United States v. Jones

• Decision Date: 27 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14 CR 155,14 CR 155
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. KELSEY JONES
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. KELSEY JONES

No. 14 CR 155

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

October 27, 2016

Hon. Amy J. St. Eve

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:

Defendant Kelsey Jones has moved for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new. (R. 320, 422.) For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant's motions.

BACKGROUND

On September 17, 2015, a grand jury returned a fifteen-count Third Superseding Indictment (the "Indictment") against Defendant and his co-defendants, Toby Jones and Mario Whitfield. (R. 216, the Indictment.) The Indictment charged Defendant Kelsey Jones in five of the fifteen counts. Specifically, Count One charged Defendant Kelsey Jones with conspiring with Toby Jones and others to intentionally possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count Seven charged Defendant with knowingly and intentionally distributing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Count Ten charged Defendant Kelsey Jones with conspiring with Toby Jones (i) to kill and attempt to kill a person, and (ii) to knowingly engage in conduct and thereby cause bodily injury to another person, with the intent to retaliate against any person for providing information to a law enforcement officer regarding the commission and possible commission of a federal offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(f). Count Thirteen charged Defendant with attempting to kill another person with intent to retaliate against a person for providing a law enforcement officer with information related to the commission and possible commission of a federal offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B). Finally, Count Fourteen charged Defendant with using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The Indictment also contains a forfeiture allegation.

Defendant pled not guilty and proceeded to a nearly two-week jury trial. Defendant's co-defendants Toby Jones and Mario Whitfield proceeded with a simultaneous bench trial. During the trial, the government called the following witnesses: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives ("ATF") Special Agent Chris Labno, Wesley Fields, Jamie Ringswald, Mark Ringswald, Lemar "Marty" Smith, ATF Special Agent Joseph Waller, Chicago Police Department ("CPD") Officer Joseph Zaccagnino, Sprint Records Custodian Ray Clarke, Christy Miskell, ATF Special Agent Kevin Schuster, United States Secret Service ("SS") Special Agent Michael Saccomen, Robert Berk, Sidney McKamey, Tim Kucharski, Kim Hofsteadter, Kensha Barlow, and retired Oak Park Police Department Officer Robert Taylor. Defendant called Agent Labno and Michael Murphy to testify at trial. Defendant Kelsey Jones did not testify at trial.

The jury found Defendant guilty on Counts One, Seven, Ten, Thirteen, and Fourteen - all counts against him. (R. 309.) The jury also found that at least 28 grams of mixtures containing cocaine base were involved in the offense charged in Count One. Defendant now moves for a judgment of acquittal or new trial, pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 and 33, respectively. (R. 346, 422.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal - Rule 29

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 29(a) provides that, "[a]fter the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion mustenter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).

"In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, [a defendant] bears a heavy, indeed, nearly insurmountable, burden." United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Miller, 782 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2015) ("We have referred to this standard as a nearly insurmountable hurdle[.]") (inner quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); United States v. Molton, 743 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Torres-Chavez, 744 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339-40 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Berg, 640 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Dinga, 609 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2009). The reviewing court must view the "evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution," and the defendant "'must convince' the court that, even in that light, 'no rational trier of fact could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Moore, 572 F.3d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 2009)); see also United States v. Eller, 670 F.3d 762, 765 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Doody, 600 F.3d 752, 754 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that the inquiry is "whether evidence exists from which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt"). In other words, a court will "set aside a jury's guilty verdict only if 'the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed,' from which a jury could have returned a conviction." United States v. Presbitero, 569 F.3d 691, 704 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Moses, 513 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2008)); see also Warren, 593 F.3d at 546. It follows that under Rule 29, courts "do not reassess the weight of the evidence or second-guess the trier of fact's credibility determinations." United States v. Arthur, 582 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Severson, 569 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2009).This strict standard is in recognition that "[s]orting the facts and inferences is a task for the jury." Warren, 593 F.3d at 547. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit teaches that:

[t]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Moore, 572 F.3d at 337 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)).

II. Motion for a New Trial - Rule 33

Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a); see also United States v. Berg, 714 F.3d 490, 500 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Smith, 674 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2012) (reviewing a district court's order on a Rule 33 motion for abuse of discretion); United States v. McGee, 408 F.3d 966, 979 (7th Cir. 2005). "'[C]ourts have interpreted [Rule 33] to require a new trial in the interests of justice in a variety of situations in which the substantial rights of the defendant have been jeopardized by errors or omissions during trial.'" United States v. Eberhart, 388 F.3d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 470 (7th Cir. 1989)), overruled on other grounds, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S. Ct. 403, 163 L. Ed. 2d 14 (2005).

"'A jury verdict in a criminal case is not to be overturned lightly,'" however, "'and therefore a Rule 33 motion is not to be granted lightly.'" Eberhart, 388 F.3d at 1048 (quoting United States v. Santos, 20 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 1994)). The court "may grant a new trial if the jury's verdict is 'so contrary to the weight of the evidence that a new trial is required in theinterest of justice.'" United States v. Washington, 184 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The focus in a motion for a new trial is not on whether the testimony is so incredible that it should have been excluded. Rather, the court considers whether the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, taking into account the credibility of the witnesses."); see also United States v. Chambers, 642 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2011). In other words, "[t]he court should grant a motion for a new trial only if the evidence 'preponderate[s] heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.'" United States v. Swan, 486 F.3d 260, 266 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Reed, 875 F.2d 107, 113 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also Presbitero, 569 F.3d at 706.

ANALYSIS

I. The Evidence Was More than Sufficient to Convict Defendant

The jury found Defendant guilty of Counts One, Seven, Ten, Thirteen, and Fourteen. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact easily could have found Defendant guilty on each of these five counts.

A. Drug Charges

Count One charged Defendant Kelsey Jones with conspiring with Toby Jones and others to intentionally possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count Seven charged Defendant with knowingly and intentionally distributing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the government established at trial that Defendant Kelsey Jones.

In order to prove Defendant guilty of the drug conspiracy, the government had to prove that the drug conspiracy existed and that Defendant knowingly became a member of it with anintent to advance the conspiracy. Defendant's own statements to Agent Labno in April 2014 regarding his participation in the conspiracy provide enough evidence to convict Defendant on this count. Defendant admitted to Agent Labno that he sold cocaine and heroin...