United States v. Minter
| Docket Number | 3:22-CR-135 |
| Decision Date | 15 September 2023 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. VICTORIOUS MINTER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
On April 5, 2022, a federal grand jury returned a one-count Indictment charging Defendant Victorious Minter with being a Felon in Possession of Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1).[1] Defendant Minter subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 26) on August 26, 2022, asserting that § 922(g)(1) is now unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's June 23, 2022, decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022). The Court denied Defendant's motion on October 18, 2022, and scheduled this action for trial. (Docs 32, 33, 34).
On June 6, 2023, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Range v. Attorney General, 69 F,4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023), applying the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Bruen and holding that § 922(g)(1) violated Plaintiff Bryan Range's Second Amendment rights, as-applied to him.
As a result of the Third Circuit's decision in Range, on July 11, 2023, Defendant Minter filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of Order of October 18, 2022” (Doc. 49) and supporting brief (Doc. 50). The Government filed a Brief in Opposition to Minter's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 53), to which Defendant filed a Reply Brief (Doc. 54). Defendant's Motion is now ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will deny the Motion Reconsideration (Doc. 49).
Defendant Minter requests reconsideration of the Court's denial of his Motion to Dismiss, “based on the Third Circuit's recent clarification of the law, in particular, the application of the holding in Bruen to Section 922(g)(1) in Range." (Doc. 49, ¶ 6).
Motions for reconsideration may be filed in both civil and criminal cases. United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 286 (3d Cir. 2003). “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Specifically, a motion for reconsideration is generally permitted only if (1) there is an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) new evidence becomes available that was not previously available at the time the Court issued its decision; or (3) to correct clear errors of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Moreover, “motions for reconsideration should not be used to put forward arguments which the movant... could have made but neglected to make before judgment.” United States v. Jasin, 292 F.Supp.2d 670, 677 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Reich v. Compton, 834 F.Supp.2d 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1993) rev'd in part and aff'd in part on other grounds, 57 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1995)). Nor should they “be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant.” Donegan v. Livingston, 877 F.Supp.2d 212, 226 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F.Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002)).
With respect to Defendant Minter's facial challenge of § 922(g)(1), which was extensively briefed by the parties and addressed by the Court in denying the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant has failed to demonstrate a proper basis for reconsideration of the Court's prior opinion and order. Defendant's present motion relies on a belief that Range constitutes an intervening change in the controlling law with respect to both facial and as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) (Doc. 50, 2 n.1). It does not. The majority and concurring opinions in Range made clear that their decision was narrowly tailored to as-applied challenges of § 922(g)(1). The Court did not hold that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and instead was careful to instruct that the statute remained facially constitutional at this time. See Range, 69 F.4th at 106 ( ) (Hardiman, J., majority); id. at 109 () (Ambro, J., concurring). This Court will thus deny Defendant's motion for reconsideration of its opinion and order denying his facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) without further analysis.
Minter asserts that his Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 26) argued that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional both on its face and as-applied to him (Doc. 49, ¶ 2). However, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and the Court's analysis thereof, focused only on a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1). As this Court noted in its Memorandum Opinion denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 32,16-17 n. 9). Where Minter did not sufficiently brief or argue his as-applied challenge in his prior motion, the Court did not conduct an inquiry on this issue. “Reconsideration” is logically therefore not the proper avenue for relief as to Minter's as-applied challenge in light of Range. Nonetheless, due to the significance of Range and its impact on the application of as- applied challenges of § 922(g)(1) by District Courts in the Third Circuit, the Court will deem Defendant's “Motion for Reconsideration” with respect to his as-applied challenge to be a second motion to dismiss and will address it as such, infra.[2]
The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST, amend. II. In Bruen, the Supreme Court, consistent with its precedent, re-affirmed that “the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.” Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2125 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)); see also, id. at 2122 ().
Although the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms, this right is “not unlimited”. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 626. As the Supreme Court in Heller explained:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. . . For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. . . . Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
Id. at 626-627 (internal citations omitted). See also, McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 ( ) (internal citation omitted).
In examining its precedent, the Supreme Court in Bruen set forth the appropriate test a Court must apply in determining whether a firearm regulation violates the Second Amendment:
In keeping with Heller, we hold that when the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's unqualified command.
Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2126 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also, id. at 2127 (); Id. at 2130 (). A Court must therefore...
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