United States v. Molton

• Decision Date: 18 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–2525.,13–2525.
• Citation: 743 F.3d 479
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Edward C.M. MOLTON, Jr., Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

743 F.3d 479

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Edward C.M. MOLTON, Jr., Defendant–Appellant.

No. 13–2525.

United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.

Argued Dec. 11, 2013.

Decided Feb. 18, 2014.

Daniel Kapsak, Attorney, Kit R. Morrissey, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Fairview Heights, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Eric W. Butts, Attorney, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant–Appellant.

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Edward Molton, Jr., of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court sentenced Molton to 108 months' imprisonment, which is substantially higher than the advisory guidelines range of 63 to 78 months. Molton first attacks his conviction, arguing that the district court should have excluded evidence of his gang affiliation, and that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. He then contends that his above-guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

I. Background

On the evening of March 14, 2012, Kenneth Brown was shot in the neck and head while driving in East St. Louis, Illinois. FBI Special Agents Nick Manns and Bryan Yingling were working the W.A.V.E. detail (a local-state-federal joint force) in East St. Louis. They heard about the shooting over their radios and went to the scene, where they saw that Brown's car was riddled with bullet holes. Brown had already been taken to the hospital; he ultimately survived.

Agent Manns was familiar with Brown as the leader of the Waverly Crips gang in East St. Louis. Concerned about the welfare of the Brown family, Agents Manns and Yingling drove to a house on 38th Street where Brown stayed with family. The agents also expected some retaliation for Brown's shooting and believed that his associates might gather at the 38th Street home for that purpose.

When Agents Manns and Yingling arrived at Brown's residence, they saw people in the street in front of the house and on the front porch. Some approached the agents; they said they were Brown's family members and were preparing to visit Brown in the hospital. While speaking with them, both agents saw a man (Molton) standing along a sidewalk to the northeast of their car. Molton was standing across the street from Brown's house, near a chain link fence. Behind Molton was a large tree. Molton neither approached the agents nor spoke to them. The agents testified that he appeared wary of them. Molton was standing with his right side turned away from the street and the agents. Although the agents could not see his right side or right hand, they believed he was holding a firearm. One of the family members in the street then yelled toward the house, “It's just the feds.” Immediately thereafter, the agents testified that they saw Molton make a quick movement, turn, and move toward the large tree. That tree momentarily obstructed the agents' view of Molton, but then Molton returned to his initial position and stood. Both agents believed that Molton had dropped a firearm.

Agent Yingling approached Molton while Agent Manns, walking the short path he had seen Molton take, retrieved a semi-automatic rifle from behind the tree. It was loaded with nineteen live rounds, one of which was in the chamber. The agents said that Molton was nervous, shaking, and sweating profusely. They arrested him.

Brown's family members denied knowing Molton and vice versa, but they seemed unconcerned that Molton was found across the street with a loaded assault rifle. Their lack of alarm convinced the agents that Molton was not there to harm the Brown family, but instead to support Brown and in response to his beingshot. The agents did not see anyone else in the area. Later that night, though, another man (Torcus Boone) was found hiding in the brush near Brown's house, across the street from where Molton had been standing.

Molton told Agent Manns that he lived on North 30th Street in East St. Louis, about eighteen blocks away from 38th Street. Molton said that just before his arrest, he had left his grandmother's house—located directly behind Brown's house—and walked to his girlfriend's house, but no one had answered the door. He was walking back to his grandmother's house when he was arrested, he said. Molton denied possessing a firearm or disposing of one.

Jevon Strayhorn, a cellmate of Molton's while both were awaiting trial, testified at Molton's trial as a government witness. According to Strayhorn, Molton told Strayhorn that he was a “Tres Nine Waverly Crip,” and that he “put in work” for his gang. Molton said that on the night of his arrest, a friend—“one of the big people” in the Waverly Crips—was shot in retaliation for a shooting that occurred some time ago. After his friend was shot, Molton said that he received a call, and that he and a partner went to the friend's house and got an assault rifle from someone on the porch. He then walked across the street and waited for a friend to bring something to wipe down the gun. When the agents' car arrived, Molton thought it was that friend. When someone yelled, “It's just the feds,” Molton ducked back and hid the rifle by a tree. Molton shared with Strayhorn his concern that his fingerprints would be found on the rifle, and he experimented by pressing his hands on the stainless steel cell doors to see if his fingerprints were left behind.

Molton was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). After a three-day trial, the jury found him guilty. The court sentenced him to 108 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release. We will relay additional information below about the trial and sentence.

II. Discussion

A. Evidence of Molton's gang involvement

Before trial, Molton moved to preclude the government from mentioning, in its case-in-chief, both Brown's shooting and Molton's alleged gang involvement. The court denied Molton's motion, reasoning that Molton's alleged membership in Brown's gang was relevant to multiple aspects of the case: “the overarching factual scenario at issue, Molton's presence at the scene, and why he would have a rifle.” We review this ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 536 (7th Cir.2009).

Relevant evidence is generally admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, but may be excluded if it is unduly prejudicial. SeeFed.R.Evid. 403. Evidence of gang affiliation must be handled with care, because “a jury is likely to associate gangs with criminal activity and deviant behavior,” raising the “specter of guilt by association or a verdict influenced by emotion.” United States v. Santiago, 643 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir.2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “we examine the care and thoroughness with which a district judge considered the admission or exclusion of [such] evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). Yet we have repeatedly upheld the admission of gang affiliation evidence when it is more probative than prejudicial. Id.; see also United States v. King, 627 F.3d 641, 649 (7th Cir.2010) (admission of gang evidence is appropriate “to demonstrate the existence of a joint venture or conspiracy and a relationship among its members” (citation omitted)); United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 1013, 1018–19 (7th Cir.2004) (admission of gang evidence proper to help establish motive); United States v. Butler, 71 F.3d 243, 250–51 (7th Cir.1995) (evidence that defendant acted as security in a gang was admissible because it provided a motive for his gun possession).

In this case, the district judge correctly summarized the law and gave logical reasons for denying Molton's motion to exclude the evidence. We accord the district judge's evidentiary decision “great deference, and it will be disturbed only if no reasonable person could agree with” it. United States v. Ozuna, 674 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir.2012). We have previously admitted gang affiliation evidence for the purpose of showing motive, including in gun possession cases. Montgomery, 390 F.3d at 1018;United States v. Sargent, 98 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir.1996) (admission of gang membership evidence was not unduly prejudicial because it “was necessary to explain the motive behind the crime charged”); Butler, 71 F.3d at 251–52. The district judge also gave a limiting instruction, and we have suggested that such instructions help reduce concerns about the prejudice inherent in this kind of evidence. See, e.g., Ozuna, 674 F.3d at 682;Butler, 71 F.3d at 251–52. For these reasons, the district court's evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of discretion.

B. Sufficiency of the evidence

Molton next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his unlawful-possession conviction, and therefore the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. We review sufficiency of evidence claims in the light most favorable to the government and will uphold a jury verdict if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Love, 706 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir.2013).¹

In Molton's case, the parties stipulated to multiple elements of the crime, so the government needed to prove only one thing beyond a reasonable doubt: that Molton knowingly possessed a firearm on March 14, 2012. Molton argues that no one saw him possess a firearm, that the government's case consisted only of circumstantial evidence, that the agents did not know if anyone had been in the area of the recovered firearm prior to their arrival, that Molton's alleged sweating could actually have been moisture from rainfall that night, that Molton consistently denied having a firearm to Agent Manns, that Molton was simply returning to his grandmother's home when he was arrested, and that no fingerprints were found on the firearm. Molton also contends that the agents...