United States v. New York & O.S.S. Co.
Decision Date | 26 April 1914 |
Docket Number | 153. |
Citation | 216 F. 61 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. NEW YORK & O.S.S. CO., Limited. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
The bill was brought in the old Circuit Court under the Tucker Act to recover $1,199.42 unpaid balance of hire earned by the transportation of certain government stores from New York to Manila in 1902 on board the petitioner's steamship Shimosa.
The petition was filed on November 5, 1906, after long negotiations with the government for the payment of the claim. On December 28, 1906, the United States attorney for the Southern district of New York filed a general appearance on behalf of the defendant.
A demurrer was filed based on two grounds: (1) That the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (2) That the court had not jurisdiction of the subject of the action. The demurrer was signed by the United States attorney without reservation as to the nature of his appearance. The first ground of the demurrer was not urged in the District Court or in this court. The demurrer was overruled; the opinion being reported in 202 F. 311. The government thereupon answered, and the case was tried on the merits; the court directing a decree for the full amount claimed. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were signed by the judge as required by the Tucker Act (Act March 3 1887, c. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 752)).
The assignments of error raise two questions: 1. The jurisdiction of the District Court. 2. The correctness of the findings that under section 3 of the Harter Act the steamship company was not liable for the damage admitted to have been sustained by the government's cargo during the voyage.
H Snowden Marshall, U.S. Atty., of New York City (Addison S Pratt, Asst. U.S. Atty., of New York City, of counsel), for the United States.
Convers and Kirlin, of New York City (John M. Woolsey and Cletus Keating, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before LACOMBE, WARD, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
ROGERS Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
The petition alleges that the petitioner is 'a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. ' A corporation is a citizen of the country or state by which it is incorporated, and it has its residence in such country or state and not elsewhere. In Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co. (1892) 145 U.S. 444, 450, 12 Sup.Ct. 935, 937 (36 L.Ed. 768), Mr. Justice Gray declared that:
'The legal existence, the home, the domicile, the habitat, the residence, the citizenship of the corporation can only be in the state by which it was created, although it may do business in other states whose laws permit it.'
And in Insurance Company v. Francis (1870) 11 Wall. 210, 216 (20 L.Ed. 77), Mr. Justice Davis said:
We must conclude, therefore, that this suit is brought by an alien and a resident of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. This makes it necessary to consider the conditions under which an alien residing outside the United States can maintain an action against the United States.
The United States cannot be sued either by a private individual or by a state without its consent. Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70, 29 Sup.Ct. 31, 53 L.Ed. 92; Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331, 27 Sup.Ct. 388, 51 L.Ed. 510. And consent by the United States to be sued must be evidenced by an act of Congress. Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255, 16 Sup.Ct. 754, 40 L.Ed. 960; Hill v. United States, 9 How. 386. Government officers cannot waive the government's privilege in this respect. Their consent that such a suit may be brought cannot bind the government of the United States. Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433, 25 L.Ed. 209.
Congress has made provision whereby under certain limitations suits may be brought against the government, in the courts of the United States, although no consent has ever been given that it may be sued in a state court in any case. Stanley v. Schwalby, supra. The question now presented to the court is whether any act of Congress authorized the District Court to assume jurisdiction of the case at bar.
In 1855 Congress created the Court of Claims (Act Feb. 24, 1855, c. 122, 10 Stat.L. 612, 614) and conferred upon it jurisdiction to hear and determine 'all claims' of the character enumerated in the act. There was nothing in the act distinguishing claims by aliens from claims brought by citizens.
In 1863 Congress passed the Captured and Abandoned Property Act (Act March 12, 1863, c. 120, 12 Stat. L. 820, 821) which authorized 'any person' who claimed as owner of any such property to prefer his claim for the proceeds thereof in the Court of Claims. Under this act it was held that aliens could file such claims, and the court appears to have been of the opinion that it had jurisdiction of any suit brought by an alien. Scharfer's Case, 4 Ct.Cl. 529, 532; Wagner's Case, 5 Ct.Cl. 637, 638.
In 1868 Congress forbade the bringing of any suit in any court by an alien under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act (Act July 27, 1868, c. 276, 15 St.L. 243). It contained, however, a provision that:
'This section shall not be construed so as to deprive aliens who are citizens or subjects of any government which accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against such government in its courts, of the privilege of prosecuting claims against the United States in the Court of Claims, as now provided by law.'
The Revised Statutes defining the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims provide as follows:
The Tucker Act, under which this suit was brought, was passed by Congress on March 3, 1887 (24 Stat.L. 50506). And the pertinent portions of that act are as follows:
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