively requests that the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the scope of discovery to be produced. Id. at 1, 20. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Wilson's requests.
The "Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ; see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 & n.9, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) ( ). In contrast to a selective prosecution claim, in which a defendant asserts that "the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution," United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), a selective enforcement claim is directed at the "actions of law enforcement and those affiliated with law-enforcement personnel," United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 214 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 713, 199 L.Ed.2d 582 (2018). Nevertheless, substantive claims of selective enforcement are evaluated under the same two-part test as selective prosecution claims, which requires a defendant to present "clear evidence" of both a discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory effect. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465, 116 S.Ct. 1480 ; Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Futernick v. Sumpter Twp., 78 F.3d 1051, 1056 (6th Cir. 1996) ); see also Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524 ); United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 976-977 (6th Cir. 1998) ; accord Washington, 869 F.3d at 214.
In Armstrong, the Supreme Court held that a defendant seeking to obtain discovery on a selective prosecution claim need not establish a prima facie case, but he or she must still satisfy a "rigorous standard" by producing "some evidence" of both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. 517 U.S. at 468-470, 116 S.Ct. 1480 ; accord United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 863, 122 S.Ct. 2389, 153 L.Ed.2d 769 (2002) (per curiam) (). The phrase "some evidence," when used in this context, must include a showing that "similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469, 116 S.Ct. 1480 ; Bass, 536 U.S. at 864, 122 S.Ct. 2389 (...
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