United States v. Nakaladski, 72-3441.

Decision Date08 July 1973
Docket NumberNo. 72-3441.,72-3441.
Citation481 F.2d 289
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis NAKALADSKI, a/k/a Louis Nash, Ettore Coco, a/k/a Eddie Coco, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

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Milton E. Grusmark, Miami Beach, Fla., for Louis Nakaladski.

Frank Ragano, Miami, Fla., for Eddie Coco.

Robert W. Rust, U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., Marshall Tamor Golding, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BELL, GOLDBERG and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:

Appellants, Louis Nakaladski, a/k/a Louis Nash hereinafter "Nash", and Ettore Coco, a/k/a Eddie Coco hereinafter "Coco", were convicted of violating various anti-loan sharking provisions of Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 891 et seq. Specifically, they were found guilty of: (1) conspiring to make and making extortionate extensions of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 892;1 (2) conspiring to participate and participating in the use of an extortionate means to collect an extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894;2 and (3) obstructing commerce by extortion in violation of the anti-racketeering provisions of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Appellants attack their convictions on numerous grounds; however, we find that appellants received a full and fair trial and that there is ample evidence to support their convictions. We affirm.

I. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Appellants were charged in an eightcount indictment with various violations of federal laws outlawing extortionate credit practices. At the trial, the government presented evidence concerning appellants' credit loan transactions with the two victims named in the indictment, Joel Whitice and Richard Besola, in order to prove the crimes charged in the indictment. The government also introduced evidence concerning similar extortionate credit transactions appellants had with other individuals in order to establish appellants' intent and their general conspiratorial course of conduct.

Viewed in a light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680, 704, the evidence introduced at the trial established that Coco, Nash, and one James Michael Falco3 were in the loan sharking business together as early as 1966. During that year they began to transact some of their business in the offices of one Harvey Goodman, a mortgage and insurance broker. Goodman testified that he heard discussions concerning the making of loans and collections. When Nash or Falco arranged to make a loan in Coco's absence they would telephone Coco to obtain his approval. On one occasion, Falco objected to a loan that Nash wanted to make on the ground that there had been difficulties in collecting a previous loan from the prospective borrower, but when Coco said that Nash would be responsible for collecting the new loan, it was approved.

The interest on the loans that Falco, Nash, and Coco made was shown to be highly usurious: (1) a $3,000 loan was repayable at the rate of $1,000 a month for four months; (1) a $400 loan, with $200 interest, was repayable at the rate of $50 a week. At one point Nash offered to extend loans to any of Goodman's customers who needed money at interest rates of "up to five percent per week."

Nash used Goodman's office to telephone borrowers in order to make collections. Goodman testified that on at least one occasion Nash threatened a delinquent debtor by saying "you better have our money there at one o'clock or I'll feed you your eyeballs." In April of 1967 Nash told Goodman that he needed "another strong man to work for him for collections," and Goodman offered to get in touch with a man named Raymond Seaman, who had a reputation "as muscle": Nash hired Seaman, whom he later described as "a good man, except he had a big mouth." After Seaman was found dead in a canal as a result of an automobile accident, Nash told Goodman, in the presence of Coco and Falco that Seaman "fell in the canal—nobody cared." Goodman testified that at that time "Mr. Coco did not say anything. He just smiled."

Appellants also advanced money to an individual named Leo Henzel. When Henzel received a $1,500 loan from Nash in November 1966, he was told "just as easy as you get it, that's how easy we want it back." The terms of the loans were that he was to pay $300 per week interest until he had paid back the entire principal. This loan was finally settled eight or nine months later with a $1,800 payment, by that time Henzel had already paid $4,500 to $5,000 in interest, making his total payment on the $1,500 loan between $6,300 and $6,800. When Henzel became delinquent in his payments, Nash called him and used obscene language in demanding the money. On several occasions, Nash informed him that the source of the loan money was "underworld elements, Mafia, and so forth."

