United States v. Mississippi
| Decision Date | 13 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-622-CWR-FKB |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF v. THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
In 2016, the United States filed this lawsuit alleging that the State "unnecessarily requires thousands of adults with mental illness to receive services in State-run psychiatric hospitals" instead of community-based services, in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Docket No. 153 at 1.
In December 2018, the State of Mississippi filed two motions for summary judgment, one alleging that the United States lacks standing to bring such a suit, and one alleging that it has not properly articulated a necessary element of the claim. Both motions are denied for the reasons below.
In 1990, Congress passed the ADA "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Congress instructed the Attorney General to issue regulations on the implementation of the ADA. Those regulations require that the government "administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d).
In 1999, the Supreme Court upheld the Attorney General's regulations and held that "under Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when the State's treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities." Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999). Olmstead continues to serve as the seminal case on this matter.
Against this backdrop, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") has investigated, litigated, and worked with states around the country to ensure that their systems for mental health treatment uphold the purpose of the ADA, as articulated in Olmstead. In 2011 DOJ issued a findings letter regarding what it deemed to be the State's over-institutionalization of adults with mental illness and the lack of alternative community-based services. Then, the United States filed this lawsuit in August of 2016.
In the complaint, the United States alleges that Mississippi over-relies on four state psychiatric hospitals that are "segregated, institutional settings that do no enable individuals living there to interact with non-disable persons to the fullest extent possible." Docket No. 1 at 9. There are thousands of Mississippians who cycle in and out of the state hospitals each year, and many return for repeated, lengthy stays. According to the United States, on a randomly chosen day in 2014, 55% of the 206 patients housed on the short-term care unit at the Mississippi State Hospital had previously been admitted to the hospital two or more times. See Id. at 11. In a similar sampling of the long-term care unit, where the average length of stay is seven years, there was a man who had been housed at the State Hospital for over fifty years. See Id. at 12.
The complaint also alleges that the over-institutionalization is compounded by a lack of appropriate discharge plans for individuals and the overall structure of the state mental health system. The United States ultimately claims that "Mississippi is aware that it unnecessarily relieson institutional settings and has not taken the action needed to remedy the violations of law[.]" Docket No. 1 at 21.
During this litigation, the State has denied these allegations and asserted the "fundamental alteration defense" under Olmstead. See Docket No. 3. In December, the State filed two motions for summary judgment challenging the United States' standing and ability to prove a key element of its claim, as well as a Daubert motion challenging the reliability of its expert reports.
Since the filing of the complaint, the parties completed discovery, where depositions were taken, and expert reports were produced. Both sides have invested significant time in litigating this case. A bench trial is set to begin on June 1, 2019.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Wallace v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court views the "evidence and draw[s] reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant." Maddox v. Townsend and Sons, Inc., 639 F.3d 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2011).
"Even if the standards of Rule 56 are met, a court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment if it believes that 'the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.'" Harris v. Bruister, No. 4:10-CV-77-DPJ-FKB, 2013 WL 6805155, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2013) (quoting Firman v. Life Ins. Co., of N. Am. 684 F.3d 533, 538 (5th Cir. 2012)).
The Court will address each motion for summary judgment in turn.
The State argues that the United States does not have standing to bring a suit under Title II of the ADA because Title II lacks explicit reference to federal enforcement actions. To support its position, the State relies heavily on a Florida district court case, C.V. v. Dudek, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2016), which held that the United States did not have standing to bring a suit under Title II of the ADA. That case is currently on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. If summary judgment is not granted in the State's favor, it argues this case should be stayed pending the appellate court's decision.
This Court is not bound by the holding of any district court or appellate court, other than the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court. In a case brought by the United States under Title II of the ADA, the defendants presented Judge Bennett in the Southern District of Texas with an identical argument. This Court finds his analysis persuasive:
[Defendant] alleges that the United States does not have standing to bring a claim under Title II of the ADA, and the case should therefore be dismissed. [Defendant] cites for authority a single opinion out of the Southern District of Florida—C.V. v. Dudek, 2016 WL 5220059 (S.D. Fl. Sept. 20, 2016). However, the plain language of the ADA, its legislative history, and the implementing regulations clearly establish that the United States has authority to bring lawsuits under Title II of the ADA. This is reflected by every court (except C.V. v. Dudek) to address the question.
United States v. Harris Cty., No. 4:16-CV-2331, 2017 WL 7692396, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2017) ().1 This Court finds that Judge Bennett's decision, basedon the cumulative weight of cases, is far more compelling than one Florida district court case which reached a contrary conclusion. Dudek is an outlier. The United States has standing to bring this claim.
Additionally, what the State fails to mention about Dudek is the court's acknowledgement that despite its lack of standing under Title II, the United States had another avenue to pursue its claims—the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 ("CRIPA").2 Dudek, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1289-90. The Dudek court held that "the Department [of Justice]'s concern that it will not be able to commence litigation [under Title II of the ADA] is at most a half-truth" because it may use CRIPA as a "vehicle" to assert Title II violations. Id. DOJ, however, had failed to allege such a claim in its complaint.
As the United States points out, the complaint in this case asserts its claims through CRIPA. See Docket No. 1 at 4 (). The State dedicates a single paragraph in its rebuttal to the United States' position regarding CRIPA. After stating the CRIPA standard, the State summarily asserts that "the claims brought under CRIPA would not be the same [as the claims under Title II of the ADA] and not staying this case pending the outcome of the Eleventh Circuit's decision [in Dudek] would result in significant harm to the State." Docket No. 165 at 8.The State fails to explain how the CRIPA claims would differ from the ADA claims. Therefore, the United States has additional support for its standing to bring this claim.
In its next motion for summary judgment, the State contends that "Plaintiff has not identified the reasonable modifications Mississippi must allegedly make to its mental health system, or the quantity (or 'amount and availability') of community-based services Mississippi should allegedly add to its system, or the cost of the modifications Plaintiff is seeking." Docket No. 146 at 4.
The United States responds that "[t]o satisfy the reasonable modification element, the United States need only suggest the existence of a plausible accommodation," which it has done. Docket No. 153 at 2 (citing Frederick L. v. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, 364 F.3d 487, 492 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2004); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 280 (2d Cir. 2003)). The United States adds that the State is trying to make a "fundamental alteration" defense—but in so doing is attempting to shift the burden from itself to the United States.
The burden of showing reasonable accommodations is...
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