United States v. Multani

• Decision Date: 18 February 2021
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:19-cv-01789-BJR
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. BALDEV SINGH MULTANI, Defendant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. BALDEV SINGH MULTANI, Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:19-cv-01789-BJR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

February 18, 2021

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant Baldev Singh Multani's Motion to Dismiss the United States' Complaint seeking his denaturalization. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 18 ("Mot."). Having reviewed the Motion, the opposition thereto, the record of the case, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court will deny the Motion. The reasoning for the Court's decision follows.

II. BACKGROUND

In reviewing the facts of the case, the Court adheres to the general principle that on a motion to dismiss all facts are presumed in favor of the non-moving party. Ariix, LLC v. NutriSearch Corp., 985 F.3d. 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 2021).

According to the United States, Defendant originally entered the country at Miami International Airport from his native India as a stowaway on September 26, 1992 under the name Baldev Singh. Compl., Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 8. Under that name, the United States alleges Defendant went through deportation proceedings, including a failed asylum application, and was ordered deported pursuant to the order of an immigration judge which became final on February 14, 1994. Id. ¶¶ 9-42. The United States claims Defendant, as Baldev Singh, never left the country after he was ordered to do so, having been paroled into the United States pending his deportation proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 16, 43. Defendant, however, claims he is not Baldev Singh and that those deportation proceedings are unrelated to him. Mot. at 2-3.

According to the United States, after Defendant failed to leave the country, he filed a second asylum application under the name Baldev Singh Multani on October 5, 1994, claiming to have entered the United States on August 10, 1994 near Brownsville, Texas. Compl. ¶¶ 44-62. Before this asylum claim could be adjudicated, Defendant married a United States citizen on May 2, 1997, who filed a Petition for Alien Relative on his behalf. Id. ¶¶ 63-77. The United States granted the petition on October 21, 1998. Id. ¶ 78. Defendant subsequently applied first for legal permanent residence status and then naturalization, and both applications were granted. Id. ¶¶ 79-118. On February 14, 2006, Defendant became a United States citizen. Id. ¶ 119. He now lives in Washington State with his wife and children. Id. ¶ 4; Mot. at 5.

On November 4, 2019, the United States initiated the present civil action under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (Revocation of Naturalization) seeking to revoke Defendant's naturalization on the grounds that he concealed material facts and made willful misrepresentations in obtaining his status, having lied in his applications about his previous deportation order. See generally Compl.,Dkt. No. 1. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the United States' Complaint on three grounds: (1) the action is untimely under either a Statute of Limitations or Laches; (2) revocation of naturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) violates Substantive Due Process; and (3) the procedures of denaturalization violate Procedural Due Process. See generally Mot., Dkt. No. 18.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, a Complaint should be dismissed where it fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The standard for raising a plausible claim for relief is establish by the familiar Supreme Court cases Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and holds that "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief with well-pleaded facts demonstrating the pleader's entitlement to relief can survive a motion to dismiss." Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d. 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2021). The Court's task in the present Motion is to "'determine whether [the well-pleaded factual allegations] plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'" Ariix, 985 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). In doing so, the Court "'accept[s] all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Id. (quoting Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness Pursuant to Statute of Limitations and/or Laches

Defendant first seeks dismissal of the United States' denaturalization action claiming it is barred by either Statute of Limitations and/or the common law defense of Laches having been initiated over a decade after Defendant became a U.S. citizen and nearly three decades after theUnited States accuses him of unlawfully entering the country. Mot. at 3-5.

1. Statute of Limitations

The Revocation of Naturalization statute does not contain a Statute of Limitations. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1451. As such, Defendant argues it is appropriate for the Court to adopt either the five-year Statute of Limitations provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2462 or an analogous Statute of Limitations from Washington State law.

First, as Defendant concedes, application of the Statute of Limitations found in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 to actions under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) is barred by the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Phattey, 943 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2019). There, the Ninth Circuit held that civil denaturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) is not a penalty, but, instead, intended merely "to remedy a past fraud by taking back a benefit to which an alien is not entitled." Id. at 1279. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the Statute of Limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462—which is a catch-all Statute of Limitations applicable to statutes imposing a penalty—does not apply in the denaturalization context. Id. at 1283.

Second, Defendant's argument that the Court should adopt a Washington State Statute of Limitations in the absence of an applicable federal Statute of Limitations pursuant to Congress Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am. (UAW), AFL-CIO v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966) is also unavailing. In UAW, the Supreme Court determined that since Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947—which provides federal district court jurisdiction over collective bargaining contract disputes—contained no Statute of Limitations, it was appropriate to adopt an analogous Statute of Limitations from state law. Id. at 704-05. Thus, "[t]raditionally, when a federal statute creating a right of action[does] not include a limitations period, courts [] apply the limitations period of the 'closest state analogue.'" McGreevey v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 897 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 378 (2004)); see also Oneida Cty., N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 240 (1985) ("In the absence of a controlling federal limitations period, the general rule is that a state limitations period for an analogous cause of action is borrowed and applied to the federal claim, provided that the application of the state statute would not be inconsistent with underlying federal policies.").

These circumstances are inapplicable here, however, as in the present action the United States acts in its sovereign capacity to enforce federal law. As the Ninth Circuit has previously stated, when the government is acting "in its sovereign capacity to enforce significant public rights and interests . . . in the absence of a specific federal statute of limitation, the borrowing of the state statute of limitations [is] not intended by the Congress." Donovan v. W. Coast Detective Agency, Inc., 748 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Lance, 617 F.2d 365, 372 (5th Cir. 1980), supplemented, 635 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[S]tate statutes of limitation are not applicable to suits by a federal agency to enforce rights of the sovereign.").

This finding accords with federal policy regarding denaturalization proceedings. Defendant has failed to provide, and the Court has been unable to locate, a single case applying a state Statute of Limitations to a denaturalization action. Instead, every court that has addressed the applicability of a Statute of Limitations, albeit most often in the 28 U.S.C. § 2462 context, has held that Congress's lack of a Statute of Limitations in 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) was intended to provide the United States leeway to bring such actions unburdened by a timeliness limitation. See, e.g., United States v. Rahman, No. 19-cv-1113-PB, 2020 WL 5236931, at *2 (D.N.H. Sept. 2, 2020)(listing cases); see also Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 283 (1961) ("Congress has not enacted a time bar applicable to proceedings to revoke citizenship procured by fraud."); United States v. Wang, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ("[C]ase law demonstrates conclusively that the Government may institute a denaturalization proceeding at any time regardless of how many years have passed since citizenship was granted to a defendant."). As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Phattey, "Congress's authority over naturalization stems from its power to 'establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization. The Supreme Court has recognized that this constitutional authority gives Congress the power to impose 'prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship.'" 943 F.3d at 1281 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. and Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981)). As such, the Court finds adopting a state Statute of Limitations is inappropriate in this circumstance.

2. Laches

Laches is an equitable defense "designed to prevent injury to the party asserting it, if such injury is caused by his opponent's delay." State ex rel. Randall v. Snohomish Cty., 488 P.2d 511, 512 (Wash. 1971); see also Tupper v. Tupper, 478 P.3d 1132, 1141 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020) ("Laches is an equitable...