Nash also lent $2,000 to Martin Davidow in October, 1966, on the condition that Davidow pay $150 per week for twenty weeks. In December of 1966, Davidow borrowed another $3,000, the terms being that he was to pay $150 in interest and $150 on the principal, in addition to the $150 from the October loan, for a total payment of $450. In February 1967, Davidow borrowed another $3,000, on the same terms as his December 1966 loan, raising his total weekly payment to $750. A few months later, Davidow borrowed from Nash again, bringing his total loan to approximately $10,000 and his total weekly payments to approximately $900. In the middle of 1969, Davidow fell about $1,000 behind in payments and arranged with Nash to pay $250 per week interest and nothing on the principal. By this time he had paid approximately $15,000 in interest and still owed the full $10,000 principal. When Davidow fell behind in his payments, Nash told Davidow that he "had better pay and that he Nash was aware of the fact that . . . Davidow had a wife and children." On another occasion Nash told Davidow that when a man named "Gee-Gee" had fallen behind in his payments, Nash had sent a couple of people to "straighten Gee-Gee out" by beating him up and that "Gee-Gee was making payments now."

In June or July of 1966, Joel Whitice procured his first loan from Falco. Whitice made most of his payments to Falco, who was accompanied by Nash and Coco on a number of occasions when he came to collect from Whitice. At other times Whitice also made payments to Nash or Coco. During this time Whitice operated a retail grocery business, Food Palace, Inc., in partnership with another man, selling items manufactured in various parts of the country. His initial loan was for $10,000, which he paid back in approximately one year with weekly payments of $300. In December of 1967, Whitice borrowed another $4,000, and in June he increased his total debt to $12,000. He paid interest on these loans at the rate of $25 per $1,000 per week, and by June of 1968 his total interest payment was $300 per week. By September of 1969, Whitice had paid approximately $27,600 in interest, and still owed the full $12,000 principal.

Whitice had borrowed the money for his grocery business and he made payments from the receipts of the business. While keeping up his payments to Falco, however, he fell behind in his payments to his suppliers. In June of 1969, the major supplier filed a complaint in state court alleging defaults on securities and promissory notes and sought the appointment of a receiver to take over the operation of Whitice's business. After negotiations, a stipulation was entered into permitting Whitice to operate the business for an interim period, on the condition that all checks had to be counter-signed by an accountant representing the supplier. The stipulation also provided that no payments of preexisting claims or indebtedness were to be made during the interim period, but a specific exception was written in permitting the business to continue to make the weekly $300 payments to Falco because Whitice made it clear that he would not enter into any stipulation or agreement that did not allow him to continue making these payments. He explained that if he were forced to cut the payments off, it might result in harm to him or his family. The accountant representing the supplier recalled that Whitice stated that he was in fear of his life, and the supplier's attorney recalled Whitice saying, in effect, that if he could not make the payments he might as well jump out the window. The supplier's representatives therefore agreed to permit the payments to be made.

After the receiver took over Whitice's grocery business, Falco visited Whitice to inquire whether the latter had any property on which he could give a mortgage. Upon receiving a negative response, Falco said that he would forget the interest if Whitice could repay the principal, whereupon he was informed that the latter had no money at all. Later, after Whitice had gone into the bail bond business, Falco asked for further payments. Around May of 1970, Falco called from New Jersey and asked that money be mailed to him, and Whitice sent a check. Still later Falco called again and told Whitice not to send any more checks, and arranged to have money picked up from time to time at Whitice's office.

Richard Besola, a general building contractor, also procured a loan from Falco. In 1967, he needed money, and one of his subcontractors, a man named Rappa, contacted Falco, from whom Besola eventually received a $3,000 check. Besola was to pay the money back within thirty or sixty days, with an additional $600 as interest. When six or seven weeks went by and Besola had not repaid the loan, Coco visited him at his job site and told him that he had "made a deal" and had "better live up to it." Besola then commenced making weekly payments of $100, initially to sub-contractor Rappa, but later,...

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